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**CYPRUS IN NATO'S
MEDITERRANEAN POLICY**

**PUBLISHING HOUSE HAYIA
THE MAIN EDITION (COLLECTION OF
ORIENTAL LITERATURE)**

Moscow 1982

Source: Cyprus in NATO's Mediterranean Policy, Vladimir Alexandrovich Shmarov, Academy of Sciences of the USSR of the Order of Labour! (RED BANNER INSTITUTE of Oriental Studies), Publishing House Hayia, The Main Edition (Collection of Oriental Literature), Moscow 1982.

Language: Russian

*English Translation and transcription by
The Socialist Truth in Cyprus-London Bureaux*

<http://www.st-cyprus.co.uk>



&

Direct Democracy (Communist Party)

www.directdemocracy4u.uk

<http://www.directdemocracy4u.uk/cominform>



E-Book: January 2021

**ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE USSR
OF THE ORDER OF LABOUR!
(RED BANNER INSTITUTE of Oriental Studies)**

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Executive Editor, B. M. POUXBEPHA

The book examines the main directions of imperialism in the Mediterranean region, the place in this policy of the Republic of Cyprus, turned by the NATO countries into the epicentre of an acute conflict situation, analyses the inter-imperialist contradictions and the desire of Western diplomacy to implement a backstage solution to the Cyprus problem. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of the struggle of the Cypriot people for a just settlement of the conflict, showing the principled and consistent position of the USSR as an important factor of peace and security, contributing to the preservation of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state of Cyprus.

The main editorial office of oriental literature of the
Nauka Publishing House, 1982.

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INTRODUCTION

The Republic of Cyprus has a difficult, dramatic fate. The situation in this small island state of the Eastern Mediterranean has been one of the pressing international issues of recent decades. This issue practically does not leave the agenda of the General Assembly and the UN Security Council, it is discussed at many other international forums (conferences of non-aligned countries, Muslim states, various public organisations, etc.).

The dramatic situation that has developed in Cyprus is a consequence of the policy of the militaristic circles of the United States and NATO, aimed at eliminating the Republic of Cyprus as an independent and sovereign state, at turning it into a stronghold of the North Atlantic bloc in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. The Cyprus problem is the problem of incessant outside interference in the internal affairs of the state, in the life of the Cypriot people, in relations between the country's two national communities—the Greek and Turkish. It is this kind of interference that has created and continues to create numerous obstacles to the establishment of friendship and sincere cooperation between the Greek and Turkish population of the island, to the achievement of a just and lasting settlement of the problem as a whole.

The nature and content of the Cyprus question is fully revealed by the following provision of the 26th Congress of the CPSU: "The imperialists are not satisfied with the strengthening of the independence of the liberated countries. In thousands of ways and means they are trying to tie these countries to themselves in

order to more freely dispose of their natural resources, use their territory in their strategic designs. At the same time, the old method of the colonialists “divide and rule!” is widely used” [11, p. 14].

Specific manifestations of interventionist NATO politicians became inspired by its agents on the island intercommunal clashes in 1963, 1964 and 1967 years, accompanied by a sharp exacerbation of the situation throughout the Eastern Mediterranean. But the events of 1974 were especially tragic for Cyprus, when the reactionary officers of the former Athenian junta committed an anti-government rebellion, and in response to Turkey sent him an expeditionary force to the island “which in the course of two military operations put under control of about 40% of the Cypriot territory. The consequences of those events persist. Describing successes, achieved by peace-loving forces in the formation of the process of detente, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Leonid Brezhnev warned at the 25th Congress of the CPSU: “But we cannot fail to see the negative aspects. In Europe, in particular, there is still such a complex and dangerous knot of tension as the Cyprus problem” [10, p. 19].

The Cyprus problem is a complex, multi-layered problem, overgrown under the influence of imperialist policy with numerous internal and external aspects. If the history of the Republic of Cyprus in terms of relations between the Greek and Turkish populations is an alternation of crises that turned into armed clashes due to active incitement from the outside, then the external aspects of the Cyprus problem seem to justify such an order of things in which foreign intervention is

legalised. The latter is the result of the colonial policy of England, which in the mid-50s clashed Greece and Turkey over the Cyprus issue, and then the intervention of the United States and NATO.

The legal basis for the so-called external aspects Cyprus' problem is the system of guarantees under the Zurich-London agreements between England, Greece and Turkey. These agreements, designed to ensure the Republic of Cyprus sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity were in fact used to establish imperialist control over the island and led to an intensification of the struggle, in fact, not between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, but the people of Cyprus with imperialism. In the form in which the Cyprus problem has developed by now, it is a manifestation of the contradictions between imperialism and the national liberation movement of the people, although it has an interstate character. In the report of the Central Committee of the Progressive Party of the Working People of Cyprus (AKEL) to the XII Congress (1970) it is noted: "Our party will never cease to assert that the main enemy of the Cypriot people, even after the declaration of independence of the Republic of Cyprus, remains imperialism, and above all the American and British ... turn Cyprus into their strategic base in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. want to make the island their unsinkable "aircraft carrier", from where they could block the Arab peoples, help their puppets in Israel and strike at the Middle East and socialist states in the event of a new aggression." [112, 1970, no. 7, p. 23].

In his report to the 15th Party Congress, AKEL Secretary General E. Papaioannou noted the contribution of the people of Cyprus to the cause of

peace and pointed out the inextricable link between the struggle for a just solution of the Cyprus problem and the general struggle of peoples for detente, democracy, independence and social progress. [111, 16.V. 1982].

In other words, the international aspects of the Cyprus problems dominate internal ones, have decisive impact on the situation in the country and on developments in the Eastern Mediterranean. The consideration usually comes down to policy analysis USA and in Soviet scientific literature, such no research. Related to this topic information contained in individual articles and monographs that relate to the Cypriot policy of Atlantic circles, as it were, in passing, which, on the other hand, creates a far from complete picture of both the essence of this policy and the place of Cyprus in it. Published works on Cyprus B. M. Potskhveriya [62], E. I. Urazova (65), S. M. Leonidova [54], O.B Shparo [71] consider the policy of imperialism only in accordance with the tasks of research.

Against the background of the great attention paid by the Soviet orientalist school to the analysis of the imperialist policy towards young developing states, this circumstance speaks in favor of a special development of the topic, and not only the functional orientation of the NATO intervention mechanism, but also a detailed examination of the elements participating in this mechanism.

The methodological basis of this work was the classic works of V. I. Lenin, documents and materials of the XXIV, XXV and XXVI congresses of the CPSU, statements of the Soviet government, speeches of leaders! (PSS and the Soviet state, documents of the international communist and workers' movement. Lenin to investigate the whole sum of factors and facts that

are associated with this or that social phenomenon. In the article “Regret and shame” V. I. Lenin noted that “all crises reveal the essence of phenomena or processes, sweep away the superficial, small, external, reveal deeper foundations of what is happening “. (5, p. 245). This Leninist position fully refers to the Cyprus crisis, which, being a military-political phenomenon, is analyzed in the totality of the forces involved in it.

Lenin’s principles of support for the national liberation struggle of peoples serve as a reliable guide to the consideration of the position of the USSR in the Cyprus question. Emphasizing the fundamental difference between Soviet diplomacy in relation to peoples fighting for their independence and the corresponding policy of the imperialist powers, V. I. Lenin noted that Soviet Russia should base its relations with the young states “on a complete break with the barbaric policy of bourgeois civilisation, which built the welfare of exploiters in a select few nations on the enslavement of hundreds of millions of working people in Asia, in the colonies in general and in small countries” [1, p. 222].

All of the above provides a basis for the presentation of the author’s concept, which determines the specific task of the study. In general terms, this concept is as follows. The exacerbated bourgeois nationalism in Greece and Turkey threatened to turn into a war between these countries, which would destroy the southeastern flank of NATO. The situation around the Cyprus problem opened up the possibility of control over the process of increasing tension in Greek-Turkish relations, made it possible to postpone the conflict territorially, transferring it to the island, and at the same time to drag Cyprus into the orbit of the

Atlantic policy. Cyprus was assigned the role of, so to speak, a “displaced conflict place” designed to localize the Greek-Turkish contradictions within its borders. Thus, the Cypriot state plunged into the abyss of a serious crisis.

Hence, the two-pronged nature of the problem in this work. On the one hand, it is necessary to investigate the mechanism of NATO intervention and the factors and forces acting in it; show the features of the positions of interested NATO and EEC states (USA, England, Germany, France); to reveal the consequences of the destabilisation of the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, the position of Greece and Turkey on the Cyprus issue and the evolution of their foreign policy. On the other hand, the situation in the Republic of Cyprus after the events of 1974 must be considered; show the increasing role of the UN in the search for a just solution to the Cyprus problem; to reveal the content of the principled and consistent position of the USSR; to highlight the state of friendly Soviet-Cypriot relations as an important factor in protecting the Republic of Cyprus from external encroachments and strengthening its international positions.

The author considered it expedient to solve the problem posed by showing the mechanism of imperialist intervention, then analysing and generalizing the main consequences of the tactics of destabilisation. In this formulation of the question, the policy of Atlanticism towards Cyprus is considered in the context of the situation in the entire Eastern Mediterranean.

The study is conditionally limited to the chronological framework of the 70s. It was during this period that the highest spheres of NATO appreciated the increased military-strategic value of Cyprus, the

dominance over which makes it possible to establish control over the shortest transport and trade routes, as well as over the approaches to the Middle East oil reserves, which are of particular importance in the context of the energy crisis and currency turmoil.

When writing the book, the author used materials sessions of the NATO Council, as well as documents of the North Atlantic Assembly, which is an advisory body of the block. The voluminous volumes of these materials could would build a decent library, but the dark corridors of Atlantic politics are afraid of the light, and for good reason even the co-chair of the North Atlantic assembly on the southern flank of NATO, US Senator S. Nunn complained that the sessions of the Council of the North Atlantic bloc devoted to the discussion Cyprus problem, “took place in an atmosphere of secrecy and obtaining accurate information is difficult.” [29].

An important source was the UN documents on Cyprus, adopted during the period under review. Basically, these include resolutions of the General Assembly and the UN Security Council, the reports of the Secretary General on the situation in Cyprus, speeches by representatives of different countries at plenary meetings and during discussions in a special political committee. The UN resolutions, which represent an alternative to the “secret” approach of NATO to the Cyprus problem, clearly formulate the fundamental principles of the Cyprus settlement.

The book makes extensive use of research by Western historians, who generally reject the structural nature of the Cyprus problem, shifting the emphasis in the interpretation of aspects of the crisis situation, obscuring the root cause of its occurrence. For example, the American authors R. Howe, S. Trott [77] and L.

Stern [85], the English historian R. Stefane [86] and a number of others impose on their readers a misconception about the Cyprus problem as a phenomenon of modern international relations, which arose and continues to exist as a result of the ethnic factor. Leading to the idea of the national incompatibility of the Cypriots of Greek and Turkish origin, they, in fact, justify the neo-colonialist policy of NATO, the preservation of foreign military bases and troops in Cyprus, trying to pass them off as a “guarantor of stability”.

These views are opposed by the views of Greek, Turkish and Cypriot authors who believe that the dramatic events in Cyprus are the result of an action planned by the United States. N. Psirukis [102], D. Hondrakukis [104], H. Bayulken [73], H. Ulman [89], O. Kyurkchuoglu [81] unanimously accuse the Athenian junta, acting at the behest of Washington, of being an organizer, suppressed the anti-government rebellion in Cyprus and thus provoked Turkey to retaliate. Although the views of these authors are not free from bourgeois nationalist ideology, in general they are characterized by a realistic approach to assessing Atlantic politics and its impact on the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In this paper, an attempt is made to understand the origins of the Cyprus crisis, which threatens the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, the interests of peace and international security.

OBJECTIVES OF THE CYPRUS ATLANTIC POLICY

From the very beginning of the existence of the North Atlantic bloc, at numerous sessions of the NATO Council, at meetings of chiefs of staff and other meetings of senior officials, increased attention was paid to the “southern flank”. The reasons for such serious attention to it boil down to the importance of this zone in the overall Atlantic strategy.

Geographically, this flank covers the southern European theater, which includes the territories of Turkey, Greece and Italy with their washing waters, as well as the Black Sea zone. It is strategically adjacent to Cyprus, some coastal Arab states and Israel, although they are not part of the NATO system. However, as noted in document No. MC/SF/75/3, presented in 1975 by the NATO Military Committee to the bloc’s foreign ministers, “these several territories, regardless of their geographic boundaries, exert varying degrees of influence on the NATO flank. are directly related to it and have “stabilizing importance” for the entire region. These include Cyprus, which is the key to the emergence of destabilizing crises in the Eastern Mediterranean and therefore requires a special approach” [29, p. 1].

The insular character and convenient position of the Republic of Cyprus at the junction of three continents - Europe, Asia and Africa—have long been tempting the NATO leadership to turn its territory into a springboard for its expansionist policy in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. From a strategic point of view, Cyprus is considered as one of the strongholds of the 11 air-sea

area of military operations, which should ensure the conduct of major operations against the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community, to undermine the national liberation movement of the peoples of the Middle East and Africa, to provide supporting reactionary regimes in the region; and maintaining the social status quo in NATO member countries. What factors influence the definition of the main objectives of this policy and how are the goals of the Atlanticists being realised?

An important link in the basic strategy

NATO in Cyprus, as a potentially important bridgehead of its policy, is practically expressed in the basic strategy, or, as it is commonly called, the “forward-based” strategy. The system of strongholds and bases constitutes one of the components of the expansionist aggressive policy of Atlanticism, which means a military-political alliance between the United States and Western Europe, with Washington playing a decisive role. The basic strategy was extended to the Eastern Mediterranean immediately after World War II.

According to documents found in the State Archives of England, the Cypriot bases were among those objects from which it was supposed to commit aggression against the Soviet Union using atomic and biological weapons during the Cold War. According to the Times newspaper, 58 densely populated Soviet cities were planned to be subjected to barbaric bombing. In subsequent years, England, being one of the initiators of the creation of the Baghdad Pact, and then the

organisation of the countries of the Central Treaty (CENTO), considered Cyprus as the leading link in the bloc policy in the zone “east of Suez”. Moreover, if in other countries foreign bases and troops are present on the basis of certain contractual conditions, the use of the Cypriot territory has its own characteristics, which gives rise to the specifics of both the ways of implementing the “forward-based” strategy and the implementation of the Atlanticism policy towards Cyprus in general.

The specific features of the Cyprus problem have arisen historically and, paradoxically, are associated with the liberation of Cyprus from almost a century of British colonial rule and with the proclamation of it as an independent and sovereign state.

Finally convinced that, under the pressure of the national liberation movement, they would have to leave Cyprus, the colonialists did so on the basis of the “leave to stay” principle. In 1959, at a conference in Zurich, a preliminary Greek-Turkish agreement was signed, which formed the basis for the decisions of the London Conference of representatives of England, Greece and Turkey with the participation of the leaders of the Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus.

The Zurich-London agreements provided for the proclamation of the independent Republic of Cyprus and determined its state structure. However, they could not solve the Cyprus issue, as they were the result of imperialist violence and the dictates of Western diplomacy, as well as the Greek-Turkish conspiracy within NATO. Taking advantage of the difficult internal political situation on the island, and in particular the disagreements between the Greek and Turkish national communities, intensified under the influence of the

outside, the British empires imposed on Cyprus a solution to the problem that served their interests and plans in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. For example, US President D. Eisenhower wrote in a telegram to Turkish Prime Minister Menderes of February 20, 1959 that the settlement of the Cyprus issue “will undoubtedly strengthen the NATO alliance” [61, p. 37]. This statement revealed the goals that Western diplomacy pursued in the preparation of the Zurich-London agreements. With the help of these documents, the British government practically retained its privileged position in Cyprus. Large territories in the areas of Akrotiri, Dhekelia and Episkopi, where the British military bases are located, with the territorial waters adjacent to these objects, were declared “sovereign” territories of Great Britain. In addition, England secured 32 military sites scattered across the 13th island, as well as the right to use large training areas and training grounds. Under the agreements, Britain also received an unlimited right to fly military aircraft over the entire territory of the country, the right to use the airfield in Nicosia, seaports, roads, power plants and communications. Moreover, the British government obtained from the leaders of the Greek and Turkish communities an official assurance that “the Republic of Cyprus will never require the United Kingdom to protect its sovereignty and effective control over the territories where the bases are located” [86, p. 205]. In turn, the Cypriots received assurances that the “sovereign” British bases would not be transferred to third countries and NATO.

In addition, Cyprus was imposed two international treaties with the participation of England, Turkey and Greece—the Treaty of guarantees and the Treaty of

Union. Article I of the Treaty of Safeguards states: “The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the preservation of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its constitution. She undertakes not to participate in whole or in part in any political or economic union with any other state. In accordance with this, it declares prohibited any activity that may directly or indirectly contribute to either an alliance with any other state, or the division of the island.” “In the event of a violation of the provisions of this Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult with respect to the representations or measures necessary to implement these provisions. In the event that joint common actions are impossible, each of the three guarantor countries has the right to take actions for the sole purpose of restoring the state of affairs guaranteed by this Agreement.” (Article IV on the rights and obligations of guarantors) [36, p. 97].

In accordance with the Treaty of Alliance, in addition to the British military contingents of Greece and Turkey (“Greek” numbering 950 people and “Turkish”—650) were deployed on the territory of Cyprus [36, p. 98].

Thus, the Republic of Cyprus is the only state in the world, whose internal affairs can be intervened unilaterally and on a “legal basis” by foreign states. Moreover, according to the Zurich-London agreements, Cyprus does not have the right to revise its own constitution: changes can only be made with the consent of the guarantor countries. The Cypriot representatives did not take part in the development of the basic law, it was not discussed or approved by the Cypriot government, but was imposed on the small

people. The English researcher R. Stefane writes in his book *Cyprus—Arms Depot*: “Makarios and Kuchuk were taken to London on an English military plane after the discussion of the Cyprus issue was completed. Two Cypriot leaders were invited to comply with a pure formality: they had to confirm, regardless of whether they liked the constitution or not, the final agreement that was imposed on them” [86, p. 160).

A historical excursion shows that the calculations on Cyprus as a potential NATO base were so absolutized by Western politicians that even at the sharpest turns in the development of events on the island, they did not allow even a hint of agreeing to give up their military presence.

Interest in the “natural aircraft carrier” arose among the NATO generals back in 1952, when an attempt was made to locate the NATO headquarters in Nicosia. Then it was planned to create a new command for the Mediterranean and the Middle East. However, the strengthening of the independent, sovereign and territorially integral Republic of Cyprus, pursuing a policy of non-alignment, created an obstacle to the implementation of plans to turn the island into a stronghold of imperialism. In addition, the Zurich-London agreements themselves, although they actually established control over Cyprus, significantly limiting its independence, did not create loopholes for NATO militarist circles to expand their military presence. London’s commitment not to transfer bases to third countries turned out to be a serious miscalculation.

Atlantic politicians, primarily American ones, faced an obvious contradiction between their “global responsibility” and, in this regard, the need to completely subordinate Cyprus to their aggressive

aspirations and the concept of an independent Cypriot state, the determination of its people to complete one of the main goals of the national liberation struggle—eliminate foreign military bases.

Expressing the opinion of the overwhelming majority of Cypriots, the President of the Republic of Cyprus Makarios emphasized: “We will not join any political or military bloc and will not accept any foreign interference or influence in the determination and implementation of our policy” [106. 12.VIII.1967]. The Progressive Party of the Working People of Cyprus (AKEL), which is at the forefront of the struggle of the Cypriot people against imperialism and for the country’s complete independence, has put forward the elimination of British bases and the demilitarisation of Cyprus as one of the main and priority tasks. On this occasion, the resolution of the XII Congress of AKEL noted: “It is necessary that our island cease serving as a base of the imperialists directed against other peoples, and turn into a bulwark of peace, friendship and cooperation of peoples. This will be a great contribution to peace in the Middle East and on an international scale.” [59, p. 27]. Analysing this stage of the North Atlantic bloc’s Cyprus policy, the NATO Political Committee stated: “The American administrations were far from favorable to Makarios. that the President of Cyprus pursued a policy of non-alignment, which could lead to undesirable consequences for the United States in the Mediterranean. Therefore, the attitude towards Makarios as a “Mediterranean Castro” was never hidden.” [30, p. 28].

The objective incompatibility of the national interests of the Republic of Cyprus with the aggressive

goals of imperialism pushed the Atlantic circles to the most extreme forms and methods of force pressure. In the face of the decisive anti-imperialist actions of the Cypriots, led by the Progressive Party of the Working People of Cyprus and supported by all progressive forces, the goal of turning the island into a NATO base was increasingly problematic. Its achievement was also hampered under the conditions of the strengthening process of detente, which became possible as a result of the change in the balance of forces in favor of socialism.

The Atlantic strategists also took into account the fact that the Soviet Union could not and cannot be indifferent to the intensification of the activities of the imperialist powers in the zone immediately adjacent to its southern borders. The position of the USSR in relation to this region is also dictated by the principled line of its foreign policy aimed at extending the process of detente, including to the Eastern Mediterranean, at resolute support of the forces fighting for their national and social liberation. The policy of preventing the threat of a new thermonuclear war, eliminating “hot spots” and ensuring the security of all peoples, the need to be ready to resist the imperialist military in the sea and ocean theatres prompted the USSR to strengthen its military presence in the Mediterranean. The exit of the Soviet naval forces to this area was a fundamentally new factor in world politics, which had a restraining effect on the nature of the actions of imperialist circles, forced to take this factor into account, including in the implementation of their military-political plans with regard to Cyprus. In particular, the NATO leadership faced this factor at various stages of the exacerbation of the Cyprus crisis.

The crisis situation in the Eastern Mediterranean was used, however, to whip up anti-Soviet hysteria, to justify the United States "of its line of defense" at the turn of the socialist world. Under this pretext, in particular, the constant build-up of the aggressive power of the US 6th Fleet, for which Cyprus is considered as a strong point in case of war, took place.

Atlantic strategists continue to proceed from the premise that staying in the Eastern Mediterranean creates favorable conditions for a nuclear missile strike from the southwestern direction against the administrative and industrial centres of the Soviet Union. At the same time, the Western press even names specific industrial facilities—Baku, cities along the Don, in the Urals and in southern Siberia. This explains fasting 2 Zac. 193 17th Pentagon appeals to its NATO allies, in particular England, to strengthen and expand military operations on the island.

The activation of the basic strategy was justified from a conceptual point of view. According to one of the NATO bodies, "now the Mediterranean and the Middle East are becoming the decisive geopolitical region of Europe, and the fate of Western Europe will be decided 1-1 along the meridional line connecting the Baltic and Adriatic seas, and along the parallel passing through the Persian Gulf and the Atlantic coast of Morocco." [123, II-III, 1968, p. 27]. The American magazine "Y.S. News and World Report" wrote more specifically:—Waterways from the Atlantic through the Mediterranean Sea, Suez, Red Sea and Indian Ocean have always been considered the most important transport. The same can be said about the airways. Turkey is located on the east coast—NATO's eastern bastion, specially created to contain the USSR. If the

USSR in one way or another manages to seize a dominant position in this part of the world, Turkey will be cut off from NATO. The region is further strengthened by the fact that a situation may arise when hostility to the United States, which has arisen within the geographical framework of the Middle East, will automatically spread beyond the boundaries of this region" [133, 19.VI.1967].

Thus, the basic strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean has two main loads: in using numerous strongholds, including the "sovereign" British bases in Cyprus, to carry out a permanent threat to the Soviet Union, to "contain" communism; 2) using a chain of military facilities to create a kind of "cordon sanitaire" that would separate the USSR and other socialist states from the national liberation movement of the peoples of the Middle East, thereby depriving them of powerful support. It is noteworthy that, inciting anti-Soviet hysteria, certain NATO circles are making efforts to transfer the entire range of conflicts that persist in the Eastern Mediterranean as (Aegean, Cypriot, Lebanese, Middle East) B: the plane of Soviet-American confrontation. In this regard, the thesis is being circulated that, they say, the main cause of tension is not in the expansionist, aggressive policy of NATO, but allegedly in the penetration of the Soviet Union. Hence the conclusion is drawn: it is time for the US government to stand up for its own interests, which can be ensured by building up the offensive potential of NATO's southeastern flank. Similar "arguments" are given by the Beijing propaganda.

The talk about the "Soviet threat" is intended to obscure the true nature of the events taking place in the Eastern Mediterranean, to hide the true origins of

the emergence and persistence of the dangerous “arc” of crises in this area. The principled and consistent position of the Soviet Union on issues related to the state of affairs in the Eastern Mediterranean is highly appreciated by the peoples and governments of the coastal states. As the General Secretary of the party E. Papaioannou emphasized at the XII Congress of AKEL, “the presence of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean is a serious deterrent against the threat of an imperialist invasion of Cyprus” [59, p. 24]. The Turkish government stated that it considers the Mediterranean Sea open and believes that the presence of a Soviet military squadron along with the 6th American Fleet provides a certain “balance of power “ that the creation of a counterbalance in the face of the Soviet Navy is in the interests of Turkey itself, since the first the first U.S. fleet is against us.” [137, 15.VI.1971].

The implementation of the basic strategy in relation to Cyprus, which determines the entire Cypriot policy of imperialism, is greatly influenced by inter-imperialist contradictions, which are expressed in the rivalry between the two centres—the United States and Western Europe (44, p. 128). These contradictions are schematically developing within the framework of two separate integration processes - Atlanticism, personified by the United States and NATO, and Europeanism, organisationally represented by the European Economic Community (EEC). The opposition of these processes was especially clearly manifested at the turn of the 60-70s, when the United States, after the failure of the plans, the new “globalisation” of foreign policy was forced to go along the path of choosing critical areas for itself and gain a foothold in them [66, p. 34]. Among such spheres was the Eastern Mediterranean. The

retreat to “new” positions led, accordingly, to a revision of regional priorities. Cyprus has become a zone of intense U.S. diplomatic activity. The increasing value of the island as a springboard for Atlantic politics served at that time as the main criterion in determining the nature of political actions against the island state, initiated by Washington. Having deployed subversive activities against the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, expressed in the inspiration of NATO agents on the island of inter-communal clashes of 1963-1964 and 1967, American strategists tried to involve European allies in it. Under the banner of the internationalisation of the policy of intervention, the Atlanticists’ aspiration to speed up the inclusion of Cyprus into the NATO sphere was concealed: and on this basis to intensify the integration process within the bloc.

Western Europe’s response reflected the ideological platform of Europeanism, which presupposes avoiding direct involvement in conflict situations. Analysing the reaction of Western Europe to the US proposal to take collective part in the occupation of Cyprus by NATO troops in 1964 under the pretext of “appeasement”, the American researcher J. Stejenga writes in his book “UN Troops in Cyprus”: “The governments of Belgium and the Netherlands, in principle agreed to participate in this action on condition that other NATO member states join it. Although the FRG agreed, after long hesitation, it subsequently took a rather vague position. France, which is in favor of enosis as a way of solving the Cyprus problem, has declared that it does not want to be involved in the operation being carried out on the basis of the Zurich-London agreements, in which it did not take part in the preparation and which can hardly

be regarded as eternal, never-subject to change document.” [84, p. 46].

After the failure of the plan for a joint aggressive action against independent Cyprus, in which the most important: the role was played by the firm position of the Soviet Union and the government of the republic, Atlantic strategists received abundant food for thought on the topic of “limited capabilities of NATO for effective intervention.” Taking into account the realities prevailing in Cyprus and in the Eastern Mediterranean region (meaning the position of Greece and Turkey in the Cyprus issue—ce. V. 111.), the English historian V. Windsor, in his study “NATO and the Cyprus crises”, came to a murderous for the Atlanticists to the conclusion: “An open, even collective, NATO intervention against Cyprus would rather lead to the collapse of the bloc itself than to pacify the dangerous situation on the island.” [92, p. 5]. This is how the Atlantic plans to immediately liquidate the independent Republic of Cyprus and include it in NATO’s sphere of activity collapsed. The forms of extreme power pressure imposed by Washington on Cyprus aroused cautious rejection, and led to an increase in Western Europe’s disappointment in the values of “solidarity”. The Cyprus problem was turning into a new element of the watershed between the two centres of rivalry.

The failure of the plans for a frontal offensive prompted the Atlanticists to focus in the Cypriot course on the “special relationship” of the United States with England. The conservative government of E. Heath (1970-1974) set these relations as the main principles of their foreign policy. The Labour government that came to replace him, headed by G. Wilson, basically adhered to the same line. Analysing the Washington-London axis,

one cannot but pay attention to the influence it has on the policy of Europeanism, including the Cyprus issue. "Special relations" with the United States muffle the militancy of the European trend, making it prone to compromise and concessions. A peculiar synthesis of European and pro-Atlantic views was expressed by the D. Hopkins Centre for Foreign Policy Research G. Adams and A. Cotrell. Speaking about the joint search for some lever of renewal of Atlantic ties with respect to Cyprus, they called for "to force Cyprus to become a NATO member in order to turn it into a bastion of anti-communism, to prevent any deviations from the capitalist development of the Cypriot economy, to prevent the elimination of British bases on the island, and to make them available for use by any NATO member state". [72, p. 51]

The motto of Anglo-American unity was originally expressed in the intensification of British policy proper. Under pressure from the United States, Britain began to modernize its "sovereign" bases. In particular, in the early 70s, the runways were expanded at the facilities in Akrotiri and Dhekelia, where strategic bombers of the Vulcan type could be based. Tactical nuclear missile weapons were delivered to the bases. At the same time, the British command began assembling a radar system, which also took into account NATO's needs for it. This orientation of British Europeanism opened up the possibility of the actual use of the "sovereign" bases on the island by the United States, although a certain prudence was required here. The reason for Washington's cautious actions was due to the sharply negative reaction of the government of President Makarios to them.

An increasingly important place in the foreign policy

of Cyprus began to occupy the Western European direction. Nicosia did not miss an opportunity to emphasize the historical and cultural belonging of the island to Europe, a deep interest in the political fate of the continent. Diplomatic actions were increasingly based on the thesis "Cyprus is unaligned, but European." The position of Western Europe, which generally looked askance at the idea of subordinating Cyprus exclusively to the interests of the United States, also forced to act with caution. And the latter was explained not only by the fact that Atlanticism was losing its appeal. The Europeanist tendencies in British politics grew stronger. Its entry into the Common Market in January 1973 lent respectability to Europeanism. The accession of Cyprus to "little Europe" in the form of its accession in 1972 to the EEC as an associate member outlined the prospects for the development of this process. The goals of the Cypriot policy were also different. If Washington embodied them in a "forward-based" strategy, then Cyprus was something more for Western Europe. In this way; the isolation of Europeanism and Atlanticism in the Cyprus question took place along the line of defining the role of Cyprus in the general policy of imperialism, either as an Atlantic bridgehead, or in a country integrated within the framework of "Little Europe".

The island fits into the plans of the Europeanists not just as a military stronghold. In particular, the Western European monopolies associate with Cyprus the implementation of their expansionist aspirations in Africa and the Middle East. The general scheme of this activity was given by the Italian Christian democrat M. Pedini in the book "Chance of Europe". According to Pedini, the direction in which the expansion of the EEC

should be carried out is not transatlantic, but for Africa, where “the countries of the Mediterranean basin should unite with the European region”, which will serve as a decisive precondition for the creation of the “Europe-Africa ensemble” centre [83, p. 91]. According to these views, Cyprus is one of the links in the economic expansion of the EEC, including towards the Middle East.

Inter-imperialist contradictions in the Eastern Mediterranean created a motley and confusing picture. The “disobedience” of Western Europe to the policy of Atlanticism, seen in it, posed new difficulties for the basic strategy. Was the United States able to find such a level of relations with Western Europe, at which, without contradicting its main expansionist line, it could gain a foothold in Cyprus, firmly establish its lever of pressure? The choice of further tactical steps of Atlanticism in the eastern Mediterranean depended on the answer to this question. The growing importance of Cyprus in the military-strategic plans of the United States against the background of the aggravation of inter-imperialist contradictions presented to the Atlantic leadership an alternative to regrouping forces in this region. The supporters of the two ideological trends were objectively needing to clarify relations in this region. It intensified even more after it became clear that adopted on June 19, 1974. in Ottawa, the Declaration on Atlantic Principles did not resolve any of the controversial issues and did not help resolve the contradictions [30, app. 1, p. one). Its 14 points boiled down to the following: the foundation of the Atlantic alliance is a common military policy on which the security of the region depends; the unity of the bloc is necessary for negotiations with the USSR and other

socialist countries; NATO members are loyal to the principles of bourgeois democracy; they should refer more widely to the principle of consultation in their relationships.

The discrepancies could not be eliminated by introducing interdependence between the integration of the EEC and the rapprochement of this community with the United States. Accordingly, hopes that the United States and the EEC would have a common economic and political line in such important issues as relations with developing countries, as raw materials and energy policies were collapsed.

It remained to wait for when, under what circumstances and in what forms a showdown would take place. Washington foresaw this and prepared.

The influence of the Middle East factor

Cyprus is the extreme base point of imperialism in the eastern Mediterranean, directly adjacent to the Middle East. Therefore, the increased interest of Atlantic strategists in the island, in addition to considerations of the general militaristic activity of the Pentagon in the Mediterranean, is also caused by the great influence of the Middle East factor.

One of the important factors determining line to involve Cyprus in the base “is undoubtedly the increasing dependence of the United States and Western Europe on Arab oil supplies. According to the estimates of the English magazine *Petroleum Economist*, industrialized capitalist countries annually import about 1.3 billion tons of oil, including 0.8 billion tons (or

almost two-thirds) from the Arab East. In the total consumption of oil in the West, Arab oil accounted for about 40%, while the share of oil produced in the Western countries themselves accounted for 35% (the remaining 25% of raw materials were imported from Iran, Venezuela, Nigeria, Indonesia) [128, 1977, XI. from. 428, 429]. The overwhelming “oil superiority” of the Arab East increases the value of Cyprus as outpost of the “world oil store”. Not surprising, that in assessing the situation on the island, the Atlantic at almost every session, strategists proceed from the possibilities of using Cypriot bases to secure oil supplies. Judging by the statement of the commander-in-chief of the NATO allied armed forces in the southern zone of Europe, American Admiral Shier, “at any given moment, there are always 25 million barrels of oil in the Mediterranean Sea on more than 300 ships” (Sovetskaya Rossiya, July 22, 1979).

In addition to the function of protecting the oil route, Cyprus is also entrusted with the function of a transshipment point for supplying Israel and the conservative Arab regimes with military equipment and equipment. This task stems from Washington’s conceptual guidelines. At the turn of the 1960s and 1970s, under pressure and with the participation of the powerful Zionist lobby in the US Congress, the doctrine of “selectivity” in the choice of American allies was developed. Its authors put forward the idea of a differentiated approach to the use of force and the protection of their partners, based on the importance of economic, political and military interests to the United States. Israel was among the first such American allies [49, p. 231].

The main provisions of the doctrine found practical

refraction in the work that took place in May 1971. in Lisbon session of the NATO Council. In accordance with the decisions taken there, the axis of the military-diplomatic activity of the Atlantic circles has shifted from the western Mediterranean to the eastern. Although the proponents of the “selective approach” have different views of this shift, the allocation of the Eastern Mediterranean into a zone of especially important US interests led to the expansion of its military presence in Greece, Turkey, as well as further penetration of the “sovereign” British bases in Cyprus.

The named doctrine is not limited to the desire to maintain the status quo in the Eastern Mediterranean. It acquires a pronounced active, aggressive character. Its authors, apparently, are not content with partial solutions, they aim to achieve full advantage for themselves. Thus, in accordance with the doctrine, the Cypriot bases are entrusted with the task of blocking the national liberation forces in the Arab East, and the experience of using these objects against the national liberation movement of peoples is borrowed by the Atlantic strategists from the British colonialists. In particular, the role of Cypriot bases in the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt in 1956 served as a practical lesson: on the eve of this action, for the first time through Cyprus from France to Israel. 60 jet fighters were transferred. Also indicative were the operations of echeloning the troops concentrated at that time on objects, their involvement in Egypt [61, pp. 103, 106]. In subsequent years, “sovereign” British objects served as a kind of springboard for the imperialist military to carry out punitive actions against various detachments of the Arab national liberation forces, including against Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, the

patriots of Oman.

The leadership of NATO realizes that the intentions to use Cyprus in anti-Arab plans can be fully realised only if its sovereignty and territorial integrity are undermined. This is also recognized in the Arab East. Therefore, every outbreak of the Cypriot crisis (in 1963-1964, in 1967 and in subsequent years) caused justified alarm, primarily in the Middle East states. The League of Arab States (LAS) is unanimous that Cyprus and the situation around it constitute one of the basic elements of peace and security and that any infringement of the status of the Republic of Cyprus is an infringement on the security of the Middle East ... and on the stability of the area. Governments of many countries and public organisations have made special statements on this matter. "The Arab peoples," said, for example, in a statement by the National Council of Peace Supporters of Syria, "are watching the events in Cyprus with concern," seeing in them a direct connection with the conspiracy "which is being carried out by world imperialism and reaction, and in particular by American imperialism and Israel. against the Arab liberation movement." [110, 1974, no. 33, p. 10].

This point of view is widespread in the Arab world. The Beirut weekly Al-Hadaf recalls the "triple" aggression of 1956, when British aircraft based in Cyprus bombed Egypt. The weekly warns against possible attempts to use the island "in support of the existing NATO bases surrounding the Arab world." [110, 1974, No. 33, p. 10]. Indeed, having lost most of their strongholds in the Arab countries themselves, the imperialist strategists are striving to place their bridgeheads in such a way as to threaten these countries from outside. In this sense, the Cypriot bases

seem to be extremely convenient. The convenience of these bases was also explained by the fact that they are located on the territory of a non-aligned state—a circumstance that allows NATO strategists to bypass such a sensitive issue for the North Atlantic bloc as the problem of NATO's "sphere of responsibility". Cypriot bases can easily be used to deploy US and NATO military forces in case of "emergencies". They are also important for a larger-scale combination—as a link between NATO and US military installations in the Indian Ocean. Suffice it to recall at least the construction of a large Pentagon base on the island of Diego Garcia, which directly threatens the oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf. It is obvious that if the Atlantic circles were able to include Cyprus in their orbit, then the states of the Arab East would find themselves in a kind of strategic pincers.

Assessing the role of the Middle East in the global strategy of Atlanticism and the place of Cyprus in its Middle East factor, many observers wonder whether the West's approach to the Cyprus issue is not showing the desire of the neo-colonialists to restore the old British "strategic chain" from Gibraltar through the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean under the new conditions to the Far East? England can now only play an auxiliary role here, but in themselves such plans look quite plausible. They are fully consistent with the new doctrine of NATO's global actions proclaimed at the May 27 (1978) session of the NATO Council in Washington by US President J. Carter. The doctrine provides for the arbitrary extension of the bloc's "sphere of responsibility" to vast areas, far beyond the limits specified in the agreement on the creation of the organisation [112, 1978, No. 8, p. 5]. According to this

geostrategic scheme, Cyprus is viewed by Atlantic circles as a “rear foothold”.

Thus, the growing dependence of the West on supplies of Arab oil, all-round US support for the Israeli aggressors and Arab reactionary regimes, the suppression of the national liberation movement in the Middle East and the place of this region in the global plans of the Atlanticists constituted the main components of the Middle East aspect of the Cypriot NATO policy. They gave this policy a particularly aggressive character, aiming the spearhead of their intrigues at the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.

It is appropriate to remark about the offensive orientation that the Middle East factor gives to Atlanticism. The use of Cypriot bases in support of Israel in anti-Arab actions requires a stable situation in Cyprus. Any destabilizing NATO action in Cyprus could create unintended consequences and even eliminate this convenient channel of support for Tel Aviv. However, according to Washington politicians, the interests of the basic strategy are higher than the consequences that the Cyprus crisis may cause. The deliberate generation of cataclysms by Washington, which is dangerous for its positions, was dictated by other considerations, in particular, the need to preserve the southeastern flank of NATO.

How was the Middle East factor practically refracted in the tactics of the US harassment of the Cypriot bases in the conditions of inter-imperialist contradictions?

Firstly, playing on such a “nerve” that was bare for Western Europe, such as securing oil supplies, the United States tried to connect its allies and the entire Atlantic system to its Middle East course. In this case,

the so-called combined approach was used, the essence of which was to offer partners to reach a compromise as well as an agreed position on a set of economic, military and political problems. Secondly, the United States counted on the opposite effect of the continuing conflict situation in the Middle East, which was supposed to induce cautious allies to joint action. It was about using the Middle East conflict to revitalise the entire North Atlantic bloc. At the same time, the stake was placed on the adventurism of Israeli extremists, who always sought to rely on the southern flank of NATO and, of course, welcomed attempts to involve Cyprus, the Arab-Israeli borders are only a two-hundred-kilometer strip of sea.

According to the Cypriot press, back in the late 1960s, at the headquarters of the North Atlantic bloc in Naples, a centre was created to coordinate the actions of NATO naval aviation in the Mediterranean Sea and the Israeli Air Force. In 1971, M. Dayan, who was then Israel's Minister of Defense, proposed that the Atlantic generals use the airfields on the Sinai Peninsula captured from Egypt. In the same period, construction of facilities related to the NATO air defense system began on Israeli territory, [111, 5.IX.1978].

At first, the declaration of the combined approach brought partial success to the Atlanticists in Cypriot politics, although its practical application revealed the divergence of interests in the camp of imperialism. A shift in the axis of military-political activity in the Eastern Mediterranean and a "special relationship" with Britain allowed them to enter the island through the "back door"—"sovereign" British bases. The facilities in Episkopi, Akrotiri and Dhekelia are, if not de jure, then de facto subordinate to the overall command

of NATO. It also housed a NATO radio monitoring and intelligence centre in the Eastern Mediterranean [67, p. 221]. The Americans expanded their radio station in Karavas (north coast of Cyprus). This is one of a series of American listening stations collecting information for the US government and some “other consumers.” Despite the fact that the Cypriot coast is little indented in; the approach of ships to them is difficult, the US command, as reported by the western press, was studying the possibilities for basing the 6th fleet here [107, 12 March 1977]. American servicemen became more and more frequent guests at British facilities. far away that Washington even began to think about how to directly involve Israel in the “development” of Cyprus. In March 1973, the Cypriot public was outraged to learn from leaked information about the strengthening of military cooperation between Tel Aviv and the United States and England. In particular, the British military command provided the Israeli Air Force aircraft with the opportunity to use the base in Akrotiri for “collecting intelligence data and tactical exercises.” Revealing the background of this action, the Cypriot newspaper Nea stressed that the basing of Israeli military aircraft at British airfields in Cyprus poses a serious threat to the republic’s sovereignty. may involve the country in conflict with other feminine-Arab states. Under pressure from public opinion, the Israeli military was forced to retreat from the Cypriot facilities [111, 14.IV.1979].

The true strategic value of the island for Atlantic politicians was revealed during the Arab-Israeli conflict in October 1973. As you know, almost all Western European countries-members of NATO, despite allied obligations, then refused the United States the right to use their territories for transfer to Israel weapons. It

was then that the US-Israel air bridge rested on British bases in Cyprus and American facilities in the Azores, through which military equipment and equipment were supplied to the aggressors. The Cypriot newspaper “Kharavgi” wrote in those days that the Phantom-class aircraft landed at Cypriot bases, where Zionist stars were painted on their fuselages, and then the pilots ferried the aircraft to Israel [146, 10.XI.1973].

During the period described, the development of the Cypriot bases by the Americans intensified. Analysing the process of their “Americanisation”, the Greek historian N. Kakaunakis cites curious data from the words of an American officer: “In April 1974, the United States, under the pretext of overseeing the cleaning of the Suez Canal, appealed to the Government of Cyprus to allow the Marine Corps units to remain at Cypriot facilities. On April 22, officials in Nicosia tried to allay international fears that the United States would be permanently present on the island. On April 24, the BBC radio station reported that the question of the withdrawal of British troops from Cyprus and Malta is being studied in London. This move was motivated by financial difficulties. On the same day, the US Embassy in Athens, through its military mission, instructed all American servicemen at the NATO base on the island of Crete to immediately move to Cyprus and settle at the base in Akrotiri” [103, p. 225].

The outside civil war in Lebanon also confirmed that imperialism is assigning Cyprus an important role in changing the balance of power in the Middle East. The Cypriot press with a tripod reported that in the course of the Lebanese crisis, units of the American marines were transferred to British military bases in “the event of an armed invasion of Lebanon. Although this

operation was formally carried out. under the guise of evacuating American citizens, in fact it was aimed at supporting the right-wing forces grouped around the Phalangists. In subsequent years, weapons and ammunition were delivered to them from Cypriot bases. German researchers N. Kadritsky and V. Wagner, defining the importance of the Cypriot bases for the Atlantic policy in the Middle East, identified three, in their opinion, main points: support for Israel, which receives the latest types of weapons from the United States and other NATO member countries; providing military assistance and assistance to reactionary groups in Lebanon ... who would like to strike at the Palestinian resistance movement; the implementation of military supplies to the reactionary regimes of the Persian Gulf countries, spending their "petrodollars" on the acquisition of weapons [78, from 119-120).

The implementation of the latter task is closely related to the process of "Americanisation" of Cypriot bases, which turned into staging points for a brisk arms trade. Only three countries—Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel—in 1974 bought, according to the newspaper "*Financial Times*", 82%, and in 1975-50 and in 1978 more than 70% of all US military equipment sold abroad ... In addition, the United States sells arms to Egypt, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and other Middle Eastern countries. The newspaper concludes that the entire Middle East region accounts for at least 80% of US arms exports [117, 3.VIII.1976).

It is quite obvious that the arms race inflated by NATO countries has an extremely negative effect on the political atmosphere in this region, and the aggravation of the Lebanese crisis, along with the Arab-Israeli conflict, actually creates for the Atlanticts a favorable

opportunity in their combinations to resort to a policy of Eastern Mediterranean.

The indirect complicity of Cyprus, against the will of its people, in imperialist adventures has caused alarm and concern in the Cypriot public. The independent course, once again demonstrated by the government of President Makarios during the aggravation of the Middle East, the Eastern crisis in October 1973, and his declared determination to prevent the use of Cyprus against the Arab countries testified that the Cypriots did not intend to retreat in the face of the NATO military threats.

Official circles in Israel outwardly did not react to such a course, but waited for an excuse to take part in the anti-Cypriot combination. According to the West German magazine *Der Spiegel*, “since 1973, an American plan has been running at the Greek General Staff, according to which, in conditions of tension in the Middle East and the then uncertainty of Turkey, a “strategic triangle” should be created, co-operating with Greece, Cyprus and Israel. But Makarios stood in the way of this project, pursuing a line of non-alignment. The Israelis insisted in Washington on the need to remove the pro-Arab-minded president” (130, 1974, VIII).

However, it was not only for this reason that the “canisation “ of the Cypriot bases was developing aggressively, as the Atlanticts wanted. The inter-imperialist process was also part of the process. The reason for this is the contradictions that flared up with renewed urgency during the fourth Arab-Israeli war in October 1973. The combined approach clearly did not work. Even the top leadership of NATO could not hide serious differences. Document No. MC/SF (75), which

was presented by the Military Committee of the Alliance Council Session Block, formally included three points that emphasize (in the current situation in the Middle East) NATO's southern flank:

1. The United States has a commitment to Israel that it must provide effective assistance and military equipment in times of crisis.

2. Western countries are dependent on the supply of Arab oil, the supply of which requires the normalisation of the situation in the Middle East and the limitation of American activity in the area or separation from it.

3. The Mediterranean remains an important oil route for Western countries; accordingly, the safety of this route must be ensured [29, p. 14].

The divisions among the allies escalated after the how the Pentagon, without NATO consultation, led during the outbreak of hostilities in October 1973, its armed forces stationed in Europe were on high alert. England and France then imposed a complete ban on the export of weapons to the belligerents. Germany did not allow the Pentagon to use its territory for the transfer of weapons to the Israeli aggressor. The positions of Atlanticts and Europeanists diverged even more after the sensational interview of US Secretary of State G. Kissinger to Business Week magazine, in which he said that the United States "in the event of the most serious, extraordinary circumstances" will consider the use of military force in the Middle East. The magazine explained that "extraordinary circumstances" meant a possible increase in the price of oil by the Arabs and the imposition of an embargo on oil supplies to countries supporting Israel's expansionist claims [110, 3.1.1975, p. 12-13]. In an interview with the Hamburg magazine "*Der Spiegel*" German

Chancellor G. Schmidt spoke out against providing the United States with West German airfields and ports for deliveries to Israel in the event of a war in the Middle East. A Bonn spokesman said: "The politicians of the government coalition consider any military steps towards the oil-exporting countries completely excluded." The *Aussenpolitik* magazine stated: "The October crisis brought a clear and sober understanding that the identity of interests in the Alliance is not something for granted" [110, 3.1.1975, p. 12-13].

The Arab-Israeli conflict has shown how risky the Atlantic policy pursued by the Pentagon is and how dangerous it is to blindly follow in its wake. The concern of Washington's Western allies about this was clearly evident at the session of the NATO Council held in December 1973 in Brussels. American diplomacy has made a lot of efforts to "calm down" the European partners and somehow smooth over the differences that reflected the contradictory nature of the processes developing in NATO. The Atlanticists tried to force their allies to strictly follow the "Atlantic canons", but they came into conflict with the national interests of Western countries and the outlined positive development in Europe.

The fourth Arab-Israeli war revealed the existence of two centres of rivalry in the provision of energy resources. If the United States, using its own energy sources, could withstand for some time the embargo of Arab countries on the supply of oil, then Western Europe without these supplies is simply not able to continue its economic life. The pro-Israel position of Washington in the Middle East conflict, declared state policy, dealt a heavy blow to the Western European economy. At the same time, it contributed to the

reorientation of Europeanists to pursue a more solid expansionist policy towards oil-exporting countries. In these conditions, the fate of the “combined approach”, including the Cyprus issue, began to seem completely doomed.

The aggravation of the energy crisis prompted Western Europe to follow the path of direct dialogue with the Arab countries, which began in 1974 and which should lead to “the establishment of cooperation aimed at creating basic conditions for the development of the Arab world as a whole and narrowing the technological gap between Arab and Western European countries.” The leadership of the EEC put forward the concept of the so-called trilateral cooperation, which involves the provision of financial resources by oil-producing states, technology—the EEC, and labour—by Arab countries that do not produce oil [14, 7.IV.1979]. Within the framework of this concept, Cyprus is assigned the role of a “docking bridge”. It should be noted that this role is interpreted differently by the Common Market monopolies. For example, West German companies would like to create a free trade zone on the island, economically connected to the Arab East, which would allow the flow of their goods through Cyprus. Although the transit trade between Western Europe and the states of the Persian Gulf region through Cyprus is, according to unofficial data, about 200 million dollars per year, the FRG business circles consider it a promising, or rather, a convenient form with the aim of squeezing England, whose activity in Cyprus is dictated by the desire to protect imperial interests against the growing competition of the EEC member states. London has a different point of view. According to the *Financial Times*, they believe that in

conditions of tension, the island, which occupies a convenient geographical position, can serve as a springboard for a wider economic offensive. According to the newspaper, priority should be given to the development of means of communication with the countries of the Middle East, in particular, the establishment of container traffic, ferry traffic; shipping lines should connect the Cypriot ports with Dubai, Bahrain, Kuwait through the Suez Canal.

The nuances in assessing Cyprus as a “connecting bridge” with the Arab East testify to the flexible tactics of the EEC, in its own way paving the way to the Middle East oil fields. If the pro-Israel position of the Atlanticists demanded an intensification of the process of “Americanisation” of the Cypriot bases, then the political reorientation of the Europeanists in the Middle East course presupposed dissociation from such an adventurous position. The divergence of the paths of the United States and the EEC indicated the absence of a single mechanism for resolving contradictions. In conditions when the Middle East factor increased the value of Cyprus, Washington had to find its own “Trump card”, its power base for establishing control over the island and the entire Eastern Mediterranean zone.

The “autonomous” actions of the United States were largely facilitated by the unexpected changes in the balance of power in the Middle East, caused by the capitulation course of ARE President A. Sadat. Accordingly, the overall geopolitical assessment of Cyprus was transformed, which could become one of the elements of the projected Cairo-Tel Aviv axis. As the Greek historian I. Yannakakis writes, “the brotherly embrace of Kissinger-Sadat under the Egyptian sun has

consolidated one of the successes of American diplomacy. The Middle East “problem” quickly popped up, the problem was on the way to a solution. It was whispered in Washington circles that the situation in Greece and Cyprus was being studied.” (122, 1974, No. 15, p. 6) to serve its regional policy.

Contradictions in the Greece-Turkey-Cyprus triangle

In modern international relations in the Eastern Mediterranean region, a special place is occupied by the Greek-Turkish rivalry, which at times turns into confrontation. The most important reason for this acute crisis situation is the Cyprus problem, although until the 1960s it did not constitute such a serious element in the general disagreements between the two neighboring countries.

In the complex of Greek-Turkish problems, the issue of Cyprus has arisen historically. It is caused by the circumstance that the main population of the island consists of Cypriots of Greek and Turkish origin. In different periods of history, the political and economic positions of the two communities have changed, reducing or increasing the influence of one of them. Although the composition of the population is subject to significant fluctuations, according to the 1965 census, 463 thousand Greek Cypriots (78%) and 108 thousand Turkish Cypriots (18%) lived on the island [52, p. 17]. In an attempt to keep Cyprus as its colony, the British administration resorted to a policy of “divide and conquer.” The more widely the national liberation

movement developed in Cyprus, the more energetically the colonial authorities provoked intercommunal tensions, and British diplomacy pitted Greece and Turkey in the Cyprus issue. In this respect the content talks of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece Averoff with Ambassador of Turkey to Athens Ixel in September 1956. In his diary, the minister wrote: "The Ambassador talked a lot about the future of Cyprus, the prospects for solving the problem. I said that if he has in mind the idea of division, which was mentioned in the English parliament, then Greece is ready to accept any option for a settlement. We will agree with the results of the plebiscite on such issues: the accession of Cyprus to Greece or Turkey, the independence of the island and, finally, partition. The ambassador began to talk about the division, which should pass along the 34th parallel, which would mean the dismemberment of the island into two equal parts. I think that the ambassador's visit pursued one goal—to clarify the point of view of Greece on the partition" [86, p. 149].

British policy on the Cyprus issue led to the fact that a Turkish representative was invited to the Anglo-Greek conferences on Cyprus. This meant that the search for a solution to the Cyprus issue was no longer the prerogative of the governments of England and Greece, but also affected Greek-Turkish relations. This policy inevitably involved Greece and Turkey in the Zurich-London agreements, as a result of which both countries, together with England, received the "right" of the security guarantor countries of the independent Republic of Cyprus, that is, to directly interfere in its internal affairs.

The involvement of Greece and Turkey in the Cyprus problem was practically carried out through the support

of these countries to ethnic groups. With the help of extremist elements in both communities, the Greco-Turkish rivalry was carried over to the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The antagonism that had grown from the outside was aggravated by socio-political and economic factors. Historically, the Turkish community was small—more numerous, and economically much weaker than the Greek. The Cypriot commercial and industrial bourgeoisie was formed mainly from among the Greek Cypriots. Under these conditions, the Enosis slogan, under which the Cypriots waged a national liberation struggle against British rule, frightened off the Turkish Cypriots with the prospect of replacing English oppression with Greek oppression. The objectively created a fertile ground for the introduction of suspicion, mistrust, and subsequently separatist tendencies into Cypriot society.

The Zurich-London agreements did not diminish the intensity of the Greek-Turkish antagonism. On the contrary, the extremely sensitive, painful reaction of Ankara and Athens to the situation in the communities, to their safety, gave it increased emotional tension. The international legal system of guarantees imposed on the Cypriots allowed the cultivation of nationalist passions on the island, and the full influence on the national communities to use in the interests of expanding the political, military and economic positions of the guarantor countries. At the same time, the governments of these countries viewed the Cyprus problem as a convenient excuse to divert the attention of the masses from serious economic and domestic political difficulties. That is, exploiting nationalist ambitions, the ruling circles of the two countries in their approach to the Cyprus problem are guided by both expansionist

aspirations and domestic political considerations.

The Greek-Turkish antagonism over Cyprus is one of the direct consequences of the unjust, anti-democratic system of international relations in the Eastern North, the Mediterranean, based on “fist law”. This system provides for a redrawing of the political map of the region, depending on the strength of the parties claiming to acquire “new spheres” of influence or any privileges at the expense of other peoples and states. This organisation of international relations provides for the use of force as the only tarantula of the so-called international equilibrium, which is actually a “balance” of violence and fear. It is quite obvious that any political combination built on such a shaky ground sooner or later reveals its instability, causes a desire to revise it, and direct encroachments create knots of tension.

The stubborn Greek-Turkish intransigence is explained primarily by the fact that the internal content of the contradictions is determined by the clash of two bourgeois nationalist doctrines—Hellenism and Pan-Turkism. The clarity of their provisions is giving way to political calculations and expansionist aspirations. Hellenistic ideologists believe that all Greeks are supposedly one nation and should unite (within the framework of the Byzantine Empire) into a single state. The White Paper of the Greek Foreign Ministry emphasized: “The Greek state is inspired by the ideals of liberation of all islands with a predominantly Greek population” [73, p. 13]. Cyprus was also named among the latter. All this gave the Turkish side reason to talk about the revival of the megalomaniac idea, which even includes the return of the Greeks to Constantinople [47, p. 14). According to the testimony of the English

historian R. Stephens, such an apparently purely hypothetical goal of the Hellenists takes the form of a strategic concept. known as the “Byzantine version” [86, p. 171].

Megalomaniac egocentrism towards Cyprus was expressed in the coordinated and complementary policy of the Greek government and the nationalist circles of the island, aimed at its Hellenisation, that is, at the absorption of Cyprus by Greece. This option was called enosis. It became the Cypriot part of the national-chauvinist bourgeois ideology of Hellenism, according to which the accession to Greece of the Osgrove (or part of it) would allow it to establish itself in Cyprus and from there exert pressure on its long-time rival, Turkey.

The propaganda of the Enosis slogan within the framework of an independent Cypriot state objectively served not the interests of intercommunal harmony and partnership, but the whipping up of racial prejudice and prejudice. On this basis, Turkish bourgeois nationalism—pan-Turkism, whose ideologues dream of “a great Turkey uniting all the Turkic-speaking peoples of the world”, took root and began to actively take root with outside support. This is stated, in particular, by the Greek author I. Yannakakis: “The counterbalance to enosis was the awakening Turkish nationalism in Cyprus, intervention Turkey in crisis and, as a consequence of all this, more and more the clear presence of Greece on the island. And behind these two countries NATO loomed” [122, 1974, No. VIII, from. 6]

The geopolitical concept of Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean is widely described in the studies of Western historians, and statements by Turkish statesmen. In the opinion of the already mentioned English author R. Stephens, “Greece controls the islands

that close all Turkey's outlets to the Mediterranean Sea, except for the southern ports of Mersin and Alexandretta. These ports are vital, but in the event of a Greek military presence on the islands, they could be attacked by air. Greek control of the islands thus threatens Turkey with complete isolation from the West, although both countries are members of NATO" [86, p. 139].

Ankara's nationalist policy in the Eastern Mediterranean was formulated in 1955 in a statement by the former Foreign Minister F. Zorlu at the trilateral Anglo-Greek-Turkish meeting in London: "The islands are vital for Turkey. This is based on considerations of military security, as well as the fact that they constitute an integral part of the Turkish mainland" [21, p. 9]. Thus, in contrast to the megalomaniac idea, the pan-Turkism put forward nationalist claims to a part of Western Thrace, as well as to the Greek islands Samoa, Chios, Mytilene, Rhodes, and others adjacent to the shores of Asia Minor. Their expansionist aspirations towards Cyprus were expressed in the slogan of *taksim*, that is, division the territory of the island into two parts – Turkish and Greek. At the same time, both the possibility of a complete division of the island into two separate state formations with their subsequent annexation to Turkey and Greece, "and the prospect of a federation between them in the conditions of state independence of Cyprus, were thought of the promotion of *taksim* was accompanied by the propaganda of the chauvinistic thesis "Cyprus is Turkish"".

It should be noted that bourgeois researchers of Greek-Turkish antagonism have always revolved in the circle of already traditional ideas about the contradictions of two neighboring countries, as about

irreconcilable enmity between Christians and Muslims. In this sense, the following statement of R. Stephens is characteristic: “Outbreaks of the Cyprus crisis are only small episodes in a long and bloody struggle between Greek Christians and Turkish Muslims. Nationalism is the source of the Cypriot tragedy.” [86, p. 6]. Consideration of the conflict situation on purely nationalistic, ecoreligious grounds is clearly aimed at, in order to deliberately exclude socio-political factors, although one cannot but agree that the collision of bourgeois-nationalist doctrines Hellenism and Pan-Turkism constitute an important component of antagonism. It is noteworthy that even the bourgeois political thought of Greece and Turkey tries to go beyond these concepts and give a deeper explanation of the contradictions. For example, the prominent Turkish diplomat and historian Haluk Bayulken, although he sees the root cause of the Greek-Turkish antagonism and irredentism, that is, the non-reunification of Greece within the framework of the former Byzantine Empire, the heirs of which the modern Greeks consider themselves to be, sees in its incitement the interests of certain groups that remain behind the scenes of events [73, p. 13].

There is a widespread version in the West that the Cyprus problem is a matter of Greek-Turkish relations, that only mutual agreement between Ankara and Athens can lead to a normalisation of the situation on the island. This simplistic approach is intended to hide the true culprits of the Cyprus tragedy. It obscures the true content of the Cyprus issue, distorts the nature of its driving forces, not to mention the constantly changing tactical means of the states involved in the conflict. Undoubtedly, it is completely wrong to view the Cyprus crisis as one of the aspects of the Greek-Turkish

differences. The contradictions in the Athens-Nicosia-Ankara triangle are of a different nature, like the Cyprus issue itself, since neither Greece nor Turkey has the right to decide the fate of a sovereign Cypriot state, an equal UN member. At the same time, it cannot be denied that on the issue of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey had and still have disagreements (in assessing the events on the island and in opinions about the forms and ways of the Cyprus settlement). For both countries, the Cyprus problem is a key foreign policy problem, which the Greek and Turkish leaders are constantly talking about, who view it not just as one of the elements of disagreement, but also as a national issue.

A comprehensive explanation for the chronic nature of the Greek-Turkish antagonism must be sought in the direct and active policy of NATO imperialist circles in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Intercommunal antagonism, actively imposed from the outside, served as a component of neo-colonialist politics. The intention of the British ruling circles was to turn the main conflict on the island (the clash between the vital interests of the Cyprus people fighting for independence and the colonialist policy of the West) into a conflict between the Greek and Turkish communities. And the wider the Cypriot national liberation movement developed, the more energetically the colonial authorities provoked intercommunal clashes, and British diplomacy pitted Greece and Turkey.

According to Atlantic politicians, after the signing of the Zurich-London agreements, the situation in the region was determined by two factors: a) a precarious balance caused by the Greek-Turkish conflicts over Cyprus, and b) the ability to influence the situation in

Cyprus using the status of guarantor countries. The first moment foreshadowed the emergence of serious cataclysms, the second seemed to be a convenient lever for turning the island into an arena of Greek-Turkish confrontation. Reliance on one of the junior NATO allies—Greece or Turkey—although it promised temporary benefits, on the whole created serious political difficulties for Washington. In a word, a rather confusing and contradictory perspective was looming, which was clearly insufficient for building far-reaching schemes. Much more concrete value was seen in the transformation of Cyprus into a “bare nerve”, by pressing on which they tried to hold. Greece and Turkey in the orbit of Atlantic influence.

In constructing NATO's southeastern flank, imperialist circles, of course, foresaw complications. However, they believed that the bonds of “Atlantic solidarity” linking Greece and Turkey were indissoluble, that the concepts of anti-communism and the arms race imposed on these countries would make them forget about contradictions forever. Greco-Turkish feuds were considered. at NATO headquarters as one of the instruments of the East Mediterranean policy, as a factor contributing to the subordination of Ankara and Athens to the goals of the global strategy of imperialism. The Atlantic spheres hoped that “nationalist passions would soon fizzle out, lose their former acuteness, which was supposed to be promoted by the propaganda of the “communist danger” thesis, and Cyprus would turn into a “bridge of cooperation” between Greece and Turkey, holding together the southeastern flank. Speaker of the House of Lords Lord Carrington in conversation with the editor of the Greek magazine “International Relations” V. Vasiliou directly

stated that the whole complex the problems of the Eastern Mediterranean, including the problem of Cyprus, must be viewed in the light of the struggle “against communist aggression” (67, p. 113). In the bonds of “Atlantic solidarity,” some even saw the prototype of the Greek-Turkish federation.

The first crack in the projected Greco-Turkish alliance appeared and began to expand as the hopes of the Atlanticts to pursue a policy towards the USSR “from a position of strength “ were dissipated from year to year, and all kinds of doctrines of “pushing back”, “containment”, etc. more and more lost ground under themselves. The change in the balance of power in the world arena in favor of socialism, the undermining of the US strategic objectives of nuclear superiority, the collapse of the myth of the “Soviet threat”—all this led to the emergence of an internal crisis in NATO’s southeastern flank, although outwardly Greek-Turkish relations looked quite prosperous. Paradoxical as it may seem, the pro-Atlantic circles of Greece and Tours were the first to talk about the instability of the “Atlantic canons”.

The greatest impact on the growth of national self-awareness, as well as doubts about the reliability of the common bloc policy, was exerted by the bankruptcy of the main calculation on which Turkey’s national policy was based, which was becoming more and more obvious in the new international situation. And this calculation was made on the fact that the United States and NATO would be able to maintain their military superiority over the Soviet Union and other socialist states for a long time. According to the Turkish historian O. Aryman, “the establishment of nuclear parity reduced the allies’ confidence in the US” nuclear umbrella “revived the

search for other ways and methods that could ensure their national security” [93, p. 39].

The causes of the crisis in the structure of NATO’s southeastern flank were in fact much deeper and more serious. They developed latently for a long time. The ramified military-strategic system of Atlanticism in Greece and Turkey immediately came into sharp conflict with their sovereignty and national independence and endangered their security. The incompatibility of the aggressive goals of NATO and the national interests of these countries is the basis of the objectively developing process of erosion of the military-political positions of Atlanticism. This process was catalysed by an exacerbation in 1963-1964. the Cypriot crisis, which was the first “test of strength” of Greek and Turkish nationalists. By this time, the combustible material accumulated growing complications in Cypriot society, has already acquired a clearly critical mass. The source of the controversy was contained, among other things, in the constitution imposed on the Cypriots. The Basic Law, developed by a group of English lawyers led by Lord Radcliffe, did not rally the citizens of the young state, but separated them. A number of articles artificially opposed the Greek population to the Turkish: the veto of the Greek president and the Turkish vice president, separate voting of Greek and Turkish deputies in parliament, separate municipalities and legal proceedings, percentage the ratio of employees in government management (70% of Greeks, 30% of Turks), in the army and police (60 and 40%, respectively), etc. In a serious a source of intercommunal controversy turned into a dispute due to the nature of the municipal government in the five largest cities of the country, as well as the

right of two communal chambers for their own taxation. It was these circumstances that prompted President Makarios, relying on the will of the overwhelming majority of the population countries, call 30 November 1963, the Greek and Turkish communities to agree to amend some articles of the constitution that interfered with the normal functioning of the state apparatus. Since acceptance these proposals would mean the transformation of the Republic of Cyprus from a bi-communal state into a state the Greek majority, then the Turkish minority it was proposed to guarantee his rights in the economic and social areas.

This happened on the night of December 20-21 in Nicosia. The day before, the leadership of the Turkish community sent a letter to President Makarios in which he sharply rejected his initiative and declared disobedience to the orders and orders of the Greek side. In response, Makarios announced a heightened readiness of the country's police forces and ordered a thorough search of vehicles passing from the Greek sector of Nicosia to the Turkish sector at night. The car in which they were sitting was subjected to such a search, armed Turkish Cypriots who resisted. During the short skirmish, several people were killed and wounded. On the same night, all Turkish police officers, refusing to follow the instructions of the president, left their posts and went to the Turkish sector. The next day, the leadership of the Turkish community issued a circular by which all Turkish Cypriots had to leave the Greek sector and gather at the recruiting offices, where they were handed weapons. In an effort to prevent clashes, President Makarios called on the people to remain calm and not be led by instigators. However, localise armed conflict with the boundaries of the metropolitan areas

was no longer possible. From Nicosia, the fighting spread to Limassol, Paphos, Famagusta.

On March 4, 1964, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution calling on all states to refrain from any action or threat of action that could worsen the position of a sovereign Republic Cyprus or pose a threat to international peace. According to this resolution, Cyprus was sent UN troops to maintain peace and order, which remain there to this day. The UN Security Council periodically decides to extend the stay of the UN peacekeeping force by six months. The Turkish side proposes to reduce the number of these troops by 30%, the Greek side believes that such a reduction could threaten the already fragile security of the island.

The Greek-Turkish “test of strength “ took place at a time when both countries were experiencing serious economic difficulties, and their governments were criticized by the opposition for signing the Zurich-London agreements. Nationalist circles in Greece reproached K. Karamanlis for excessive compliance, which consisted in the fact that the agreements made it difficult to implement enosis, and demanded a more active policy on the Cyprus issue. In Turkey, this criticism was directed at the former regime of Bayar-Menderes, but also served as a warning to the government of I. Inonu. Turkish historian Sh. Aydemir writes: “The government carefully concealed from the Majlis the conditions for receiving American aid, which increased its dependence on the United States, which ultimately meant dependence on the Greek lobby in the American Congress, forcing Turkey to pursue an indecisive policy towards Cyprus “ [94, p. 72].

Intercommunal armed clashes have aggravated the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean region. By order

of Prime Minister G. Papandreou, Greek officers were recalled from NATO headquarters in Izmir. The troops of both countries were put on high alert. I. Inonu recalls: "The landing in Cyprus was scheduled for June 4, 1964. The day before, Washington had warned me not to use American weapons. President L. Johnson said by telephone that if the Russians act, NATO forces may not be able to hold out. Difficulties will also arise with our allies in the UN. In half an hour after your action we will be left without an alliance" (75, p. 30). Although the Turkish Air Force bombed Cyprus, the landing of troops did not take place as a result of the then existing belief in the principles of "Atlantic solidarity", as well as in the mythical "danger from the north".

The above telephone conversation and the subsequent correspondence between the statesmen of the United States and Turkey had a significant impact on the formulation of the foreign policy course of Ankara, which was most consistent with the national interests of Turkey. US President L. Johnson, in a letter to the Prime Minister of Turkey dated June 6, 1964, referring to US legislation, confirmed that the US could not give permission to use its weapons to invade Cyprus. L. Johnson invited I. Inonu to consultations in Washington and threatened that the United States would demand an immediate convocation of the NATO Council and the UN Security Council, if this action is undertaken.

The content of the letter deeply shocked the Turkish leadership, especially as regards the obligations of NATO member states to Turkey. "I got the impression," wrote I. Inonu in his response message, "about the existence between us of a wide divergence of views on the essence and basic principles of the Alliance" [90, p.

313-324). On June 13, 1964, the Turkish Foreign Ministry announced Inonu's visit to Washington, which testified to the hopes that the US mediation mission was still warm in Ankara. Neither the talks in Washington, and then in London and Paris, nor the conference held in Geneva in July with the participation of England, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus and UN representatives have led to a compromise and normalisation of the situation in and around Cyprus.

In the face of Greece's activation in the Cyprus issue, expressed in the illegal transfer of a division to Cyprus and the supply of heavy weapons, Turkey had basically two levers of influence: the deportation of Greeks from Istanbul and the use of the problem of the islands in the Aegean Sea. During the aggravation of the crisis of 1964, c. Rumours circulated in Ankara that in the event of Greek provocations in Cyprus, Turkish troops would occupy one of the archipelagos (86, p. 182] on a demonstrative overflight by Turkish aircraft of the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea, these rumours were not confirmed. The Turkish government has resorted to a different leverage. In March 1964, it denounced the Greek-Turkish Treaty on Settlement, Trade and Navigation of 1930, which also regulated the security problem of the Greek and Turkish minorities living in Turkey and Greece, respectively. As a result, about 1,000 Greeks were deported from Istanbul and the property of 8,000 Greeks in other cities, valued at £80 million, was expropriated. By September 1964, Turkey had expelled another 6 thousand people. In addition, the right Turkish citizens of Greek origin to open schools with teaching in the Greek language [86, p. 181-182].

One caveat should be made here. The fact is that

during the tragic events in Cyprus, Western strategists did not forget for a minute about the interests of their basic strategy. They made the most of the crisis situation to consolidate and expand their positions on the island, in particular, military bases. The “nightmare of bases” also prevailed over them at the Geneva talks, which were organized in July 1964 with the participation of representatives of England, Greece and Turkey. The main role was played by a former secretary of state USA D. Acheson, who acted as a “special intermediary”. In Geneva, a plan was put forward called The Acheson plan, which reflected the “maximalist program” of Atlantic circles in the Eastern Mediterranean, that is, the strengthening of the southeastern flank of NATO and control of Cyprus with the bases of two block countries on it. In the West, this option was deciphered as “a project for converting British bases into Island to Alliance Facilities”.

Although the Greek and Cypriot governments rejected the plan, NATO leadership persistently promoted all sorts of options to ensure the interests of the “forward-based” strategy. In particular, on the resumed in mid-August 1964. In Geneva, diplomatic negotiations on the Cyprus issue, Atlantic circles proposed a modified “Acheson plan”, which differed from the first for the worse for Turkey: it offered it a base in Cyprus only for lease, and not for sovereign possession. And then the “Rask plan” appeared, according to which NATO facilities with the participation of Turkish troops should be created on the island and enosis should be carried out. Both plans were rejected, and in early September the Geneva talks ended in vain [88, p. 227].

The Atlantic politicians faced the first difficulties,

which were expressed in their obvious inability to impose a solution they liked either on the Republic of Cyprus or on their two allies—Greece and Turkey. “Atlantic solidarity” was clearly overshadowed by the intransigence of the parties. In the Cyprus issue, Turkey has resolutely opposed enosis. In early October 1964 Turkish Foreign Minister J. Erkin said: “Enosis, no matter how it is carried out, means war.” Ankara began to put forward the thesis of the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus and the federation, without insisting on the demand for the division of the island. In turn, the governments of Greece and Cyprus rejected the idea of federation and energetically emphasized the idea of enosis. “Enosis is the only way to solve the Cyprus problem,” said the then Prime Minister of Greece G. Papandreou [88, p. 229]. All this foreshadowed new complications for the Atlantic strategists.

The adventurous course of the Athenian junta, which usurped power in a military coup on April 21, 1967, led to the second “test of strength” of Greece and Turkey. The head of the Greek division, to seize the territory of the Turkish Cypriots, creating a situation after the fact. For the supporters of the junta, this action was a “trump card” that could raise their reputation in the eyes of the nationalist-minded middle and petty bourgeoisie. The bloody clashes provoked in November 1967 in the area of Ayios Theodoros and Kofinou aggravated the Cyprus problem and the Greek-Turkish relations. The two countries again put their armed forces on high alert, and again American diplomacy played the role of “honest broker”.

However, the Greek generals clearly overestimated the possibilities. The Turkish government in an

ultimatum demanded that the Athenian junta immediately remove the Greek division from the island of Grivas. The junta yielded and even expressed its readiness to pay material compensation for the damage caused to the villages of the Turkish Cypriots during the intercommunal clashes, which openly admitted its guilt for the bloodshed provoked.

The Statement of the Soviet Government on this matter stated: "The current events in Cyprus cannot be considered in isolation from the policy of the reactionary circles of Greece, which, with the support of external forces, have been developing plans for a long time providing for the solution of the Cyprus problem by military methods, the elimination of the independence and territorial integrity of the Cypriot state through the so-called "enosis", that is, the annexation of Cyprus to Greece" [111, 23.XI.1967].

Events 1963-1964 and 1967 revealed the complex nature of the Cyprus problem, the content of which is determined by a complex, multifaceted combination of internal and external aspects. The internal aspects are the sum of the contradictions that separate the Greek and Turkish communities. As a result of outbreaks of crisis and under the influence of chauvinistic propaganda, the two national communities became increasingly distant from each other, mutual grievances accumulated, mistrust and alienation grew. Over time, controversial issues have been layered that divided the citizens of one country. Since 1963 representatives of the Turkish community do not participate in the work of parliament, government and other government agencies. In 1967 the Turkish Cypriots established a "provisional Turkish Cypriot administration", which took over the functions of administrative management, as

well as a legal body, his power over all the Turkish enclaves of the country.

The external aspects of the Cyprus problem are caused in a broad sense by the interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cyprus by the imperialist circles of NATO and the United States, and in the narrow sense—by the involvement of Greece and Turkey through the support of the communities in the Cyprus crisis.

In the rivalry between the two NATO member states, a new stage opened, which, in the context of the politicisation of the Cyprus conflict, was characterized by increased US intervention. Concerned that Greek and Turkish nationalism threatens to finally destroy NATO's southeastern flank, American diplomacy has begun to probe various options for a compromise agreement. Her support for the dictatorial regime in Greece was expressed, in particular, in promoting plans to "buy" enosis from Turkey at a good price. For example, an option was being developed to provide Turkey with compensation in the form of joining some regions of Thrace, where the Turkish population is concentrated. The second option provided for the transfer of the islands of Samoa and Mytilene to Turkey. However, the Athenian junta did not accept these plans under the pretext that Thrace means more to Greece internationally than Cyprus, and the transfer of islands with a purely Greek population is an even more difficult loss.

The third settlement option, according to which the Turkish Cypriots should be exchanged for the Greek minority in Istanbul, also failed, but in this case the residence of the Greek Orthodox Church should also be transferred to another country. The latter proposal met

with resistance from the Greek government, which wanted, with the help of the church, to preserve the last historical ties with Constantinople.

Sensing the growth of anti-Junta sentiment in the country and the growing isolation in the international arena, the leaders of the military-dictatorial regime in Greece, together with the US Department of State, attempted to regulate their relations with Turkey in order to strengthen NATO's southeastern flank. The initiative was based on a modified plan for the partition of Cyprus (double enosis), which, in essence, was part of the nationalist project "Byzantine option".

According to the initiators of the project, the Cyprus problem could be solved by placing the North Atlantic missile and missile bases on the island and transferring two British military facilities under Turkish control. The rest of Cyprus fell to Greece. The Turkish side, which has repeatedly stated the need to preserve an independent Cyprus, rejected the junta's harassment. The head of the Turkish government, Demirel, after a meeting with Greek Prime Minister Kollias, said: "Turkey will never agree to the annexation of the island to Greece." [111. 14.IX.1968]. Turkey demanded to allocate territory in accordance with the percentage of the Turkish Cypriot population. And also to provide her with a special port" [143, 12.IX.1967]

An analysis of compromise options shows the inability of the bourgeois governments of Greece and Turkey to find a mutually acceptable solution to contentious issues on a bloc basis. The two NATO allies remained in confrontation. The Cyprus crisis acted as a factor in the aggravation of relations between Greece and Turkey, as well as between these countries and NATO. Along with the isolation of the interests of the

Atlantic and European ideologies, these contradictions intensified centrifugal tendencies in NATO, accompanied by the growth of anti-Americanism. If the events in Cyprus revealed the inconsistency of the global doctrines of imperialism to serve as a cementing element of the southeastern flank, then the powerful anti-American sentiments in Greece and Turkey confirmed the truth that bourgeois nationalism, in addition to the ability to chauvinistic excesses, has great untapped anti-imperialist potential. Atlantic strategists were seriously alarmed by the growing support of the world community for the just cause of the Cypriots, the determination of the government of President Makarios to firmly adhere to the course of non-alignment, to defend the sovereignty and integrity of the country, and the demand put forward by democratic forces to eliminate foreign bases on the island.

The forward-looking formulation of Cypriot policy, undoubtedly, had to take into account such a complex and delicate problem for Atlantics as the collision of two bourgeois-nationalist doctrines in the future. This seemed all the more necessary since Anglo-American diplomacy, which formed a kind of tandem at this stage of the development of the Cyprus crisis, failed to solve the problem in the interests of NATO, although it managed to prevent its settlement in accordance with the interests of strengthening the peace and security of peoples and the independence of the Republic of Cyprus. ... With the growth of anti-American, anti-imperialist sentiments in Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, there could be no talk of neutralizing nationalist ambitions with the help of internal political factors, and the intensity of passions foreshadowed their clash. On

the one hand, the Atlantic circles received powerful leverage over Greece and Turkey, and on the other hand, the clash threatened to exacerbate the Greek-Turkish relations, which could lead these contradictions out of control, generate an armed conflict between the allies and, accordingly, destroy the southeastern front NATO. All of this prompted American strategists to seriously revise previous foreign policy doctrines and find regional concepts that, without changing the existing nature of international relations and the general structure of the North Atlantic bloc, would be able to prevent the process of erosion of military-political positions and ensure the protection of the permanent and long-term interests of imperialism.

CYPRUS-DISPLACED CONFLICT PLACE

The history of the Republic of Cyprus is a chronicle of the struggle against imperialist intrigues. The Zurich-London agreements actually provided the “interested” parties with a convenient opportunity to pursue a policy towards this country that bypasses and contradicts international law. These agreements legalized intervention, the methods of which range from the direct use of force to the most sophisticated means of indirect diplomatic pressure and pressure. Depending on the specific historical situation and the phase of development of the Cyprus crisis, the NATO ruling circles choose different methods of interventionism.

In the very first years of the existence of the Republic of Cyprus, external intervention was aimed at pushing it from the position of non-alignment, a policy of positive neutrality. A clear illustration of this line was the intercommunal clashes, inspired by NATO agents on the island in 1963, 1964 and 1967. In order to change the foreign policy orientation of the Cypriot state, the Atlantic circles resorted to the “ethnic factor” used by the British colonial administration to curb the national liberation struggle of the Cypriots. Assessing the internal political situation in the country, Secretary General of AKEL, E. Papaioannou described the impact of this negative moment as follows: “The peace-loving people striving for progress in Cyprus could not fully use this period for constructive efforts aimed at developing their homeland ... The conspiracy of the imperialists is based on the desire to split the Cypriot people by various kinds of pressure and intervention ...

They (the imperialists) resorted to subversive activities and inciting ethnic hatred between the Greek and Turkish population of Cyprus” [12, 153].

In subsequent years, subversive actions became more sophisticated, the arsenal of means of interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cyprus was replenished with new methods, in particular ideological ones. “Psychological warfare” against the democratic, national liberation movement is becoming an integral part of the state activities of the imperialist powers. It acquires the significance of the “fourth sphere” of foreign policy, equated to diplomatic, military and economic [53, p. 58]. It is symptomatic that in the early 1970s the American Secret Service published three books about Cyprus. From the first (“American Army Handbook of Cyprus”) you can find out that the 6th US Fleet in January 1964 would have landed troops on the island, if not for the decisive position of the Soviet Union (see [59]). The book *Cyprus Between East and West*, which has already been quoted, is crammed with propaganda against AKEL and the USSR. The third book attempted to drive a wedge between President Makarios and AKEL. The purpose of the publications was to psychologically prepare the American people for the imperialist invasion of Cyprus under the pretext of preventing the island from becoming “Mediterranean Cuba”.

The imperialist forces cannot reconcile themselves to the existence in the Eastern Mediterranean of an independent, non-aligned state, where a strong working class party, AKEL, operates. To discredit its activities and conduct anti-communist propaganda, the United States allocated in 1969 20 million dollar. According to information disclosed by the former CIA agent Hefner,

on ideological sabotage on the island in 1973-1974, 60 million dollars were spent [112, 1977, No. 1].

At the same time, the arsenal of means of intervention in the affairs of Cyprus reveals their ineffective, limited nature, and also shows that the development of the optimal regional variant of the Atlantic policy was an empirical path, as if by groping the sharp, explosive elements for themselves or bumping into strong links of opposition. They felt the need for such a conceptual approach to the problems of the Eastern Mediterranean, which would accumulate the previously carried out subversive tactics and individual actions to undermine the stability of the Republic of Cyprus, creating a coherent, independent scheme with a wide range of actions. The next chapter describes the content and features of the regional concept of Atlantic circles, as well as the consequences of its application.

Interventionist Mechanism

The search for optimal regional options was delayed by the attempts of certain circles in Washington to neutralize the militant doctrines of Hellenism and Pan-Turkism through direct intervention in the internal affairs of Greece and Turkey, as well as by drawing them into the so-called controlled arms race. Atlantic circles believed that acts of intervention would lead to the strengthening of obedient regimes, and the concept of “balance of fear-e-restraint of the parties.

The military coup in Greece in April 1967, according to the plan, Prometheus was a direct interventionist act by NATO and the US CIA against its junior ally. The

Athenian junta that came to power signed a number of documents of enslaving dependence, including the agreement of August 22, 1972. and on January 8, 1973 on the provision of Greek ports for basing ships of the US 6th Fleet. However, the events in Greece had other consequences as well, provoking the outrage of all people of good will, who condemned the gross violation of democratic and constitutional rights in Greece.

The reactionary coup forced the publics of neighboring countries to seriously think about the question: are there no other options in NATO, like the "Prometheus " plan, that directly affect their interests? It turned out that the Atlantic leadership has such plans. The Turkish newspaper "Barysh" made public the document FM-30-31, which is an integral part of the operational manual and instructions for infiltration of American agents into friendly countries that should contribute to strengthening the position of pro-American governments [138, 3.IV.1975].

The document deals with various situations in which the Pentagon (always in cooperation with the intelligence services of a friendly country) acts as stabilizing element. Possible options included "excessive manifestation of nationalism, the consequences of which are hostile to the United States and incompatible with their interests". At the same time, it was noted that explosive nationalist sentiments "can create situations with the aim of obtaining maximum benefits from US assistance and control." In short, these were instructions for direct intervention by the US military in the internal affairs of any NATO country in the event of a crisis or "emergency". Documents, the presence of which has not been denied Pentagon, were signed by the deputy commander

American forces in Europe by General J.P. McConnell.

The Western press, for example, the newspaper “Monde”, does not make a secret of the fact that on the basis of these instructions CIA agents operate in the Turkish army, the way the conservative forces retain control over the armed forces [121, 2.IV.1975]. Washington’s involvement in these events sparked an increase in anti-American sentiment in Turkey. It was noticed in other European NATO member states, but there it did not provoke a broad reaction of protest, which was explained by a number of reasons, the most significant of which was fear of social changes, fear of losing dominant positions, and the desire to ensure the security of the entire social system. Closely linked to the social aspect of Atlantic politics is the arms race imposed within NATO on Greece and Turkey. Analysing the US policy of the Nixon-Kissinger-Ford period in the field of arms deliveries abroad, Princeton University professor R. Falk writes in the pages of the Nation magazine that this policy was based on “providing friendly governments with weapons and training sufficient to enable them to resist the internal forces that threaten them without resorting to direct intervention of American troops” [124, 9.VI.1979].

The concept of “balance of fear” did not, however, serve as a platform for Greek-Turkish cooperation. The internal logic of the arms race in the Eastern Mediterranean is that the ruling circles of the two countries have never strived for “equality” by force. Not a balance of power, but at least some advantage—that’s their goal. All this gave rise to distrust, suspicion, created a dangerous military psychosis, and imparted aggressiveness and expansionism to the bourgeois nationalists.

Thus, in its difficult search for a regional concept, Washington faced two unequal values: the Athenian junta, which was obediently following in the American channel, and Turkey, in which the situation was characterized by a difficult internal political struggle. Therefore, the initial principle of the projected scheme should have been the artificial containment of the objective processes of historical development in the Eastern Mediterranean zone. And since neither the intervention nor the arms race brought about the desired and final results, it was possible to use only an extremely aggressive option. However, the Atlanticists also considered it problematic due to widespread criticism after the Vietnamese adventure of Washington's excessive activity and the ineffectiveness of its power policy.

The balance of power that has developed in the world, the growing tendency to defuse international tension, forced the US ruling circles to seek new forms of intervention that would not directly involve them in local wars and conflicts. Direct military intervention, of course, was not completely ruled out, however, being aware of the international consequences it could have, Atlantic circles focused on indirect intervention. The scope of the intervention was also to be outlined by a regional concept. Citing a report from the Centre for the Study of International Politics, Nation wrote that the Nixon-Kissinger administration recognized new realities that constrain interventionist politics. "The key question," the report noted, "was the question of tactics: whose manpower would be used to fight dirty little wars. The use of American troops was politically undesirable, therefore, the Allies had to assume the main responsibility for providing human resources" [124,

9.VI.1979].

This side of the process of forming a new regional concept reflected one of the features of the Atlantic policy in the Eastern Mediterranean: even in the face of a military confrontation between two NATO allies, Washington is forced to abandon the use of force as a preventive means, despite its powerful military, political and economic positions in the area. This circumstance gave rise to the specifics of the tactical approach, according to which the United States remains behind the scenes of the conflict, but actively balances between the opposing allies.

At the end of 1973 the general scheme of the East Mediterranean concept of Atlanticism was defined in the speech of the then Assistant Secretary of State S. Vance (in Rome, at a seminar of representatives of the developing states of the Mediterranean basin). Calling Cyprus “a potential hotbed of tension destroying the southeastern flank of NATO,” Vance bluntly stated: “In the event of a new aggravation of the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, the United States will not prevent Turkey from invading Cyprus and landing its troops there” [103, p. 234]. This statement was preceded by the active work of the CIA, whose leadership tried to convince President L. Johnson that he acted incorrectly in 1964, preventing Turkey from launching an invasion of Cyprus. The secret telegram from the American president was interpreted as an insult and, according to the CIA, incited anti-American sentiment in Turkey. In support of their conclusions, the US intelligence services placed eavesdropping and recording equipment in one of the hotels, where representatives of the Cypriot government and the Turkish Foreign Ministry met secretly. Attached to this

information was the report of the DIA (Office of Military Intelligence), which predicted that Turkey, although it is militarily stronger than Greece, would not be able to win the Turkish-Greek war [104, p. 87].

At that time, many political and public figures perceived S. Vance's speech at the Rome seminar as a dull echo of the struggle of various political schools in the United States. Meanwhile, this statement removed the main issue of the future scheme (the question of the form and method of Washington's regional policy), which was supposed to take into account both the specific features of the system of international relations and the priorities of Atlanticism in the Eastern Mediterranean. The actual sanctioning of the Turkish invasion unambiguously marked the pivotal element of the hatched concept—interventionism, which was justified by the “right” of the strangers to interfere in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cyprus. In the event of a new explosive exacerbation of Greek-Turkish relations, the doctrines of Hellenism and Pan-Turkism were localized by the borders of the island, that is, in the developed scheme, Cyprus was assigned the role of a “displaced conflict site” of two NATO allies. Although other elements of the regional concept remained unknown, the question of the form and method of its practical implementation also clarified the complex-functional approach: to prevent the collapse of the southeastern flank of NATO as a result of the Greek-Turkish confrontation, to suppress the national liberation movement of Cypriots, striking it by moving the epicentre conflict on the island, to achieve military-political subordination of Cyprus, to strengthen the position of Atlanticism in the Eastern Mediterranean. The new regional concept, as part of the strategy of

destabilisation, was an example of how elements of the intervention policy tested in the past acquire a fundamentally new quality at a different historical period of time, and the nature and functioning of the conflict is the form of a certain system.

As for the priorities of the Atlantic policy, at first glance, their assessment looked very contradictory: the transformation of Cyprus into a “displaced conflict place” foreshadowed an imminent threat to the viability of NATO’s southeastern flank. In the opinion of the Greek historian I. Yannakakis, “breaking the precarious equilibrium in Cyprus would mean opening the way for direct intervention by the United States and NATO, which would not tolerate an armed conflict between their allies, each of whom was intent on snatching the largest piece of the island for itself” [122, VIII. 1974]. Subsequent events showed that Washington was ready to take a certain risk of destabilisation, temporary and partial loss of its positions for the sake of far-reaching foreign policy claims in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The price of risk rose due to inter-imperialist rivalry. The overseas leaders of Atlanticism presented a convenient opportunity to once again demonstrate their superiority in power to Western Europe. Formulating the regional concept, they were aware that in conditions of contradictions, Western European partners would use possible miscalculations to strengthen their positions, and therefore they attached a particularly tough aggressive character to their scheme of actions (a variant that frightens off supporters of Eurocentrism). The special envoy of the US President K. Clifford later explained: “We were not interested in the cost of destruction and sacrifice. The primacy was given to the preservation of the southeastern flank of NATO” [85, p.

5].

This dangerous interventionist mechanism has been figuratively called “controlled slippage” in Western scientific literature. The Greek historian I. Yiannakakis believes that “controlled slipping” is a carefully designed political action in which nothing or almost nothing was left to chance. “Historians of international relations will consider the “Cyprus case of 1974” as a classic example of the actions of American diplomacy on the principle “strike while the iron is hot”, when, at first glance, independent from each other, but arising in the same geopolitical space, they are trying to resolve simultaneously in favor of global politics” [122, VIII.1974]. According to Yiannakakis, the comprehensive “linkage” was about maximizing the benefits of the conflict, while minimizing political costs and losses.

Lawrence Stern, a researcher of US foreign policy during the Nixon-Kissinger administration, in *The Wrong Bet*, also sees this operation as an attempt to reformulate Atlantic policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, taking into account new realities and modernisation of means. In his opinion, the new conceptual approach should preserve the old system of international relations in this region, approved by the “Truman Doctrine 1”, but a certain bias should be made in it towards the political consequences of the decisions made (85, p. 72).

Two years after the dramatic events of 1974, US Secretary of State G. Kissinger will call on Congress to assess the content of the concept of “controlled slippage” not from the point of view of “a moral problem, but as a challenge to serious politicians engaged in the achievement of serious goals in the Eastern Mediterranean” [85, from. 142].

According to the concept, the United States acted as a “balancing factor” controlling the actions of the conflicting allies. Turkey, as a militarily stronger country in comparison with Greece, was assigned the functions of the so-called uncontrollable element, whose actions were theoretically limited to waging a “war of nerves”. In this scheme, a special place belonged to the dictatorial regime of Greece, whose internal crisis pushed Athens on the path of external adventures.

The developed scheme provided for the layering of the “primary” elements of the Aegean conflict on the Cypriot elements of the same order, thereby creating a more complex structure of the international conflict than the relations of the directly conflicting parties—Greece and Turkey. Such a structure revealed a certain inconsistency between the true purpose of the regional concept and those ideas about “crisis management” that were widely promoted in American academic spheres. Not managing the conflict in order to prevent war, but using the “primary” elements involved in it in the direction most fully consistent with the objectives of US policy—this is what the authors of the concept intended.

The final formulation of the conceptual approach encountered two complications. The first was as follows. Tactical nuclear weapons are stationed in Greece and Turkey. In the event of a conflict, the threat of its use increased, since at the Brussels session of the NATO Council in December 1969 a doctrine was approved providing for a lowering of the “nuclear threshold”, that is, the use of these weapons at an earlier stage. Greece and Turkey, among the other nine European countries—NATO members, using the American

“atomic umbrella”, have adopted fighter-bombers carrying nuclear warheads [43, p. 59]. As noted in the collection “World Armament and Disarmament”, prepared by the Stockholm Institute for the Study of International Affairs, “the storage of nuclear weapons for NATO allies is under US control, and in” emergencies “nuclear weapons are carried by aircraft. As soon as the threat of the Cyprus crisis arose, the nuclear warheads were removed from Greek and Turkish aircraft and placed under American control” [43, p. 59].

If the first complication was eliminated in the course of the conflict, then the second difficulty put the authors of the concept in an extremely delicate position. The fact is that the presence of US military advisers and specialists in Greece and Turkey in the event of the participation of these countries in an armed conflict could lead to the involvement of Washington in the war, even against its will. In addition, since the Pentagon supplied weapons (and advisers) to both sides simultaneously, a paradoxical situation could arise in which the United States would be involved in the conflict on both sides of the barricades—a situation with unforeseen political consequences. The concept of “controlled slippage” posed a dilemma for Washington: whether to allow its advisers, who may be on opposite sides of the front line, to take part in battles against each other, or to abandon their obligations to keep the supplied weapons on full combat readiness, risking turning thousands American military specialists are a kind of hostages.

The difficulties that arose at an early stage indicated the incompleteness of the scheme being developed. Its authors were clearly in a hurry. What motives prompted Washington to rush into the

introduction of the concept of “controlled slipping”, knowingly neglecting possible complications?

First, the Athenian junta ceased to be profitable from the point of view of Atlantic politics. Galloping inflation, financial scandals, persecution and arrests “in all directions”, unrest in the army and navy undermined the dictatorial regime, and with it discredited American policy. Attempts to “liberalize” the regime in August 1973 were unsuccessful. The coup d’etat on November 25, 1973, replacing the junta of “black colonels” with a junta of generals, also did not bring the country out of the impasse. All the deteriorating situation threatened with serious social upheaval. The Greek historian D. Hondrakukis believes that the turning point came after the failure of the chauvinist slogan “Greece for Christian Greek” put forward by the dictators. In his book “Dictatorship in Cyprus” he writes: “The impulsiveness of the leaders of the fascist regime led to an attempt to switch the explosive mood of the oppressed people to the problem of national prestige, which foreshadowed the Greek Turkish war” [104, p. 93]. Experts of the NATO Political Committee in a special report noted: “The Greek regime, which is isolated at home and abroad, is looking for an external adventure in order to divert public opinion from internal difficulties, to gain support through the propaganda of nationalist slogans. The nationalist echo is clearly audible in contradictions with Turkey” [30, p. 24].

Secondly, Washington’s haste was caused by signs of a certain activity of Western European countries, which openly criticized the United States for all-round support of the junta and demanded to impose restrictions on the supply of military aid to it. Demands to put pressure

on the junta were not dictated by altruistic considerations. In a memorandum from the Atlantic European Committee, distributed in March 1974 to representatives of NATO member states in Brussels, it was said: "There are groups of officers in Greece. who fear a fall in the authority of the army among the people and its removal from the implementation of the national mission. They claim that they are ready to act and rectify the situation, but only on condition if NATO exerts pressure on the regime, including ceasing to provide military assistance to the junta "[30, p. 26). The memorandum revealed the tactics of some Western European countries, which boiled down to the implementation of the next summit coup in Greece. The obviously palliative option did not suit the Atlanticts, since it did not contribute to the "solution" of the complex of problems of American regional policy, but only knocked out one of the important elements of the concept of "controlled slippage".

Thirdly, the violation of the line of the independent Cypriot state, expressed in the propaganda of the hidden enosis, created a difficult situation on the island, led to the alienation and alienation of the two national communities. The revival of the course towards enosis was accompanied by intense subversive activities that were launched in Cyprus by the underground nationalist organisation EOKA-B and Greek officers who served in the Cyprus National Guard. They made the Cypriots in service to greet each other by raising their hands and exclaiming: "Long live enosis!" Treating the soldiers in the spirit of chauvinistic ideas of Hellenism, the Athenian officers in every possible way denigrated the course of the government of President Makarios of non-alignment. Hanging portraits of the head of the

Cypriot state in the barracks was strictly prohibited. The representatives of the government succumbed to the pressure of the intensified campaign for enosis and, in the conditions of the terror unleashed by the reaction, unwittingly contributed to the imperialist conspiracy. The Atlantic forces could not but take advantage of a serious mistake, which the AKEL leaders also admit. According to the highest spheres of NATO, the intercommunal contradictions contained an internal abscess that needed to be opened in order to “stabilise” the situation in the entire Eastern Mediterranean (122, VIII.1974).

Fourth, in the spring of 1974, the Greek-Turkish contradictions were seriously aggravated in connection with the dispute over the oil and gas discovered in the Aegean Sea basin. In February 1974, the Turkish government tried to settle the dispute over the delimitation of the continental shelf through negotiations [35, p. 7].

The fact is that Greece insists on a monopoly right to explore for oil fields both within its territorial waters, as well as on the seabed around the Greek islands, including along the western coast of Turkey. In turn, the Turkish government considers it its right to conduct drilling and prospecting operations for oil within its continental shelf. The Greek side considered the Turkish demands unfair and refused to take part in regular consultations to resolve the differences, which led to an even greater aggravation of the conflict. Mutual accusations of provoking a crisis in the Aegean have been replaced by direct threats and military preparations. The Moloch of the coming war was devouring colossal funds that were so necessary for the national development of the two neighboring states.

The cost alone of the three-day mobilisation of the Greek armed forces was, according to a general estimate, over 650 million West German marks. As the already mentioned American researcher L. Stern wrote, “the armies of Greece and Turkey were in full combat readiness, but they stood not against the “communist enemy from the north or east” prescribed by the NATO charter, but against each other. confronting along their common Aegean and Mediterranean borders. In this sense, the “combustion chamber” in the Eastern Mediterranean originally arose here, and the United States could not sit back and watch the development of events that significantly weaken NATO” [85, p. 4-5).

Regarding the development of the Greek-Turkish contradictions and their impact on the NATO crisis, *Nouvel Atlantique* magazine made the following admission in an editorial: “In the early days of the development of the Greek-Turkish conflict, it seemed that American intervention would be avoided ... US leaders have been heavily blamed for their behavior at the start of the crisis. behavior that was deemed ambiguous and that was possibly only cryptic. From the very beginning it became obvious that the crisis could be reborn, and it was very clearly visible in which direction ...” [123, 28.VIII.1974]. Here is a chronicle of the development of events of those days in the statement of the newsletter of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey.

“On February 22, the Information Department of the Turkish Foreign Ministry made a statement regarding a note sent to Greece on the issue of the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea. It notes that, contrary to the unsubstantiated statements of the Greek side, the note explains the reasons for the government-sanctioned

permission to conduct oil exploration within the Turkish continental shelf. Permit issued to Turkish Petroleum”.

On February 23, Greek Foreign Minister Spiro Teghenis, at a press conference in Athens, insisted that, in accordance with the decisions of the 1958 Geneva Conference, Greece enjoyed all sovereign rights to the territorial waters of the islands of Samoa, Lesbos, Lemnos and Chios.

On April 28, Turkish Foreign Minister T. Gunesh made a statement on the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea, in which he stressed that direct Greek-Turkish negotiations are necessary for the settlement of the conflict. He noted that the Turkish government has not received a response to this proposal from the Greek side. “If the Greek government does not accept our proposals, “ T. Gunesh said, “we will continue to enjoy our legal rights” ...

On May 5, Turkish Defense Minister H. E. Ishyk, speaking in the Senate, expressed concern that Greece was building up its armaments, and accused the leaders of the United States and NATO of insufficient diligence to maintain the balance of power between the allies...

On May 22, Turkish Foreign Minister T. Gunesh, speaking in the parliament on foreign policy, stressed that, despite the principles of relations developed by the founders of the Greek-Turkish friendship, Greece encroaches on Turkey’s legal rights and tries to change the balance of power in its favor. She refuses to enter into negotiations on the continental shelf in the hope of taking a more comfortable position after the UN conference on the law of the sea in Caracas” [35].

The chronicle of events shows that in the study of such an international conflict as the Greek-Turkish one, one must proceed not only from the principle of

historicism, but also from the analysis of the state of the conflict in its dynamics.

Subsequent events reveal how the “controlled slip” concept works. On May 28, 1974, the Turkish oceanographic vessel Chandirli, accompanied by a destroyer, entered the Aegean Sea to begin exploration for oil and gas in the disputed waters. Athens’ reaction was sharply belligerent. The junta leaders brought the armed forces on alert on May 29. The defences of the Greek islands off the western coast of Turkey, near the Greek-Turkish border, were strengthened. Turkey also undertook military preparations, declared a state of emergency in seven vilayets of the country. The junta’s call “we will answer Turkey, which wants our oil,” meant that the internal crisis should be externalized. The “big” Greco-Turkish war seemed inevitable. “All of us in the State Department were convinced, “recalls one of the high-ranking American officials, “that it is no longer possible to eliminate the danger of war, and we knew for sure that it would be a war over the Aegean oil” [85, p. 95].

To defuse the critical situation, to avoid a direct armed confrontation between the two NATO allies, and therefore to avoid the collapse of NATO’s southeastern flank, the concept of “controlled slipping “ was called upon. At that critical moment, news agencies broadcast the following statement by a State Department spokesman: “The United States is closely following the development of the situation and issued a “friendly warning” to Greece and Turkey so that they avoid actions that could lead to an aggravation of relations between NATO member states [110, 1974 , No. 24].

At this stage, the authors of the concept of “controlled slipping”, which demanded an immediate

distance between the Greco-Turkish conflict and the zone of the southeastern flank, had to face an unexpected opinion from a group of high-ranking diplomats. They called for “stopping halfway,” that is, allowing an armed clash between Greece and Turkey, which are unable to wage a protracted war due to the dependence on the United States for arms supplies and extremely limited domestic resources. Hence the conclusion was drawn: the hostilities could be easily controlled and stopped without transferring the war to Cyprus [95, p. 154]. The assumption of a direct Greco-Turkish armed conflict was based on the demagogic idea of a “limited” war. As if the fear of destruction and mass destruction should by itself lead Greece and Turkey to a kind of “rational” use of force. How to achieve such “rationalisation” in conditions of heightened passions and what forms it could take - all these questions remained unanswered. As a result, the strategists’ arguments prevailed.

It is noteworthy that, while embarking on the implementation of its concept, Washington, as in the case of the 1973 Middle East war, ignored its European allies, not honoring them with any preliminary consultation or even a simple warning regarding its possible steps. After 10 emergency meetings devoted to the analysis of the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Political Committee of the Alliance issued a special statement in which it expressed its bewilderment with the American position and stressed that “Washington’s response seems surprisingly slow and evasive” [30, p. 21].

The awareness of the American government bodies themselves went very far. Localisation of the Greek-Turkish conflict within the framework of Cyprus was

considered in Washington at the beginning of 1974. as a very likely option in the event that the “war by notes” over the Aegean oil turns into a real war. American sources do not hide the fact that the practical preparation of the implementation of this option was entrusted to the US CIA, in particular to the former resident in Nicosia, Eric Neff, who arrived in Athens on February 12, where he had contacts with the junta generals, as well as with officials from EOKA-B. The meetings discussed plans to overthrow the government of President Makarios (the CIA leaders in Athens did not refute the official presentation made by the Cypriot government, which cited these facts and expressed concern about the impending anti-government conspiracy on the island).

An important element of preparation was the supply of weapons to the terrorists in Cyprus, financed by the CIA and the Greek industry. The Western press mentions the name of the Greek ship owner A. Potomyanos, who organized the daily supply of weapons, as well as the Iliades company, the main distributor of these weapons in Cyprus.

As Greek-Turkish relations escalated, the CIA’s behind-the-scenes activities also intensified. Former Greek minister and prominent public figure I. Tsigdis in an interview given on August 15 to the newspaper *Le Monde*, emphasized: “No one in Athens doubts that the Americans played the role of a conductor during the performance of the Atlantic Symphony. The production was developed in Washington, and not in the State Department, but in the Pentagon and the CIA” [121]. And further: “The all-powerful chief of the military police and secret services of Greece, General D. Ioannidis, prepared a coup plan in Cyprus in cooperation

with one of the CIA representatives in Athens, Colonel Peter Karamanlis, an American of Greek descent. Their tool: carefully selected Greek officers and the terrorist organisation EOKA-B, funded and armed by the intelligence services of Greece and the United States—KIP and CIA” [121, 15.VIII.1974]

Meanwhile, no matter how much the Pentagon and the CIA were rushing to introduce the concept of “controlled slipping,” the Nixon-Kissinger administration seemed to fear the consequences of widespread destabilisation. At least two interconnected reasons prompted Washington to give the State Department a chance to settle the Greek-Turkish confrontation by diplomatic means. The first reason, of a moral and psychological nature, was that government spheres were still under the impression of a hearing on US policy in the Eastern Mediterranean held in April 1972 at the American Congress Subcommittee on European Affairs. In the course of this trial, the congressmen reasonably pointed out the danger of such an approach to decision-making on fundamental foreign policy problems, in which military-strategic considerations took precedence over political values. The members of the subcommittee expressed their conviction that with this approach, military interests are ultimately threatened due to underestimation of the political consequences of these decisions [85, p. 73]. The subcommittee, chaired by Congressman B. Rosenthal, sent detailed reports on the debate and its conclusions to the White House.

Another reason, which logically followed from the first, was of a pragmatic nature and concerned oil fields in the Aegean Sea, the search for which began in 1972 and was conducted by two American companies Oceania—(from Greece) and Texas KO (from Turkey).

The State Department, not without the participation of the “oil lobby”, seriously studied the possibility of how, with the help of the oil problem, it is possible to drive the Greek-Turkish contradictions deep into the depths and at the same time ensure the interests of their monopolies. The timing of the operation in the Eastern Mediterranean was clearly postponed. According to Greek sources, G. Kissinger sent an “explanation” to the American ambassador in Athens, Taska, in which it was ordered to inform the head of the junta, General Ioannidis, the “wish” of the American side to “postpone” the Cyprus operation, postponing it from June 1974 to a later time [31, p. 6].

During this period, American diplomacy was in a feverish search for ways to prevent the Greek-Turkish confrontation, playing on the increased interest of the parties in the Aegean oil. Speaking in conjunction with the “oil lobby”, the State Department sent messages on May 24 to Greece and Turkey proposing to delimit the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea based on the principles of territorial integrity and respect for the rights of each side. At the same time, the Aegean issue was brought up for discussion at the June session of the NATO Council in Brussels. However, the Greek-Turkish talks held under the auspices of NATO on June 26 (at the level of heads of government) only revealed serious disagreements, thereby dashing the State Department’s hopes for a compromise solution.

As the Prime Minister of Turkey B. Ecevit said at a press conference immediately after his meeting with the Prime Minister of Greece Androtsopoulos, the Greek side, despite numerous calls from the Turkish government to enter into negotiations in order to find a solution to the disputed problems of the Aegean Sea,

refuses even to give any—or an intelligible answer to these proposals. “Facing such facts, B. Ecevit said, “Turkey will continue to enjoy its legal rights in all spheres” [139, 28.VI.1974].

The failure of attempts to resolve the Greek-Turkish conflict in the interests of the oil monopolies and NATO during the month’s delay cast doubt on the effectiveness of diplomatic means. The head of the junta, Ioannidis, refused to deal with the US ambassador to Athens, preferring to keep in touch with Washington not through the embassy channels, but through the CIA.

According to L. Stern, the conversation between General Ioannidis and Karamanlis last took place on June 27. Her detailed record was delivered to Washington the next day. Karamanlis received comprehensive information on the preparations for the putsch in Cyprus. In this conversation, the head of the Athenian junta assured his interlocutor that Makarios would be removed. According to the magazine “Der Spiegel “, subsequent meetings took place in the building of the clinic “Kianos Stavros” (“Blue Cross”), where a plan for the split of the island was developed, approximately corresponding to the “Acheson plan” [130, 8.VIII.1974]. These facts were confirmed by the newspaper “*New York Times*” [127, 2.VIII.1974]

The interventionist “controlled slip” mechanism was launched on July 15, 1974, the day when the reactionary Greek officers carried out a coup d’etat in Cyprus with the active participation of the CIA. The planned action was preceded by an exacerbation of the internal political situation caused by the activation of the underground terrorist organisation EOKA-B. In early July, President Makarios sent a message to Greek

President Gizikis, in which the Greek government and Greek officers in Cyprus were accused of trying to liquidate the independent Cypriot state. The message cited irrefutable evidence that EOKA-B was created on the island by order of the Athenian junta and with the direct participation of the Greek officers; its activities were also financed from Greece. In this regard, the Cypriot government demanded the immediate recall of 650 officers. Just demand of Makarios but was used by Athens as a pretext for an anti-government rebellion. President Makarios managed to escape. Power was seized by an ardent nationalist Nikos Sampson, who unleashed a civil war on the island. Much of this action remains a mystery: the Greek government still refuses to open the so-called dossier on Cyprus, which contains documents exposing the involvement of the US special services in the coup on the island.

The nine days of Sampson's reign were marked by repression and violation of all constitutional rights, causing outrage throughout the world. A wave of repressions hit the progressive forces of Cyprus, primarily the AKEL members. During the reactionary putsch and the armed invasion of Turkey, AKEL lost about 2 thousand party members [56, p. 219]. In those severe days of testing for the country, the party appealed to the people with an appeal to resist the dictatorship of the Greek military. As before in critical periods in the history of the Cypriot state, AKEL called on the Cypriots to support the government of President Makarios [115, 1974, No. 30]. The Cyprus tragedy continued, disfiguring the fertile land with new hills of graves and destruction. The American Newsweek magazine broadcast in those days the contents communications by direct radio communications

between the putschists and Athens, one report reported a “successful course of the operation”, another said that a ship with new officers for the Cypriot National Guard was sailing from a Greek port [125, 25.VIII.1974]. Speaking on 19 July 1974 In the UN Security Council, President Makarios said: “The military regime in Greece insidiously violated the independence of Cyprus. Without showing the slightest respect for the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, the Greek junta extended its dictatorship to Cyprus. Events in Cyprus are not only the internal affair of the Greek Cypriots; they also apply to Turkish Cypriots. harassment, and the whole people of Cyprus, both Greeks and Turks, suffer from its consequences” [21, p. 46].

During a critical period for Cyprus, Washington tried to somehow whitewash its policy. US Deputy Secretary of State John Sisko was sent to the island with a “mediating mission”, but his task was not to stop the regional concept of destabilisation, but only to demonstrate a showy gesture. The calls for restraint, sounded from the lips of a diplomat sent with an “empty briefcase”, could no longer have any impact on Athens and Ankara [67, p. 90].

On July 20, the Turkish expeditionary force landed on the island. The government’s address said that the action was aimed at restoring “independence, territorial integrity and security and returning the country to the regime established by its constitution.” For the first time after the Greek-Turkish war of 1921-1922, two countries launched military operations on the island. The calculations of the Atlantic strategists were justified: Greece and Turkey, acutely perceiving the security interests of their national communities,

transferred the military confrontation, which was considered inevitable, to the territory of a third state. The Greco-Turkish conflict was geographically distant from the southeastern flank of the North Atlantic bloc. The Republic of Cyprus has been turned into the arena of a planned clash of insoluble contradictions in NATO. The harsh reality of war overshadowed the tragedies of the ancients. The fighting dispelled the sweet legends about Aphrodite and Adonis, from whose tears and blood anemones and poppies once grew on the island.

Analysing the position of Greece during the “peaks” of the Cyprus crisis, one cannot but draw attention to its passivity and indecision. The former commander of the Greek Navy, Admiral P. Arapakis, justifying the decision not to interfere during the landing of Turkish troops, made the following argument: “I came to the conclusion that it would be more profitable for the Greek fleet not to send its ships to the region of Cyprus, where they would not have aviation support moreover, it would leave the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea unprotected” [145, 12.XII.1975] extraordinary consciousness: the danger of internal quarrels and disagreements. important news of the impending rebellion, the president and government refused to believe that the Greek junta could commit such a crime. The consequence of underestimating the danger was that the necessary measures to thwart the plans of the reactionaries were not taken in time and the putschists relatively easily managed to put Cyprus on the brink of a national catastrophe.

Western researchers give a different explanation. For example, the American authors R. Howe and S. Trott see the reason for such indecision in the corruption of the high command of the Greek army,

which was caused by the re-export of American weapons, turning the arms trade into a profitable business area [77, p. 461]. The already mentioned Greek general and historian D. Hondrakukis refutes the arguments of statesmen and military leaders explaining the passivity of Greece by the great distance from the island, in which aviation could not be used. Hondrakukis believes that the Greek Air Force would cover the distance (600 miles) to Cyprus in 3-5 minutes and provide sufficient support. In his opinion, the main reasons for indecision are the weakness of the army, its poor technical equipment, the absence of a well-trained command staff, and most importantly, the unpopularity of the war among the masses [104, p. 94].

As a result of this position of Greece, the forces in the unfolding battles in Cyprus were unequal. The Greek units did not put up serious resistance to the Turkish corps, well equipped with American equipment.

It is noteworthy that at this stage in the implementation of the concept of “controlled slipping” in the political calculations of its initiators, another dimension suddenly appeared: to what extent could Turkey’s independence of actions reach? In order not to lose control over the course of events, Washington, according to some foreign sources, insisted on assigning American officers to the landing Turkish troops, who determined both the pace of the offensive and the final boundaries of the invasion. However, American observers Evans and Novak, commenting on the Cyprus crisis on the pages of the Washington Post, wrote that the “uncontrollable element” had become so important that “if the Turks, whose appetite is growing with their military successes in Cyprus, decide to seize the whole island, the United States will be practically unable to do

anything about it, except blocking Cyprus to prevent the transfer of troops there by sea” [135, 17.VIII.1974]. The concept of “controlled slip” included such extremes. Citing Pentagon officials, the Associated Press reported at the start of military operations in Cyprus that the 6th Fleet had been ordered to concentrate off the island and instructed to be ready for a Marine landing [110, 1974, No. 35].

As a result of two operations, the expeditionary force Turkey has taken control of about 40% of the Cypriot territory. The rebels were forced to retire from the political arena. On the same day, the military dictatorial regime in Greece collapsed. Opposition leader K. Karamanlis, who arrived in Athens on July 23, headed the civil government. In Cyprus, G. Clerides became acting president. The cessation of hostilities and the ensuing politicisation of the conflict became possible as a result of the adoption by the UN Security Council of a resolution of 16 August 1974.

The Cyprus adventure, although it cost the former Athenian regime of power, softened the force of the explosion. The transfer of the military confrontation to the territory of Cyprus, “letting off steam from the boiler, “ helped to avoid the “big” Greco-Turkish war, and in this sense, we can say that the crisis in the Aegean basin gave rise to a chain reaction, causing the Cyprus conflict.

It should be noted that the concept of “controlled slipping” has opponents. As a rule, they include those bourgeois researchers who portray the emerging spontaneity and contradictions of events in the Eastern Mediterranean as almost a political version of the “Brownian movement”. They see only chaotic and random in the development of events, a free play of

forces, devoid of any clear system, a common core. Such researchers include, for example, Professor of the University of London P. Vatikiotis, who claims that the fault is the “conspiracy theory” invented by the Greeks [131, XVIII.1976]. Simplification of the true picture of the complex situation in the region leads to perversion of the true mechanism of the imperialist policy of the US and NATO in the Eastern Mediterranean and, of course, to disregard of the class content of international relations.

The tragic events in Cyprus were not an inevitable tragedy determined by fate; Nor were they the result of the uncontrolled activity of the forces. Speaking at the XXIX session of the UN General Assembly, S. Kyprianou stressed: “What happened in Cyprus was not accidental: the coup was not accidental, the invasion was not accidental. The plan had to be carried out.”

The concept of “controlled slipping” revealed the particular aggressiveness and selfishness of the Atlanticist policy. As a product of the bourgeois military-political thought of the United States, this concept reflected the desire of Washington politicians to make Atlanticism more effective and active. Moving away from purely political, top-level solutions to the problems of the Eastern Mediterranean (another turn in Greece, behind-the-scenes influence on the development of the situation in Turkey, etc.), Atlanticists use new opportunistic opportunities, put the solution of these problems in a complex functional dependence, in which the results in one direction could compensate for miscalculations in the other. But the concept of “controlled slippage” has put American diplomacy in the face of serious difficulties. Were all the consequences of the tactics of destabilisation in the

Eastern Mediterranean region foreseen? Did Washington realize that the Cypriot adventure could ricochet a blow to regional politics? That Greece, against which the US pursued a policy based solely on the need to maintain it as a NATO stronghold, can leave the military organisation of the North Atlantic bloc and revise the status of foreign bases? Did Washington assume that Turkey, in response to the 1975 arms embargo, would take American military facilities under national control?

The Cyprus conflict led to an unexpected turn for Atlantic strategists—strengthening of anti-American, anti-imperialist sentiments in Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. What American politics had been creating in these countries for decades collapsed within months. This was a completely natural, albeit belated, reaction to the monstrous strategy of destabilisation. The Cyprus crisis has shown what adventures these countries can lead to a policy of blindly following in the wake of the Atlantic strategy, how much it threatens the cause of world peace and international security.

From an analysis of the development of events, it is clear that the Cypriot putsch, as a consequence of the concept of “controlled slipping”, pursued the achievement of three functions. Its first function was aimed at introducing radical changes in the situation in Cyprus that could change the political orientation of the country. This was linked, in particular, to the hopes of eliminating the government of President Makarios, which opened the way for the “Atlanticisation” of the island—either on the basis of the actual accession to Greece and the inclusion of the island in the “defensive” system of Atlanticism, or through the dismemberment of Cyprus, which ultimately led to the same goal—parts of the island would go to Greece and Turkey—NATO

member countries.

The social aspect of this function directly affected Greece, where, according to the CIA, a revolutionary situation was created that threatened to significantly shake not only the dictatorial regime, but also the very foundations of bourgeois society. Initially, the leadership of the junta and its patrons hoped to switch the discontent of the masses to the “Turkish factor”, mistakenly believing that opposition to it would rally the Greeks around the generals. The replacement of dictators did not eliminate the social threat. On the contrary, the bourgeois circles faced powerful anti-imperialist, anti-American sentiments, galvanized by the Cyprus events. Now we can say that the price of the political survival of bourgeois society was the withdrawal of Greece from the NATO military organisation.

The second function was of a purely provocative nature: to give Turkey a reason to land troops on the island. As the well-known Turkish historian and former political adviser to the Prime Minister H. Ulman testifies, “Turkey’s interference in the internal affairs of Cyprus was provoked by the United States, which simultaneously sought to limit military operations on the island and direct them into a framework favorable to their plans.” A similar opinion is expressed in Greece. Thus, a prominent politician A. Papandreou accuses American politicians of deliberately destabilizing the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. tacitly handing the head of the Turkish government B. Ecevit an invitation to invade [31, p. 8]. The same point of view was expressed by American congressmen during the consideration of the issue of military assistance to Turkey in July 1975 in the House of Representatives of

the US Congress. Many speakers, including S. Vance, noted that the absence of Washington's condemnation of the Greek regime and a clear statement of its desire to restore constitutional order in Cyprus created favorable conditions for the start of the Greek-Turkish war on the island. "In its circumstances," admitted S. Vance, "the actions subsequently taken by Turkey were to be expected. "Member of the House of Representatives K. Zabolotsky also pointed out that American policy" "created grounds for Turkey to land troops in Cyprus" [67, p. 88].

To understand all the complexity and internal contradictions of the Turkish action, it is necessary to consider the factors that influenced the adoption of such a decision. These factors are multifaceted and unequal in their influence. In terms of domestic politics, it should be noted that it hopes to put success in Cyprus at the service of the party interests of the CHP in order to strengthen its positions and attract the conservative generals to its side. The Cypriot action was associated with the task of diverting the attention of the masses from a complex of economic and social problems. The prospects for socio-economic transformations were replaced by the incitement of nationalist passions.

In terms of foreign policy, the Turkish operation appears to be the most ambivalent and contradictory. On the one hand, it was not typical of the Turkish policy style of recent years. Ankara has a tendency to pursue a balanced, realistic line, especially when it relates to involvement in crisis situations. On the other hand, the appeal to methods "from a position of strength" is apparently caused by many years of adherence to the "Atlantic canons". At the same time, the personal attitude of certain Turkish statesmen to the practice

and theory of Atlanticism is also reflected (B. Ecevit, for example, studied in a seminar with G. Kissinger at Harvard University). The impact of such phenomena as the fall of the US authority, the erosion of “Atlantic discipline”, and the collapse of detente cannot be disregarded.

The other side of the Cyprus putsch was related to the Middle East conflict. Evidence of this is not only the enthusiasm of Tel Aviv politicians over the overthrow of the government of President Makarios, but also the publicized contacts that the former head of the Athenian junta, General Ioannidis, maintained with Israel. Subsequent events make one think that there is indeed a behind-the-scenes link between the ominous rebellion in Cyprus and the difficult situation in the Middle East. On August 19, 1974, a retired general and former chief of Israeli intelligence H. Herzog came up with an official plan for the deployment of bases for the US 6th Fleet off the coast of Israel. This plan went further than the already mentioned proposal of M. Dayan, made in 1971. With informed courtesy, the Duke declared that perhaps the Cyprus crisis would lead to the loss of strong points in Greece by the American fleet. According to Herzog, the creation of bases in Israel “could only be welcomed, given the radical strategic changes taking place in the Middle East” [135, 20.VIII.1974].

Confirming this idea, the French newspaper *Le Monde* Diplomat noted that for the Pentagon, seeking to solve the Cyprus problem based on the interests of the North Atlantic bloc, “it was necessary that the 6th Fleet maintain and find new permanent, stable and reliable bases in the vicinity of the Arab-Israeli conflict” [122, 1976, No. 1].

The dangerous game over Cyprus was by no means confined to plans to bring NATO's footholds as close as possible to Israel. The Cyprus conflict was supposed to serve as a signal for the reactionary circles in the Middle East to intensify subversive actions: against the progressive processes in the area.

Right-wing Christian forces in Lebanon perceived the Cyprus events and their consequences as a perfectly suitable model for suppressing democratic evolution in the country. Having inspired armed clashes, they put forward at the end of 1975 the option of resolving the conflict by dividing Lebanon into two separate states on a religious basis. This option was called the "Cypriot Plan" for the Lebanese crisis. Although the idea of dismemberment failed, American diplomacy continued to develop this option "just in case". At that time, in the diplomatic circles of Beirut, information was widely disseminated about the possible opening of a US consulate and representative offices of a number of American companies and organisations in the area controlled by right-wing Christian formations. "At present, I believe in the infinite ability of the Lebanese to find, as in the past, political compromises that could provide for something like a confederal or cantonal system that somehow preserves territorial unity," Dean Brown, director of the Middle East Institute at Columbia University, said after trips to Lebanon [64, p. 124]. The events in Cyprus turned the section into a patented means for resolving conflict situations according to a scheme pleasing to imperialism.

When considering the driving mechanisms of the concept of "controlled slip", a reasonable question arises: was its destabilizing effect fatally inevitable, or could the Atlantic circles encounter a decisive rebuff,

which would lead to the disruption of their plans?

External onslaught and pressure, as a rule, are resisted by those governments that pursue a consistent policy of freeing their countries from all areas of neo-colonialist dependence. That is, opposition is the more effective the more persistently the influence of imperialism is overcome in the political, economic, military, ideological and other spheres. The Atlanticist conceptual scheme worked because Greece and Turkey, being in a dependent position, themselves became elements of this scheme. As for the Republic of Cyprus, the sure guarantee of the success of the anti-imperialist struggle of its people has been and remains vigilance, allowing in the bud to frustrate the plans of the conspirators, to prevent the escalation of events. Analysing the reasons that led to the putsch in Cyprus, AKEL Secretary General E. Papaioannou, in particular, noted the underestimation of the danger of the rebellion, the lack of due vigilance. Even at a time when three important news of the impending rebellion were spreading from everywhere, the president and government refused to believe that the Greek junta could commit such a crime. The consequence of underestimating the danger was that the necessary measures to thwart the plans of the reactionaries were not taken in time and the putschists relatively easily managed to put Cyprus on the brink of a national catastrophe.

Many years before the events described, the communists insisted on the expulsion from the security organs and the state apparatus of those who played an active role in the subversive activities of EOKA-B, on the development of a plan to counter a possible rebellion. However, despite warnings and insistence on taking

effective measures to prevent the impending putsch, the government did not draw the necessary conclusion. As the Western press wrote, President Makarios was so sure of the impossibility of rebellion that on the day of the coup, which was announced in advance, he received a delegation of Egyptian youth at his residence. Shots fired nearby alerted the President's interlocutors, but not the President, who continued the conversation. The audience was interrupted only after Makarios's assistant ran into the hall with an exclamation: "Your Eminence, tanks are entering the palace grounds!"

Describing the events in Cyprus, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Leonid I. Brezhnev, in a speech at a dinner in the Kremlin in honor of the party and government delegation of the Hungarian People's Republic on September 25, 1974, noted that "the world has received yet another clear proof of what the NATO military bloc plays a dangerous role in international life, as far as the very essence of this bloc, its main political goals are incompatible with the interests of freedom, independence and security of peoples" [7, p. 419].

The Cyprus tragedy and the fight to eliminate its consequences

Despite the sharp and multifaceted onslaught of NATO, the Republic of Cyprus withstood, although the anti-government rebellion of the reactionary Greek officers and the ensuing landing of Turkish troops created serious trials for it, brought the Cypriots a lot of

grief and sufferings.

The dramatic July-August events caused a massive movement of Greek Cypriots from the northern regions of the country to the southern regions and, in turn, gave rise to a widespread migration of the Turkish population to the zone controlled by Turkish troops. According to official UN statistics, the total number of displaced Greek Cypriots is 198 thousand people, and the Turkish Cypriots—37 thousand people [24, p. 15]. There was a violent demarcation of the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots along national and geographical grounds, which, on the one hand, contributed to the ethnic unification of each of the communities, and on the other, introduced new dangerous elements into the situation in Cyprus. The “pearl” of the Mediterranean, as Cyprus is figuratively called, was split. The dividing line, which runs through the entire island, begins on the outskirts of Morphou, passes through the capital quarters of Nicosia and continues on to Famagusta. Its width ranges from 20 meters up to 7 km, covering about 3% of the country’s territory. On the map published in Nicosia, the green line cuts the territory of the country like a deep scar. On both sides it appears in the form of wire barriers, a chain of machine-gun nests and checkpoints [24, p. 10].

The supporters of Hellenism suffered a sensitive defeat. The leadership of the Greek community and the government of G. Karamanlis announced the rejection of the slogan of enosis, As the Permanent Representative of Greece to the UN stressed, “in order for enosis to take place, Greece must agree with it, and Greece’s response on this issue is negative” [21, p. 77].

Returning to his presidential duties, Makarios during a visit to Athens in the summer of 1975 agreed with the

Greek government a “framework for concessions” in the Cyprus settlement, which was based on the federal structure of the state. Their agreed line was embodied in a proposal (April 1976), the preamble of which, in particular, stated: “Based on the basic premise that the territory of the Republic of Cyprus should be a single and indivisible whole and that an integral or partial union of Cyprus with any state or any separatism, independence and division are excluded...” [21, p. 77].

The Turkish nationalists who gained the upper hand significantly strengthened their nationalist positions, which found expression in the creation in Cyprus of a new state entity—the Federal Turkish State of the Republic of Cyprus. For every government department and service on the Greek Cypriot side, there is today a corresponding Turkish unit in the northern zone of the island. The land use system has undergone significant changes.

In the changed conditions, Turkish nationalists put forward a new ideological concept. In particular, the leadership of the Turkish community argues that the Turkish Cypriots can no longer live mixed, side by side with the Greek Cypriots, but only within the framework of a two-communal federal state [142, 17.IV.1975]. Theoretically speaking, this concept could take into account new elements in the structure of Cypriot society if it implied a set of measures and policies aimed at preserving and strengthening an independent, sovereign and territorially integral Cypriot state, the interests of strengthening the unity of its people. However, “living nearby” is interpreted as the conservation of the “fait accompli” policy, as a toughening of the line on separatism. Such an

interpretation of the concept of two zones is fraught with the danger of a split in the Cypriot state, with a direct threat to its territorial integrity. The unilateral decision to create the Turkish Federative State of the Republic of Cyprus was described in the TASS statement as “a new attempt by certain NATO circles to disrupt the settlement process and carry out the partition of the island contrary to the interests of the Cypriot people” [111, p. 11/17/1975].

The introduction of a new state formation was also expressed in a change in the demographic picture of Cyprus due to the influx of emigrants from Turkey and the forced deportation of the local Greek population. This practice should increase the share of the Turkish community in the total population of the country from one fifth to one third.

According to Der Spiegel, everything Greek is being eradicated in the Turkish sector. The old inscriptions on the walls of houses disappeared, streets and institutions were renamed, churches became mosques, bell towers and minarets. Citizens of a separate state pay for purchases with Turkish liras. Their clocks, like in Turkey, go one hour ahead in summer [130, 1975, No 31].

The armed NATO action and the forcible dismemberment of Cyprus caused great damage to the Cypriot economy, disrupting the historically established way of life and economic harmony of the two national communities.

Although the Turkish-controlled northern part makes up only about 40% of the entire territory, it produced over 70% of the gross national product. This zone accounted for 80% of citrus production, 79% of cereals, 45% of olive crops, 25% of potatoes, 100% of tobacco,

86% of carrots, 47%—livestock products. 56% of minerals were extracted there. In the northern sector, 83% of all loading and unloading mechanisms and 65% of hotels and tourist bases remained [23, p. 147].

The country's gross domestic product declined from 309.5 million in 1973 to 242.8 million Cypriot pounds in 1976 (as of November 1, 1976, one Cypriot pound was equal to USD 2.38). But the total value of exports increased from 51.3 million to 83 million pounds. Agricultural exports remained unchanged at 26.5 million pounds. The increase was due to an increase in the sale of industrial goods—from 14.7 million to 49 million pounds [69, p. 260].

The economic realities of the section have put forward an alternative associated with the need to focus on industrial development. As the former Minister of Trade and Industry of Cyprus S. Pieridis stated, “before the invasion of Turkish troops, industrial development could be seen as a matter of evolution. Now Cyprus needs an industrial revolution so that it can provide a standard of living for its people and survive as a state” [149, 18.12.1976].

The forced change in economic strategy demanded drastic changes in the structure of trade. Along with traditional Cypriot exports (citrus fruits, wines, potatoes, minerals), the government intends to enter the wide world market in the future with plastic products “footwear, clothing, irrigation equipment. To implement these plans, the emphasis is on the development and expansion of the state a sector in which subsidies and jobs are increasing. But the achievement of industrial progress is closely associated with significant investment. In the zone controlled by the Cypriot government, a guarantee system for loans

for exports is in place, a law on free trade zones is being prepared. Private investment is strongly encouraged. Foreign capital is an extremely shy bird and the ongoing internal political crisis is holding back investment, resulting in an investment in constant prices of CYP 80.2 million in 1973 and CYP 43 million in 1976.

The long-term economic viability of such a small unit as the Greek community is physically limited and depends on the solution of a number of important problems: unemployment, balance of payments, government budget deficits, refugee problems, and finally, on a general settlement of the Cyprus issue, in particular on the territorial aspect and integration with the North part of the island.

1974 events, gave birth to a new, albeit very an artificial, economic unit in the northern regions of the island. Under the control of the Turkish army, the Turkish Cypriots “got the most fertile agricultural areas, 60% of the industrial enterprises and mines left by the Greek Cypriots, 70% of the income from international tourism. It is not surprising that such outwardly brilliant opportunities immediately attracted the attention of businessmen from Turkey. Their first squad was made up of hotel owners. According to the Turkish press, there are already several companies based on Turkish capital, which specialize in tourism, shipping, industry, agriculture, produce alcoholic beverages, cigarettes. According to the Turkish community administration, in the second quarter 1976. 122 out of 360 existing industrial facilities were put into operation. These rates are explained by the acute shortage of capital investments, the lack of trained technical personnel. Mixed Turkish-Cypriot companies

are widespread in the northern zone. One of the largest holders of shares in the mixed industrial-commercial firm ETI is the leader of the Turkish community R. Denktash: [27, p. 8].

A quick profit was promised at the beginning by the export of agricultural products. Vegetables, fruits and olives are transported by the mixed Turkish-Cypriot company "Cypfruvex" to the Turkish port of Mersin, and then exported to England, Germany, the Scandinavian countries. However, food prices are rising in the Turkish community, and there is an acute shortage of spare parts for the machinery used in agriculture. According to the leadership of the Turkish community, the economic situation of the Turkish Cypriots is catastrophic and even subsidies to Turkey, which it annually provides in the amount of 90 million West German marks, cannot correct it [130, 1975, No. 31].

Thus, as a result of the events of 1974, the Cyprus economy was disorganized and all of its sectors suffered significant damage, estimated at 173 million Cyprus. f. (69, p. 260).

AKEL is making a major contribution to eliminating the economic consequences of the anti-government putsch and invasion. The party took an active part in the development of an emergency plan for economic development (1975-1976), as well as a second emergency plan (1977-1978). Her proposals emphasize the urgent need to nationalize banks and insurance companies, mining companies, water resources and establish full state control over the oil refinery in Larnaca.

In 1979, the AKEL Central Committee developed its proposals for the third emergency plan of economic

activity (1979-1981), the basis of which should be “acceleration to the best of the possible pace of development with the aim of a significant and sustainable increase in the living standards of the working people and the entire people” [112, 1979, No. 9, p. 3].

Despite great difficulties, over the past six years life in the southern part of the island has normalized and is characterized by relative stability. Already in 1978, it was possible to achieve and exceed the level of production of basic agricultural products that existed before the events of 1974. Export-oriented industries (cement, footwear, tobacco) developed dynamically. The share of the agricultural sector in the total gross national product (381 million Cypriot pounds in 1980) reached 65.7 million, and the export of this product was estimated at 33.4 million. The expansion of the tourism industry was stimulated. The gross income from tourism in 1980 was 71 million Cyprus pounds (compared with 50 million in 1979), by 1981 the country's gold and foreign exchange reserves exceeded 150 million (100 million in 1974)

Western propaganda attributes this “little economic miracle” to the spirit of private entrepreneurship, as well as assistance to Cyprus from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, the Common Market, and Greece. Of course, the influx of loans contributed to some stabilisation of the Cypriot economy, but it is clear that it was evicted not by the philanthropic inclinations of Western monopolists, but by their attempts to keep Cyprus in their sphere of influence with the help of economic levers.

The country owes the success of the restoration

process primarily to the efforts of the entire population. In order to revive the economy, Cypriot workers agreed to even a significant reduction in wages, while entrepreneurs took advantage of this for personal enrichment. In this regard, the AKEL party is now putting forward a demand for a more equitable distribution of income, on remuneration of workers for the victims suffered.

Among the factors that contributed to overcoming difficulties, such as the planned management of the economy, the revitalisation of the state in the economic field, favorable conditions for exports. According to the plan adopted in January 1980 by the government, the total appropriation for 1979-1981. will amount to 552.2 million Cyprus pounds. Of these, 172.3 million will fall on government allocations, the rest—on private. The annual growth of the gross national product should be 5%. Judging by the statement of the Minister of Finance A. Avxentiu, the plan provides for an increase in exports, an increase in production efficiency, an increase in domestic savings [14, 15.1.1980].

However, clouds are gathering again on the economic horizon. The country has a high level of unemployment (15% of the workforce is not provided with employment), the deficit of the balance of payments is growing (214 mln. in 1980, up from 172 million in 1979). Inflation, which for three years was maintained at the level 7.5%, in 1979 it exceeded 9%, and its level in 1980 was reached 13%.

Especially negatively affected the Cypriot economy, inflationary processes and deepening energy crisis in Western Europe. During 1980, gasoline prices nearly doubled, giving foreign oil companies the opportunity to drive profit margins to 117%. As a radical measure for

solving the fuel and energy problem, national-patriotic forces put forward the demand for the nationalisation of the only one in Cyprus a refinery in Larnaca and a distribution system for petroleum products.

Economic problems primarily affect the living standards of the working people. The so-called displaced persons found themselves in a particularly difficult situation, many of whom fled without taking with them even the most essential. To improve the living conditions of the Greek Cypriot refugees, the government adopted a decree providing for the construction of residential buildings for the affected population. To this end, the third emergency plan for economic development provides for the allocation of significant funds from state funds—65 million Cyprus pounds. At the same time, the government stressed that caring for refugees does not mean changing the principled approach to solving the problem of “displaced persons”. Ensuring the conditions for their return to their homes remains one of the key aspects of resolving the Cyprus crisis.

A “small economic miracle” does not remove the burden of social problems. Therefore, the progressive forces of Cyprus put forward the following demands: raising the living standard of the people; full employment; improving working conditions; professional organisation of all workers; social insurance and pensions for all workers; solving the housing problem with the help of the state; special care for the countryside and backward areas; electrification; organisation of water supply, construction of roads, schools; protection of the interests of artisans; restructuring of education, its democratisation and adaptation to the needs of the country; introduction of

compulsory education for children up to 15 years of age and free, secondary education, payment of scholarships to indigent students [112, 1978, No. 6].

Despite the difficulties caused by the consequences of the anti-government rebellion and the landing of Turkish troops, the national liberation movement in Cyprus did not weaken. In May 1975, on the initiative of AKEL, the House of Representatives began to discuss the issue of British bases. Exposing an aggressive entity. foreign objects, the party called on all progressive forces of the country to fight for their elimination, for the withdrawal of foreign troops and the demilitarisation of Cyprus. The remaining unfulfilled proposal found wide support in parliament. In September 1976, on the AKEL initiative, a bill was prepared and approved by the government on the purge of the state apparatus from the coup elements, many of which continue to carry out subversive work. This measure was implemented only partially, as it encountered opposition. During 1979 only 60 active participants in the rebellion were dismissed from the state apparatus. Meanwhile, the intensification of the activities of the extreme right-wing forces alarms the democratic public, on whose initiative a discussion of the purge issue has been renewed. By an overwhelming majority, the Cyprus House of Representatives adopted on July 4, 1980. a resolution that calls on the government to bring the "ministers" of the putschist "government" to trial, and to take measures to seize the illegally stored weapons. A special paragraph of the resolution requires the return to the country of N. Sampson, who was sentenced by a Cypriot court to 20 years in prison, but was issued in 1979. abroad for treatment, although, according to the Western press,

the “patient” is not so much treated as while away the time in the entertainment establishments of Bonn and Paris.

The struggle for the elimination of the events of 1974, for a just solution to the problem led to a significant polarisation of the socio-political forces in Cyprus. The watershed between them was the attitude to the ways and means of settlement. One line is anti-imperialist, focused on the liberation struggle for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, on pursuing a policy of non-alignment and demilitarising the island, on resolving the Cyprus issue within the framework of the UN. Three political forces firmly adhered to this line: AKEL, the Democratic Party headed by the current president S. Kyprianou, and the socialist party United Democratic Union of the Centre (EDEK) [112, 1977, No. 1].

Another line, aimed at accepting the situation that has developed as a result of foreign aggression, is characterized by the desire to resolve the Cyprus issue within the framework of NATO and in accordance with the goals of the imperialist powers. The Democratic Gathering Party, a coalition of extreme right-wing forces, is most inclined to compromise with the West. Its leader, former chairman of parliament G. Clerides, in March 1978 resigned from the National Council (the presidential advisory body), which includes the leaders of the leading parties. He motivated his move by the transition to active opposition. As before, the underground terrorist organisation EOKA-B, which seeks the annexation of Cyprus to Greece, continues to act from the extremist platform [112, 1977, No. 1].

The solution of a complex of vital problems objectively requires the unity of all democratic forces,

whose cooperation cannot be limited to joint parliamentary activities, but should extend to the general aspects of the liberation struggle and those special moments that arose as a result of the putsch and Turkish intervention (the struggle for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Cypriot territory for the return of refugees to their places of former residence, for clarifying the fate of all missing persons, for an independent, sovereign, territorially integral, non-aligned and demilitarized Cyprus, for resolving the constitutional aspect of the Cyprus issue and the implementation of UN resolutions).

Defining the content of this struggle as anti-imperialistic, liberating, AKEL believes that for its successful completion it is necessary to create a united front of all patriotic and democratic forces on the basis of a minimum program acceptable to all participants. This explains the cooperation of AKEL with the national bourgeoisie, with the government, although while retaining the right to criticize negative aspects in its policy and take measures to correct them [56, p. 218].

A serious test of the balance of forces was the parliamentary elections held on September 5, 1976 in the territory controlled by the government [108, 1976, No. 10]. They were held despite the difficult internal political situation, since, on the one hand, the term of office of the legislature officially expired already in 1975, and on the other hand, many deputies demanded to renew the composition of parliament and announced that they would resign if elections were not held. The results of the voting brought a convincing victory to the democratic forces - the AKEL, the Democratic Party and EDEK, which during the election campaign reached cooperation agreements based on the support of the

foreign policy course of President Makarios. They received 34 out of 35 mandates {108, 1976, No. 10}. The right-wingers, which had an insignificant parliamentary majority before the elections, have generally lost their positions in the legislative body. In accordance with the agreement, the seats in parliament were distributed as follows: Democratic Party—21, AKEL—9 and EDEK—4. The remaining one seat was given to the representative of the Greek Cypriot side in the intercommunal negotiations [112, 1977, No. 1].

The Turkish Cypriots did not participate in the elections, although, according to the constitution, they have 15 seats in parliament. Having created a separate state entity in the zone controlled by the Turkish troops, the leadership of the Turkish community separately held elections to the so-called Legislative Assembly of the Federal Turkish State of the Republic of Cyprus. As a result of elections held in June 1976, 30 out of 40 seats were taken by MPs from the National Unity Party. The leader of the Turkish community R. Denktash became the president of this “state “. The rest of the deputy mandates were distributed among representatives of the Social Liberation Party, the People’s Party, the Turkish Republican Party [144, 14.X.1976]. All groups advocate a solution to the problem on the basis of the creation of a two-zone bi-communal federation and believe that the proclamation of independence of the Turkish community will open the way to a confederate the political structure of the country [112, 1974, No. 2].

A serious situation developed after the death of President Makarios on August 3, 1977, the permanent head of the Cypriot state, an ardent champion of national unity. The name of Makarios (Michael

Christodoulos Muscos) is associated with the long years of the struggle of the Cypriot people against imperialist enslavement. In the 1968 presidential election, his candidacy was supported almost unanimously. Makarios garnered 96% of the Greek Cypriot vote, while the far-right candidate barely 4%. In the 1973 election campaign, the ultra-right chauvinist bloc did not dare to nominate its candidate at all, therefore, in accordance with the constitution, Makarios was elected president without a vote, supported by a 200,000 rally. Based on considerations of maintaining unity on the broadest possible basis, the leading political parties of the Greek community reached an agreement that Acting President S. Kyprianou would remain in this post until February 1978, when Makarios's five-year term of office expired.

In Atlantic circles, they hoped that with the change of the head of state, the new leadership of Cyprus would move away from the policy of non-alignment and it would be possible to impose a desirable NAT settlement on it. In this case, the calculations were based on the fact that the events due to internal contradictions themselves will give a "reverse course", which could be credited to the tactics of destabilisation.

The parties entering the parliament of the country unanimously decided, based, according to their statement, on the highest interests of the state, to support S. Kyprianou [108, 1978, No. 3]. In accordance with the constitution, in the absence of other applicants, Kyprianou was automatically proclaimed President of Cyprus. In his speeches, Kyprianou expressed a clear intention to follow the political course of Makarios, to continue the policy of non-alignment, and to strengthen relations with all countries. The new head of

state stressed that the Cyprus problem is not a problem of relations between the Cypriot Greeks and Turks, but is caused by foreign invasion and occupation of the country and that the solution to the problem “must protect the rights and interests of all the people of Cyprus and ensure the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and policy of non-alignment of the republic”. This approach, along with the consent to a federal structure (provided that it would be a true federation, not a confederation) created the prerequisites for finding a just settlement of the problem [108, 1978, No. 3].

Unfortunately, in the future these statements diverged from the practical line. Maintaining a responsible position, AKEL made it clear to the president that it would not support steps that were inconsistent with the tactics of struggle proclaimed by the National Council and the government, with the line and tactics of Makarios, and warned that in this case it would not hesitate to reject his policies.

Contributing to the mobilisation of the Cypriot people for disruption of imperialist conspiracies, a peaceful and just solution to the problem was the solution of the May 1978, in Nicosia XIV Congress of AKEL. It was attended by representatives of 34 communist and workers' parties, as well as national liberation movements. The party approached its congress strengthened, recovered its strength (at present, there are more than 12 thousand members in its ranks, united in 272 primary organisations. The social composition of the party has strengthened: 67% of members come from workers and office workers, 20% are peasants and representatives of the middle strata) [56, p. 219]. The congress approved a political

resolution, which provided a deep analysis of the domestic and international situation and outlined the main ways of resolving political, economic and social problems. An appeal was made to the Cypriot people, exposing imperialism and the bloc NATO as the main enemies of Cyprus, and an appeal to the president of the republic with an appeal to democratise the political and public life of the country.

The issue of democratisation is of particular importance at the present stage of the struggle. In essence, it boils down to the transformation of Cyprus into a truly democratic republic. This is due to the fact that the Republic of Cyprus remains “tailored to the measure “ of imperialism and local right-wing forces.

National-patriotic forces demanded the democratisation of the constitution and the expansion of parliamentary rights, a more democratic electoral system, respect for human and civil rights, the abolition of any discrimination on ideological, national or other grounds [112, 1978, No. 6]. In June 1979, the democratic forces achieved major success. On their initiative, parliament passed a new law that replaced the majoritarian system of elections with a proportional representation system, which provided for the distribution of mandates between parties in accordance with the number of votes they received.

The implementation of democratic demands in the political sphere will block the possibility of a NATO solution to the Cyprus problem, contribute to the achievement of full independence of the Republic of Cyprus, although an offensive from the left will undoubtedly cause confrontation from the right. It can be assumed that in the coming years the national-patriotic forces will face one of the central questions of

how to overcome the resistance to democratic transformations. In these conditions, the AKEL party again calls on the Cypriots to be vigilant, reminding the people of the lessons of the pre-coup period, which remain relevant to this day, especially at the present stage of the development of the Cyprus crisis, when the forces of the imperialist conspiracy against Cyprus are activated.

The 15th AKEL Congress (May 1982) was a demonstration of the communists' solidarity. After analysing the state of the Cyprus problem, the congress set the task of continuing the struggle for its settlement on the basis of the UN resolution and the agreements reached in order to achieve a peaceful, just, mutually acceptable and viable solution. The political resolution confirms that the internal aspects of the problem should be resolved at intercommunal negotiations, while the external ones should be resolved at a representative international conference within the framework and under the auspices of the UN. The 15th AKEL Congress adopted a special appeal to the President, in which noted the importance of cooperation between democratic and patriotic forces. The congress spoke in favor of the demilitarisation of the island as one of the prerequisites for a just settlement.

The unresolved nature of the Cyprus problem and the related complications of a territorial, constitutional and socio-economic nature have led to the emergence in the Greek and Turkish communities of trends reflecting the views of opposition or extremist circles. In the Greek community, capitulators and compromisers became more active, considering the "Western factor" decisive in the settlement, as well as putting forward the thesis of "double enosis" as an alternative to the

proclamation of an independent Turkish Cypriot state. Extremists did not leave the scene either, who call in the name of the ideas of Hellenism “to Vietnamese Cyprus—with murder and partisan war” [129, 21.VIII.1974]. After the defeat, the underground terrorist organisation EOKA-2 regrouped its forces. 1977 American newspaper Christian Science Monitor, EOKA-B “is preparing for a decisive confrontation.” The reactionary clergy calls to be inspired by the ideals of 1821 (the year of the uprising of the Greek population against the Ottoman Empire) in order to raise the Greek flag again in the northern zone of Cyprus [117, 14.IV.1978].

A split has emerged in the Turkish community. The disruption of traditional economic ties, combined with mismanagement, resulted in shortages of goods and high prices. The West German magazine *Der Spiegel* admits that the once lucrative resorts in the Kyrenia and Famagusta regions are flooded with tourists from Turkey who bring in erratic lira, while; Turkish Cypriots need hard currency [130, 1975, No. 31]. Serious dissatisfaction among the population of the Turkish zone is caused by the social policy of the community leadership, the decline in the living standards of the population. Kuchuk, Serious friction has arisen between the Turks—the indigenous Cypriots and the settlers.

The clashes between Turkish Cypriots and aliens from Anatolia are convincing evidence that the Cypriot’s sense of identity is a political reality and that even Turkey’s military presence cannot tame it. Signs of “local nationalism” in the Turkish community objectively contribute to the development of the identity of this ethnic community into a broader concept of “national unity” and “territorial identity”.

The only connection between the Turkish Cypriots and the newcomers—the Turkish language—is clearly not enough for the latter to integrate into the life of the community. The whole world separates the Cypriot Turk from the Anatolian peasant.

Concentrated in the northern zone, the Turkish Cypriots have become the target of a triple exploitation: the Turkish troops, immigrants from Turkey, who occupied key positions, and the local bourgeoisie. Their standard of living is 2/3 lower compared to the period before the Turkish landing and resettlement to the northern part of the island. Turkish Cypriots occupying Greek Cypriot homes are subject to a monthly accommodation tax of 10-15% of the total amount paid. There are taxes for the use of utilities (water, electricity), etc. The difficult economic situation, complete dependence on Ankara, and the violence of the Turkish army and immigrants from Turkey feed the “local nationalism” of the Turkish Cypriots. It is no coincidence that trade unions have become more active in recent years, demanding changes in socio-economic conditions. To the pages of western newspapers receive reports of official divisions in the Denktash administration. They relate to the prospects for the political structure and ways of resolving the Cyprus issue. The national patriotic forces of the Turkish community are approaching the solution of the Cyprus issue proceeding from the interests of the entire Cypriot people. They oppose the division of the island, for the restoration of cooperation relations between the two communities within the framework of an independent, sovereign and territorially integral state. This contradicts the position of the Denktash administration, which believes that in conditions when

about twenty countries are ready to recognize the independence of the Turkish Cypriot state, it makes sense to continue to pursue a policy from a position of strength, to lead matters towards legalisation of the results of the 1974 events.

Thus, the conspiracy of the Atlantic circles of NATO dealt a sensitive blow to the structure of the Cypriot society and caused fundamental changes in the content of the Cyprus question. To the old controversial issues that divided the two communities, more complex ones were added, forming a multi-layered complex: territorial and constitutional issues, the problem of refugees, the issue of freedom of movement and settlement, the search for missing Cypriots. Clearing these layers: will require goodwill and a lot of effort from the parties.

Inter-communal negotiations

Despite the disassembly of the parties, a considerable distance in the positions of the communities on many fundamental issues, both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, did not leave a sense of responsibility for the fate of their homeland, an understanding of the fact that only intercommunal negotiations are the only reasonable: a procedure for finding a mutually acceptable solution to internal aspects Cyprus question. Taking a course towards strengthening the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, the government of President Makarios took a number of measures that contributed to creating conditions for

direct dialogue between representatives of the Greek and Turkish communities.

Intercommunal negotiations began in June 1968. By this time, restrictions on movement in areas controlled by the Greek Cypriots had been lifted. In turn, the Turkish community allowed the Greeks to travel along the Nicosia-Kyrenia road, which was previously closed to them. The commissions formed during the dialogue to settle the accumulated problems have started to work. The stumbling block was the issue of local government bodies. The Turkish Cypriots wanted to enjoy self-government in all areas inhabited by them within the framework of a unitary state. The Greek Cypriot side saw this as a threat to territorial integrity. There was another reason that later said in an interview with President Makarios, namely, torpedoing anyone by Athens: the possibility of an agreement [114, 8.VI.1976]. In June 1972, on the recommendation of the UN Secretary General, the UN representatives were involved in the negotiations, and the representatives of Greece and Turkey - as experts on constitutional issues. Negotiations nearing completion were interrupted by dramatic events. In the years 1.975-1978. In accordance with the resolutions of the General Assembly and the UN Security Council, attempts were made repeatedly to achieve an intra-Cypriot settlement through intercommunal negotiations with the participation of the UN Secretary General. During this period, six rounds of meetings took place (April 28-May 3, June 5-7, July 31-August 2, 1975 in Vienna, September 10, 1975 in New York, in February 1976 and March 31-April 7, 1977 in Vienna), which, however, only confirmed the existence of significant differences in the positions of both parties and did not lead to any, albeit partial, agreement. As

for specific positions, they are constantly changing under the influence of time, as well as various external factors. Nevertheless, it seems important to briefly outline principled approaches of the parties.

The proposals of the Greek Cypriot side were based on the principle of freedom of movement of all citizens and freedom of settlement, on the right to work and acquire property in any region. She proposed to solve the territorial aspect of the problem proceeding from the proportional ratio of national groups. Turkish Cypriots categorically rejected such principles as freedom of settlement and the granting of rights to property, labour and professional activity to all Cypriots throughout Cyprus, seeing them as a direct way to return the situation in which the Turkish community was in 1963-1974. In the constitutional aspect, the leaders of the Turkish community envisaged the creation of a central government with limited powers and functions and the concentration of the main power in the hands of the community governments. The Greek Cypriots saw this as a threat to the country's territorial integrity. The former head of the Greek Cypriot delegation at the intercommunal talks, G. Clerides, in an interview with the West German weekly *Forverts* on April 1, 1976, characterized the position of the Turkish community: "Denktash did not say how large the territory of Cyprus would ultimately be for the Turkish population. But he wants a weak central government in Nicosia. From his statements it does not follow unequivocally that he wants a federation or a confederation of the Greek and Turkish parts of the island. I got the impression that he is talking about federation, and he means confederation." This interview convincingly testified to the lack of trust between the parties.

In accordance with the requirement of the resolution of the General Assembly and the UN Security Council, on February 12, 1977, in Nicosia, with the participation of the UN Secretary General, President Makarios met with the leader of the Turkish community R. Denktash. At the meeting, an agreement was reached on four fundamental principles that should guide the representatives of the two communities in negotiations. In particular, it was agreed that the parties would seek to create an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal federal Republic of Cyprus and that the territory administered by each of the communities would be determined based on the fertility and economic value of the land, as well as on the ownership of it. The parties agreed to discuss issues such as freedom of movement and settlement, the right to property and other issues. The last point of the agreement read: “The executive power and functions of the central, federal government should be aimed at preserving the unity of the country, taking into account the bi-communal nature of the state” [15, 14.V.1979]. Lack of trust and the general burden of unresolved problems prevented the Cypriots from taking advantage of the favorable moment. Only in May 1979, as a result of the meeting between President S. Kyprianou and R. Denktash, held under the auspices of the UN Secretary General, an agreement was reached on the resumption of intercommunal negotiations based on the principles agreed by Makarios and Denktash, as well as ten principles developed by Kyprianou and Denktash ... These principles provide a practical formula for resolving contentious issues that balances the interests of both communities wherever possible. In particular, one of the points provides for the advantage in the negotiations of the agreement on the settlement

of Varosha (Famagusta region) under the auspices of the UN. The principle that independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the policy of non-alignment must be sufficiently guaranteed (regardless of whether it is a full or partial unification of Cyprus with any other country or any form of partition or secession) is of paramount importance to the Cyprus reality. A special point provides for the discussion of the issue of demilitarisation of the Republic of Cyprus [15, 14.V.1979].

Negotiations on this basis began on June 15, 1979 in Nicosia, instilling in the Cypriots the hope of reaching a mutually acceptable agreement, but they also ended in vain. The country's progressive forces advocate the implementation of the agreements reached earlier, call for the eradication of any forms of hostility between the Cypriots, for the soonest restoration of normal intercommunal relations. Explaining the position of AKEL, the General Secretary of the party E. Papaioannou said: “..Everyone should realize that there is no other solution to the Cyprus question, except on the basis of the creation of a federation” [146, 16.VII.1980].

The leaders of the ruling Democratic Party do not object to the federation. The Turkish Cypriots are also in favor of a federal structure in Cyprus. What is the reason for the paradoxical situation in which everyone agrees with the federal form, and settlement issues are not moving off the ground?

The point is that different political forces put different meanings into the concept of federation and interpret it in their own way. The leader of the Turkish community R. Denktash expresses the following point of view. “The aim is to create a bi-zonal, federal,

independent, non-aligned Cyprus, in which the Turkish Cypriots will be responsible for their own security. In practice, this boils down to the transfer of some of the powers that are now exercised by the Turkish Federal State of the Republic of Cyprus, to the central government formed jointly with the Greek Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots will also delegate some of their powers to the central government, and thus a federation will be created. In their zones, the governments of the members of the federation will remain completely autonomous in matters of responsibility for the economy, security, social affairs” [144, 18.IX.80].

As for the issue of “displaced persons”, according to the Turkish Cypriots, it has already been resolved after the population exchange. The territorial aspect comes down to “some limited ordering “ of the dividing line between the two zones.

The position of the Turkish community is not accepted by the leadership of the Democratic Party. At a press conference on August 9, 1980, President Kyprianou said that the Greek Cypriot side could not bind itself by agreeing to a two-zone federation. “We do not agree with two-zone, “ the president stressed.—The regulation must be federal in all its aspects” [15, 18.VIII.1980].

The leadership of the Turkish community regards this line as an attempt to avoid creating a partnership regime. “If no agreement is reached, “Denktash retorted, “we will have to seek recognition in the world as a separate state” [144, 12.VIII.1980].

In response to the ultimatum threat, the Greek Cypriots continued to insist on the creation of a federal republic, uniting two regions under the rule of a central government, responsible for everything that usually falls

under the authority of this type of government (army, monetary system, diplomacy, etc.), however providing a wide field of activity for local authorities, especially in such sensitive areas as education, culture, religion, and landscaping. Under these conditions, there could be no talk of constructive intercommunal negotiations, for the necessary dialogue was replaced by the opposition of monologues. The positions were even more divided after the leadership of the Turkish community put forward a demand for the consent of the Greek Cypriots with the creation of a “two-zone federation”, and also raised the issue of ensuring the “security” of the Turkish community.

The disputes around the aforementioned theses that have flared up on both sides of the demarcation line have a fundamental basis. They touch upon the very essence of the internal aspects of the problem—the quality of the future federal state. The Greek community pondered for a long time over the question of whether it was possible during negotiations or in the relevant documents to agree that the word “two-district” was replaced, as required by the leadership of the Turkish community, with the word “two-zone”. The decision matured in the form of the following statement by the representative of the Greek community G. Ioannidis: “In the end, let them call the two parts of the new state what they want, if only it was born! Childbirth will already be difficult enough for it to be necessary to argue about the name that will be given to the newborn at baptism...” [121, 19.X.1980]. So the sense of realism again triumphed over prejudice. On August 9, 1980 in Nicosia at the Ledra Palace Hotel, a preliminary meeting was held to conduct intercommunal negotiations. The Greek Cypriot side was represented by

G. Ioannidis, the Turkish Cypriot side, Umit Onan. The meeting was chaired by the UN Secretary General's Special Representative in Cyprus, Yugo Gobi. Both sides reaffirmed the importance of the Makarios-Denktaş agreements of February 12, 1977 and Kyprianou-Denktaş of May 19, 1979, as well as their support for a federal settlement of the territorial aspect of the Cyprus problem. They indicated that the issue of security can be raised and discussed in intercommunal negotiations and agreed that this issue will be addressed and take into account certain practical difficulties related to the security of the Turkish community and the security of Cyprus in general.

On September 16, 1980, intercommunal negotiations began in Nicosia. The agenda includes the following items:

1. Reaching an agreement on the settlement of Varosha under the auspices of the UN.
2. Adoption of preliminary practical measures by both sides to show goodwill, mutual trust and the desire to return to a normal situation.
3. Constitutional aspects,
4. Territorial aspects.

These issues will be discussed jointly and separately. At the appropriate time, at an early stage of the dialogue, representatives of the two communities will set up committees or working groups on various issues [15, 18.VIII.1980].

Since then, meetings of community representatives have been held in Nicosia with some interruptions. Their participants consistently emphasize the good atmosphere of the negotiations, although they say little about concrete results. Judging by individual statements, the parties have repeatedly discussed each

of the four issues included in the agreed agenda, but did not progress further than clarifying their positions. The leaders of the Turkish community continue to repeat the well-known demands regarding the equality of the two administrations and the need to ensure their security. In a speech at the XXXV session of the UN General Assembly, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus N. Rolandis stressed: “We do not forget that on some issues the positions of the parties are opposite, which cannot be a reason for their termination, but on the contrary, should intensify efforts” [15, 13.X.1980].

The struggle that unfolded during the intercommunal negotiations for the quality of the federal structure of the Cypriot state is directly related to the procedural question of how and where to start real concessions. The Turkish community, although it agrees with the priority of the issue of settling Varosha by Greek Cypriots under the auspices of the UN, but speaks out against the agreement on the administrative status of the city and the definition of the territory of settlement. The military superiority of one side over the other feeds political intransigence. Describing the intra-Cypriot negotiations, the General Secretary of AKEL E. Papaioannou, in his speech at the 26th Congress of the CPSU, said: “If these possibilities are exhausted and it becomes clear that it is impossible to reach an agreement, then we will again turn to the General Assembly and the UN Security Council with a request for a more effective support and assistance” [111, I.III.1981].

The negotiators face a difficult path: a wide range of disagreements, the atmosphere of intercommunal relations is too full of prejudice. However, the

negotiations have become a reality and constitute one of the important factors in the internal political life of Cyprus.

The alignment of political forces in the country has a great influence on the process of normalizing the situation. To a large extent, this circumstance predetermined the attention to the parliamentary elections held on May 24, 1981. For the first time, elections in Cyprus were held on the basis of a proportional system. All parties announced that they would conduct the election campaign on their own, without joining blocs and coalitions. Seven political parties participated in the election campaign: the Progressive Party of the Working People of Cyprus (AKEL), the Democratic Party (DP), the Democratic Assembly (DC), the United Democratic Union of the Centre (EDEK), the Pancyprian Front of Renovation (WFO), the New Democratic Front (NDF) and Union Centre (SC). The last three parties were created at the end of 1980. The reason for their appearance was the crisis, and then the partial collapse of the ruling Democratic Party (many members, disappointed in the actions of the leadership, left its ranks). However, the DP avoided complete disintegration, and the presence of the levers of state power allowed it to approach the parliamentary elections with certain chances of success.

The fact that the unity of the patriotic and democratic forces was in fact violated also gave a particularly acute character to the pre-election struggle. Serious contradictions were revealed, mainly caused by different positions of the parties on the issue of the line and tactics of the struggle for a peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem. For example, the party of the United Democratic Union of the Centre opposed

the intra-Cypriot negotiations, believing that they were pushing the supposedly Greek Cypriots to concessions. Among the ways to solve the problem, she called “the effective internationalisation of the Cyprus issue, the adoption of measures to implement UN resolutions, the construction of defences, the creation of a truly popular militia, and the education of fighting spirit.” In the decision of the Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of AKEL, held on May 25, 1980, it was pointed out that political circles were moving away from the line and tactics of Makarios, that they, at the first opportunity, proclaim nationalist, extremist slogans, and create distrust around the negotiations.

Against the background of the polarisation of forces, the Democratic Assembly party intensified its activities, which launched an election campaign under the banner of anti-communism and anti-Sovietism, and its leader, G. Clerides, tried to appear in the role of the messiah and savior of Cyprus. However, fire was directed against de from all other parties, which reminded the voter that there are many dark spots on the political reputation of this figure. In particular, newspapers published documents testifying that Clerides opposed the return to the island of Makarios, and later, being the representative of the Greek Cypriot side in intercommunal negotiations, concluded in 1975 in Vienna a deal with the Turkish Cypriot side on population exchange and hid it from Makarios until the UN threatened to publicise the tape recording of the talks.

The Cypriot communists went to the parliamentary elections under the slogan “AKEL—the first party in parliament!” Having made a decision to delimit

responsibility from Kyprianou, AKEL announced that it would participate in the elections on its own. Taking into account the peculiarities of the period, she put forward such tasks as the unswerving implementation of the line and tactics approved by the National Council and the government; the solution of the Cyprus problem through intercommunal negotiations on the basis of the Makarios-Denktaş and Kyprianou-Denktaş agreements, as well as UN resolutions; rallying the patriotic, democratic forces of the people on the basis of this line; rapprochement and close cooperation of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots within a single state.

Thus, despite a wide range of political forces, the real struggle for seats in parliament unfolded between the three leading parties AKEL, DP and the right-wing DE.

After the votes were counted, 35 seats in the legislative body of the country were distributed as follows: AKEL—12 seats, the Democratic Party—8, 3 deputy mandates were won by EDEK, and DE-12 seats to parliament.

Simple arithmetic calculation indicates a major success of the democratic forces. Almost a third of the votes—more than any other party—received AKEL, speaking with a broad political and social economic and economic program. Attractiveness and the constructiveness of this program limited the possibilities of the right-wing forces. Despite the strong financial and political support from the West and the local oligarchy, the right-wing party failed to implement its main the goal is to get ahead of other parties in the number of recruited votes.

The absolute majority in parliament of democratic

forces opposing NATO schemes for resolving the Cyprus issue, against fascism, for a democratic Cyprus, opened up favorable prospects for intensifying the struggle for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the country. At the same time, the Cypriots are seriously concerned by the fact that, according to the party's lists, MPs from the underground terrorist organisation EOKA-2 were elected to parliament, which confirms the continuing danger posed by former putschists and extreme right-wing forces. Summing up the results of the parliamentary elections, the Politburo of the Central Committee of AKEL called the struggle for the unity and cooperation of patriotic democratic forces, reconciliation, the most serious task. the development of the people and the isolation of the putschist elements.

On June 28, 1981, elections for the President and the entire composition of the "Legislative Assembly" were also held in the Federal Turkish State of the Republic of Cyprus. New political issues that appeared shortly before the elections the parties did not make significant changes in the alignment of forces. Six people took part in the election campaign political parties, although the ruling National Unity Party remained the main rivals (PNU, leader Mustafa Chagatay) and the opposition Social Liberation Party (leader Alpay Durduran). As in the 1980 communal elections, the exodus struggle and this time was determined primarily by the political goals of Turkey in relation to the northern part islands. As a result of the vote by the President for the second R. Denktash was elected, who received over 51% votes. In the "legislative assembly", the votes were distributed as follows: Unity—18 seats (out of 40), Social Liberation

Party—13, Turkish Republican Party—5, Democratic People's Party—3, Turkish Party unity—1. The decline in popularity of R. Denktash and PNU, which formed a one-party "government, due primarily to economic difficulties, inability to stop the decline in production, rise in unemployment, etc.

The separate elections in Cyprus once again showed how far the split has gone, how important and urgent is the solution of the national task of normalising the situation. At the same time, in a specific national situation, two parallel developing tendencies take on more and more clear outlines—the tendency towards communal consolidation and the tendency towards the integration of communities within the framework of a single statehood.

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An important factor that has left its mark on the development of the political situation in the country is the established cooperation between AKEL and the Democratic Party. Their common platform was a jointly developed minimum program. On the eve of the pre-presidential elections, which will be held in February 1983, both parties support the candidacy of S. Cyprian for his re-election for a second term. In accordance with the program, at least AKEL and DP declared their desire to create an independent, sovereign, territorially

integral federal two-district republic, guaranteeing the unity of the country and the people and the protection of their inalienable rights. Prioritising the development of ties with the non-aligned and socialist states while expanding relations with Western countries, both parties supported the idea of internationalizing the Cyprus issue and the Soviet proposal to convene an international conference within the UN. The program is at least open for all other political parties to join. It was the result and recognition of the long-term struggle of the Cypriot communists for the unity of the democratic and patriotic forces of the republic.

The Boomerang Effect

Although the NATO adventure put the Republic of Cyprus on the brink of national disaster, it did not bring decisive advantages to the Atlantic circles. The concept of “controlled slipping” did not even enhance NATO’s southeastern flank, which the maximalist-minded Atlantic strategists hoped for. On the contrary, it gave rise to the actual collapse of the flank, gave a new impetus to centrifugal tendencies in this global military-political alliance of imperialism.

The landing of Turkish troops in Cyprus and the establishment control over 40% of the island’s territory was perceived by Greece extremely painfully, qualifying this action as intervention and crime against everything Hellenism. Frustrated by NATO’s inaction, she accused her allies in the bloc of being limited only to statements and assurances, and then took decisive steps. NATO’s failure to stop Turkey from provoking a conflict

between the two allies Prime Minister of Greece K. Karamanlis gave the order to the Greek armed forces to withdraw from NATO. "Greece will remain a member union only as far as its political part is concerned," said the official communiqué of the Greek government on August 14, 1974. [145, 15.VIII. 1974]. In the then sent an official message of the Greek governments to presidents and prime ministers of countries NATO noted: "Greece will henceforth fully exercise its sovereignty over its entire territory, airspace and territorial waters ... Until now, such sovereignty was limited to the presence of foreign military bases and installations, the regular use of Greek waters and airspace by foreign warships and by planes" [110, no. 2]. Speaking in December 1974, at a session of parliament (according to the government program), the head of the cabinet announced the government's decision to close "foreign bases that are not make no contribution to ensuring national defense of the country [110, 1975, No. 2].

This was the disastrous result of the Cyprus adventure for the North Atlantic bloc. The protracted crisis of NATO's southeastern flank began. The motivation for Greece's withdrawal from the bloc's military organisation, indicated in the official communique, of course, does not provide an exhaustive explanation for such a radical step. It served rather as a pretext for its implementation. When deciding to withdraw from the military structure, Athens was guided by serious political motives: the need to restore sovereignty and independence and to protect the country from being drawn into international intrigues and adventures, which are an integral part of the policy of Atlanticism. The extreme aggravation of relations

between the two allies in the bloc revealed the incompatibility of the national interests of the Greek people with the imperialist goals of NATO. The bloody events in Cyprus triggered an unprecedented wave of anti-NATO and anti-American sentiments in Greece, which the new civilian government could not ignore. "Greece's withdrawal from NATO is only the first manifestation of a powerful deep war of anti-Americanism that shook the whole of Greece," wrote the Parisian "Monde" then [121, 15.VIII.1974].

Did the authors of the concept of "controlled slipping" envisage that the events in Cyprus would have such an impact on the internal political situation in Greece? Professor of the University of Athens N. Devletoglu gave an affirmative answer in the London newspaper Times, noting that support for the "right-wing" policy could be vulnerable both to the interests of the United States and to the bourgeois circles of Greece, and, therefore, it was not a summit coup that was required. but a radical change in the political image of the country [129, 21.VIII.1974]. The "incentive" for such changes was the concept of "controlled slippage", which, according to Devletoglu, dictated to the Greek bourgeois government "a long-term new perspective, in the absence of which neither the current government nor any other government could hope for survival. " That is, the tactics of destabilisation took into account the preservation of the previous social status quo in Greece, contributing to such a solution to the problems of power, which was imposed from above as a result of a compromise between the junta and its patrons, on the one hand, and conservative bourgeois parties, on the other. The Greek author I. Yannakakis believes that such a solution to the problem of power suited "the

classical right-wing forces, ousted from power in 1967, who demanded that they be given full power, otherwise they would refuse to participate in the government. They considered themselves the only instrument of American policy aimed at normalizing the situation in Greece, and did not want to compromise themselves in the eyes of the people by cooperation with the suffocating junta.” [122, VIII.1974] also relied on these forces.

This solution to the “Greek problem” influenced the course of all subsequent events. It suggests that Greece’s withdrawal from the NATO military organisation and the revision of the status of foreign bases served as a kind of diplomatic maneuver undertaken to put pressure on the US and NATO, so that they, in turn, influence Turkey’s position. The Washington Post wrote that “even in the Greek government circles themselves, they believed that Prime Minister Karamanlis made the decision to withdraw from NATO as a compromise, and the London weekly Observer expressed the opinion that this step by Greece” was not only a gesture in side of political trends in Athens, but also represents an action undertaken for reasons of bargaining, which will have to be conducted. The readiness to return to NATO is one of the few trump cards that remained with the Greeks in order to use them in bargaining and to get Washington to put pressure on Turkey in order to induce it to moderation” [135, 15.VIII.1974].

The solution to the problem of power from above predetermined the inconsistency and indecision of the position of the Greek government on many issues. In the end, it turned out that it was not NATO that succumbed to Greek pressure, but Greece to NATO, inclined to the

possibility of all kinds of concessions.

At the same time, the events of 1974 had a great impact on the formation of foreign policy concepts of post-revolt Greece. In particular, the position of Athens on the Cyprus problem, which continues to be viewed as a national problem, has undergone very significant changes. Speaking to Parliament on December 14, 1977 With the program statement of the government of the New Democracy Party, Prime Minister Karamanlis pointed out the paramount importance of the Cyprus issue for Greek foreign policy, which he attributes not only to the Greek-Turkish disagreement, but to the national problem [148, 15.XII.1977]. The new government announced its rejection of the policy of enosis and diktat in relation to Cyprus. Thereby a strong blow was dealt to the reactionary nationalist views, according to which Cyprus was listed as a Greek fiefdom and the theory was postulated on the “national centre” and “branch” (“Greece decides and Cyprus obeys”). The government officially declares that “the permanent policy of Greece in the Cyprus issue excludes the division of the island” [111, 8.VII.1978]. However, judging by the statements of the Greek press, in to the government circles, there are other, unofficial opinions on this issue, which do not less adventurous grain than plans at the time the Athenian junta.

The position on the presence of foreign (Greek and Turkish) troops on the island has also undergone radical changes. If earlier the military-dictatorial regime saw the stronghold of its influence and influence in the Greek officers sent to them to lead the Cypriot National Guard, and categorically rejected President Makarios’s demands for their withdrawal, the new government took a different platform. It faced a completely

different situation, when Turkish troops became the determining force on the island. The irony of fate always hurts. Turkey does not agree with the Greek demands for the withdrawal of all foreign troops and the demilitarisation of Cyprus, saying that its presence on the island is necessary to ensure the security of the Turkish community.

Athens continues to adhere to the concept of internationalising the Cyprus problem, supports the demands of the Cypriot government, and raises the issue of Cyprus at various conferences, meetings and conferences. True, recently, under pressure from the United States and NATO, Greek diplomacy has done this less and less. Greece provides Cyprus with an annual grant of 10.1 million Cyprus pounds. [146, 22.XI.1980].

In the political circles of Greece, they believe that the Cyprus problem is of an international nature and cannot be the topic of the Greek-Turkish dialogue. The erroneousness of linking the Cyprus issue with other problems of Greek-Turkish relations was also pointed out by the former Foreign Minister of the “transitional” government of Karamanlis G. Mavros in his book “Dangers Facing the Nation.” He writes: “The unchanging goal of Turkish diplomacy since the invasion of Cyprus has been to reduce the Cyprus problem to the level of another Greek-Turkish disagreement, which must be resolved by Athens and Ankara. I have always directly and openly opposed this position. The approval of this approach would mean in practice the destruction of the independence of Cyprus.” “Another reason for disagreeing with the linkage Mavros sees in the fact that Turkey, in exchange for easing pressure on Cyprus, demands concessions in the Aegean Sea” [82, p. 24].

Is there a consensus between Athens and Nicosia,

which Greek and Cypriot leaders often talk about in official statements? In one of his public speeches, G. Mavros, with his usual frankness, stated that “there is no complete coincidence of views between the Greek and Cypriot governments” [145, 6.XI.1978]. Without diminishing the importance of Greece’s support for the Cypriot government, it seems nevertheless necessary to highlight a number of issues on which the views of Athens and Nicosia differ, since without this the picture of relations within the Greece-Turkey-Cyprus triangle would be incomplete.

Judging by the comments of the Greek press, the idea is being expressed in the political circles of Athens that Cyprus is a victim of its policy of non-alignment, and not of external interference. If we take into account that some in Athens see the policy of Atlanticism propagated through the slogan “Greece belongs to the West “ as an alternative to the course of non-alignment, then the differences between the parties in the approach to the Cyprus settlement and to NATO plans will become clear. The Cypriot government believes that the international aspects of the problem should be resolved only on the basis of the resolutions of the General Assembly and the UN Security Council and only within this framework. organisations. As emphasized in Nicosia, the Cyprus problem is primarily a problem of foreign intervention and a question of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the country.

In turn, the Greek leaders do not deny the possibility of resolving the Cyprus problem in within NATO. The non-identity of points of view is evidenced by the attitude of the two countries to the Soviet proposal to convene a broad representative conference

on Cyprus within the UN. Gratitude to the Soviet The President of the Republic of Cyprus S. Kyprianou and other political and public figures have repeatedly expressed to the Union the support of the just cause of the Cypriots countries. The Greek side behaves differently, which or generally pass over in silence the Soviet proposal, or tries not to mention that it was put forward by the USSR.

There are many examples of such discrepancies, which they try not to advertise in the capitals of the two countries; here the gravitation of the ruling circles of Greece to NATO options for solving the problem was reflected.

Visit of the President of Cyprus in June 1980. to Greece outlined a new aspect of relations between Athens and Nicosia. Although the official purpose of the visit was to agree with the Greek government on the next step in the Cyprus problem, the actual appointment of contacts went beyond the formal protocol. For the sake of a conversation with the chairman of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement Party (PASOK) A. Papandreou, the President of Cyprus stayed in Athens for a whole day. According to the Cypriot press, the president considered it necessary to enlist the support of Greece at a time when such support was denied to him by the main political forces in the country.

Arrival in 1981. to power, PASOK gave rise to hopes for intensifying the struggle for a solution to the Cyprus problem, especially since this party owes much of its victory in elections to promises to pursue an energetic policy. According to the Western press, A. Papandreou has increased the volume of financial assistance to Cyprus. An instruction was sent to the Greek embassies

instructing them to more effectively protect the interests of Cyprus. The new prime minister came up with an initiative to demilitarize the island by withdrawing Turkish and Greek troops and replacing them with UN forces. February 27–March 1, 1982. Papandreou paid a visit to the Republic of Cyprus. This was the first trip to the island of the head of the Greek government in the history of relations between the two countries. The parties discussed the prospects for resolving the Cyprus problem and spoke in favor of continuing the intercommunal talks. However, the “distance “ between Cyprus and Greece remained,

The conceptual approach of “controlled slippage” also dealt a blow to Atlantic policy towards Turkey. On July 27, 1975, the so-called temporary status of 25 US military bases in Turkey was established and they were taken under national control. As indicated in a government statement, Turkey is suspending the US-Turkish joint defense treaty and related agreements. The statement emphasized that there is no return to the past and the future of American facilities is associated with the outcome of bilateral negotiations [11 O, 1975, No 32].

The country’s public demanded to take such a firm stance on the foreign presence and take practical steps as early as February 5, when the US Congress, under the influence of the Greek lobby, decided to end military aid to Turkey. The significance of the embargo and the role of the Greek lobby in shaping the US foreign policy is specifically discussed above. Here, we only note that the formal reason for such a decision was the fact that during the Cyprus conflict, American weapons were used against a partner in the bloc, and this violated one of the conditions for the provision of American military

assistance (1961 law).

Ankara's actions were received in the highest NATO spheres with concern and irritation. On the day the bases closed, the American newspaper *The New York Times* wrote: "They lowered the shutters on our windows," including the USSR, but she saw some consolation in the fact that the established ban does not apply to the NATO airbase in Incirlik. Other Western media outlets presented Turkey's demarche as a purely "family matter" caused by the whims of certain groups of the American Congress. They say, Congress with the White House proposal to partially lift the imposed embargo on military supplies to Turkey, and there would be no problem.

Of course, the confirmation by the US Congress of its decision played a role. But this decision served only as a kind of catalyst for the process of revision of the notorious "Atlantic obligations" that was developing latently in Turkey. Such a course is considered dangerous. It fetters the country's political initiative, does not promise it any advantages, makes it sacrifice many favorable opportunities that a relaxation of international tension opens up. These sentiments were reflected in the activities of the January 1978 to the power of the government of B. Ecevit, in which the Republican People's Party played the leading role.

The new approach was reflected in the government program, which pointed out the impossibility of "separating foreign policy from national defense, therefore, in developing the country's national security concept, the government is guided by the fact that Turkey's defense should not be overly dependent on external assistance and rely only on one specific source" [139, 01/13/1978]. In Turkish historiography, such a

policy is figuratively called “multipolar “, which is one of the forms of manifestation of the crisis situation in NATO caused by deep contradictions between the junior partners and the leading powers of the bloc.

The reassessment of the foreign policy course was facilitated by a whole complex of factors: a further change in the balance of forces in the world arena in favor of socialism, the impact on world processes of the active peace-loving foreign policy of the USSR and other socialist countries, the ripening in Ankara’s ruling circles of an understanding of the need for a certain adjustment of their course, the growth of inter-imperialist contradictions and competitive struggle between the states of the West. However, one should not assume that Turkey’s “multipolar” policy has in any way diminished its role as one of the most important and reliable US allies in Western Europe and NATO. The commonality of class interests, the great political, military and economic dependence of Ankara on the United States make the ruling circles of both countries take care of maintaining close allied relations.

The Cyprus conflict and direct involvement in it, and then the armed presence on the Cypriot territory, unleashed a monstrous wave of problems on Turkey. In addition to economic difficulties (the maintenance of the expeditionary corps costs the Turkish treasury about \$200 million annually, in connection with the purchase of weapons there was a deficit in the balance of payments, etc.) there were political complications. Almost always, when discussing the Cyprus problem at the sessions of the General Assembly and the UN Security Council, the representatives of Turkey practically remain alone: in Ankara they consider the changes that have taken place in Cyprus irreversible and

do not allow the possibility of returning to the situation that existed before 1974. Speaking out against the internationalisation of the Cyprus problem and its discussion in the UN, Turkey is trying to reduce the problems to the level of one of the disagreements with neighboring Greece, although it does not support the plan of a double enosis—the division of Cyprus between it and Greece. According to the Turkish leaders, the presence of the troops ensures the security of the Turkish community, and they can only be withdrawn as part of a common settlement.

Why does Ankara, being aware of the costs incurred as a result of such a position, continue to remain a prisoner of its military success in Cyprus? A partial answer to this question is provided by the extremely acute emotional perception in Turkey of the situation on the island of Turkish Cypriots. In his speech in the Mejlis in February 1976, when discussing the country's budget, then Prime Minister S. Demirel stressed: "The Cyprus problem is not mine or anyone's problem. This is a national problem and it is necessary to approach it broadly" [139, 18.II.1976]. Muddled with the nationalist ambitions of the Pan-Turkists and their expansionist calculations, the Cyprus issue is not only the pivotal element of Turkish foreign policy. When approaching it, any government has to bear in mind that Turkey has a firmly rooted practice of considering Cyprus as a sensitive factor in domestic politics.

Nevertheless Ankara offers its own program/Settlement. It was set forth by former Turkish Foreign Minister I. Caglayangil in his speech at the XXX session of the UN General Assembly and contained four fundamental points: 1) negotiations are the only procedure that can lead to a settlement of the conflict,

they must be conducted on the basis of equality; 2) the decision must be based on respect for the independence of Cyprus; 3) the constitution should provide for the creation of a bi-communal federation, as well as the achievement of an agreement that would take into account the economic situation of the Turkish community, as well as the structures and needs of both communities and the need to ensure cooperation based on security and mutual trust; 4) both communities must participate in the federal government on the basis of equality [21, p. 71].

As you can see, the methodology for approaching the settlement proceeds from the idea of the Cyprus conflict as a clash between the Greek majority and the Turkish minority on the island. In the next two years, Turkish policy on the Cyprus issue was generally determined by these principles, although under the pressure of the embargo, some concessions were made to American diplomacy. In particular, Ankara agreed to “fix “ the intercommunal borders.

The “multipolar” approach of B. Ecevit’s government also did not touch upon these principles. The government program noted: “Every effort will be made to guarantee freedom and security Cypriot Turks, acquired by them as a result of the Turkish peace operation of 1974, and measures were taken to accelerate development in all areas of the economy of the Turkish Cypriot community. In implementing this policy, our government will strive to strengthen peace in the area so that Cyprus is a safety factor and tranquility in the region and around the world. To this end the Cabinet of Ministers will soon take measures to so that a federal, bi-district, bi-communal, independent and non-aligned state was created in Cyprus” [139,

13.1.1978]. English newspaper Sunday Times January 22, 1978 outlined general contours of Turkey's "peace initiative". According to the newspaper, the Turkish concessions amount to the return of 4-6% of the Cypriot territory to the Greek community. This gave rise to skepticism in Cyprus and Greece, where the "peaceful initiatives" see a tactical move taken in order to create the appearance of progress in the Cyprus settlement, weakening the influence of the Greek lobby to obtain new loans and loans from the United States.

Meanwhile, the direct involvement of Greece and Turkey in the dramatic events in Cyprus continues to have a great impact on their relationship, and therefore on the state of the entire southern flank of NATO. The Cyprus crisis has acquired a "boomerang effect": it has become a permanent element that awakens the Greek-Turkish confrontation. In practice, it became apparent that the concept of "controlled slip" clearly did not take into account the force of the explosion. It failed to localize the Greek-Turkish antagonism within the borders of the island, the Cyprus crisis further exacerbated its individual aspects: the problem of the continental shelf, territorial waters, airspace over the Aegean Sea, and the islands located near the Turkish coast. The situation reached a critical stage when, at the end of July 1976, Turkey sent the research vessel Sismik-1 Hora to conduct exploration for oil in the controversial part of the Aegean Sea. The English magazine Middle East wrote on 24 August 1976: "Athens reacted very sharply to this, bombarded Turkey with notes of protest, and in early August the Greek troops were put on alert. Turkey responded by mobilizing its Aegean army with additional artillery and reinforcements."

The highest ranks of the Greek army advised the prime minister to sink the ship. The head of the Turkish government S. Demirel said: "No one dares to touch the Sismik. If anyone does this, the response will be immediate and devastating." The headline in one of the Turkish newspapers read: "Greeks want another thrashing", and Greek newspapers included advice to the civilian population in case of Turkish invasion.

Of course, bourgeois nationalism, which overshadows reason, can push people to use the most extreme forms of force. But when the capitals of the NATO countries complained about the "inability to pay Greece and Turkey for the display of moderation" and therefore predicted that "more blood than oil would flow in the Aegean Sea", Ankara and Athens realized faster than the Atlantic strategists that in modern conditions war has changed its face so much that the territorial, political and economic advantages acquired as a result cannot be compared with the losses incurred in the course of hostilities and with the destruction caused. The manifestation of realistic restraint and sanity, undoubtedly, was facilitated by the gaining strength of the process of detente, the decisions of the all-European conference in Helsinki, in which the heads of the conflicting states took part.

The explosiveness of the Aegean problems forces Greece, as a weaker party in the conflict, to seek ways to eliminate confrontation while maintaining the former status quo in the Aegean Sea region and in Cyprus. She came up with an initiative proposal to conclude a non-aggression pact, which was rejected by Turkey on the pretext that there was no need for such an agreement between the two NATO members. However, later the government of B. Ecevit proposed to sign an agreement

on friendship and cooperation, which would include the principles of all aspects of Greek-Turkish relations. In the proposals of the governments, as we can see, there are differences in the methodological approach to solving controversial problems. Turkey sees a way out of the current situation, which, in its opinion, is a product of contradictions between the two countries, not in a non-aggression pact, but in contacts at the highest level. The Greek side is confident that such a procedure does not make sense if there is no progress in the part of the problems, the solution of which is legal, not political. In the end, the parties agreed on the desirability of signing, in principle, a political document, the work on which is too far from completion.

Certain steps have also been taken towards the revitalisation of contacts at the highest level with the aim of the peaceful settlement of disputes and the establishment of good-neighborly relations. At the suggestion of the Turkish government. in March 1978, a meeting of two heads of government was held in Montreux, at which, according to the newspaper *Katemerinie*, both prime ministers “reaffirmed their political desire to find peaceful and just ways of solving problems” [145, 13.111.1978]. In accordance with the agreement, meetings are regularly held in Montreux at the level of the secretaries general of the Foreign Ministries of Greece and Turkey, and experts on various aspects of bilateral relations maintain contacts. However, the matter does not go further than friendly gestures, so it is too early to draw optimistic conclusions, let alone talk about the irreversibility of the process of improving Greek-Turkish relations. Border incidents are constantly breaking out between the two

countries, each of which, even the smallest, is used as a pretext for mutual accusations and stirring up passions.

Both Ankara and Athens do not deny the likelihood that the crisis in their relations could drag on and lead to an armed conflict. They are preparing for such a prospect, just in case, by increasing military budgets and aiming armies against each other. NATO's southeastern flank remained almost completely paralyzed. Thus, the concept of "controlled slippage" turned into serious political costs and losses for Atlantic politicians.

Mutual suspicion between Greece and Turkey reached the point that at the December 1978 session of the NATO Council, the allies refused to even disclose their military spending figures. Greek and Turkish researchers agree that in the conditions of the next round of the arms race and the unsettled complex of controversial problems, there is a real danger of exacerbation of the Greek-Turkish conflicts, where Cyprus will again be assigned the role of a displaced epicentre of the conflict.

Is the concept of "controlled slipping" applicable to the new conditions of ethnically divided Cyprus? Didn't the new conditions block the old possibility for the Atlanticists for the canalisation of the clashes of Hellenism and Pan-Turkism on the island?

The regrouping of forces of the two national communities that has taken place in Cyprus has to a certain extent made it difficult to use such a traditional component of imperialist policy as inciting intercommunal friction and clashes. With Turkish Cypriots scattered across the island and living among Greek Cypriots, it was easier to provoke conflicts. However, the "green line" of the division also contains

such a lurking element as tempting extremists to settle scores for the events of 1974. Professor R. Vatikiotis, a lecturer at the University of London, recalling the details and motives of the Turkish invasion, predicts: “Nevertheless, it seems quite possible that in the future the Greek Cypriots may turn to some form of armed opposition to the Turkish troops on the island. Without a satisfactory solution to the Cyprus problem, this may be the only alternative” [131, 1976, No 18].

Thus, the unsettled nature of the Cyprus problem and the absence of a reliable system of international guarantees preserve a potential hotbed of military conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean, and, therefore, the core element of the concept of “controlled slipping” is in effect.

Centrifugal Trends in NATO

Greco-Turkish antagonism over the Cyprus problem and the Aegean Sea exacerbates the already deep military-political crisis in NATO. Events in the Eastern Mediterranean have sharply marked again the divide between the two centres of rivalry—the United States and Western Europe. The clear divergence of interests has again raised the question of whether America is “protecting” the Europeans, or whether it needs Europe for its global strategy. This time, the European movement attached particular importance to this issue, since the consequences of the destabilising policy of Atlanticism were considered against the backdrop of the successfully developing process of defusing international tension, improving the overall political climate in

Europe after the historic meeting on security and cooperation in Helsinki.

“In the capitalist countries of Europe, the desire to expand contacts and cooperation with the USSR and other socialist states, and the creation of a system of European collective security has intensified. These tendencies met with resistance from the United States, which tried in every possible way to retain the political leadership of the European countries through the NATO military bloc system and through economic pressure. In this regard, there was an aggravation of contradictions in NATO, the main military-political grouping of the imperialist powers. Some of its participants have switched to a course that is more in line with their national interests and provides an opportunity for the implementation of an independent policy” [51, p. 466].

In these conditions, the creation of a new hotbed of tension in the Eastern Mediterranean by the United States and NATO was seen as undermining the process of positive change, as an attempt to use the unresolved problems in Europe to whip up military psychosis. The style of politics of Atlanticism inspired fears for the future fate of the bloc. According to the director of the Ankara Institute of International Relations Seyfi Tashkhan, “the tension between Greece and Turkey over the problems of Cyprus and the Aegean Sea are symptoms of NATO’s progressing disease.” Pointing to the discrepancy between the goals of American “globalism” and Western European “Eurocentrism”, the New York Times columnist Drew Middleton ranked the causes of the Greco-Turkish conflict and the Cyprus issue as “new elements of the European problem “ for Washington’s policy [127, 30.V.1978].

The tactics of destabilisation in the Eastern

Mediterranean region have caused discontent among the Western European allies of the United States for another reason. Although the conflict “showdown” between the Atlanticists and the Europeanists ended with significant costs for the former, it confirmed that they had powerful levers of influence in this zone. The supporters of “Eurocentrism”, in fact, were in the role of simple event recorders. In the opinion of the Political Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly, these events have put the bloc in the face of serious tests, which in their influence on inter-imperialist contradictions are compared with the last Arab-Israeli war. “The Cyprus problem, ” wrote the magazine *Nouvel Atlantik* in those critical days, “is, without a doubt, the most serious crisis that NATO experienced from a political, psychological and strategic point of view ... in itself a very serious fact. It is serious that there are no means to resolve it within the framework of NATO” [123, 28.VIII.1974].

As in the period of the “October war” of 1973, in the days of the development of the Cyprus and Aegean conflicts, Western Europe immediately dissociated itself from US policy, taking a special position on the problems of the Eastern Mediterranean. The Military Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly in a special report noted “the non-identity of the goals of the Alliance and the strategic interests of the United States” and called for a “specific European approach” to dangerous events. “There is no doubt,” the report said, “that the main burden of responsibility for these events falls on those who have always supported the Greek regime, contrary to logic and repeated warnings. And if lessons are learned from the conflict, the first of them should be the conclusion that selfish interests and

the thesis of “strategic stability” cannot serve as defining criteria in the formation of foreign policy” [29, p. 10].

Officials in Washington tried to fend off the accusations by referring to the scandalous “Wargate affair” and to excessive involvement in the Middle East conflict. Agreeing with European opponents, L. Stern writes: “During the entire period of the military regime, the United States pursued an ambivalent policy towards Greece: they publicly advocated the restoration of constitutional rules of government, but in fact prevented the creation of such a government by providing the regime with weapons, money and all kinds of patronage gestures. In the Nixon-Kissinger administration, the Athenian regime was a reliable racehorse, which gave the right to bet for Greece’s commitment to NATO’s military-political goals, and this point of view was literally engraved on the National Security Council’s charter of action” [85, p. 6].

The moralistic position of supporters of Eurocentrism in NATO has its own explanation. The fact is that the events in Cyprus dealt a blow to the very ideology of Atlanticism, which is centered on the adherence to the principles of bourgeois democracy, which is supposedly inherent in the North Atlantic region. This helped the Europeanists to partially take revenge for the “secondary”, “regional” role assigned by Washington to Western Europe. Hence the edifying tone of criticism: “The principles that determine foreign policy. can be vital within the framework of the Atlantic alliance only if they are based on democratic ideals, as well as on the observance of personal freedom and rights. The policy, which was carried out in relation to Greece, although it brought temporary stability and

security, but, as events showed, was built on sand". In the same report, supporters of Europeanism sharply criticized NATO for its "inability to deal with crises" and for "the lack of a mechanism for resolving internal problems" [30, p. 27]. The same idea was expressed by Ian Smart, Deputy Director of the Royal Institute of International Relations in London, wearing it in the form of a question: "What, in fact, can be said about an alliance whose members find themselves on the brink of war with each other and decide to withdraw the troops allocated to NATO, or use them to conduct hostilities for purely their own purposes? is defense possible when some countries, in an effort to solve their own problems, turn their backs on the common enemy?" [127, 18.VIII.1974].

The views of Western European ideologists boiled down to the fact that NATO is not a satisfactory mechanism, in particular, because it is a purely military bloc, and it cannot become a more political organisation due to the contradictions of its Atlantic components. In short, NATO is necessary but not sufficient. Sharp criticism of the Atlanticist policy and its destabilizing implications for the Eastern Mediterranean gave Europeanists an opportunity, on the one hand, to show the attractiveness of the tendencies of Eurocentrism and spread them to the region, and on the other hand, to strengthen the integration process in Western Europe itself, slowed down by the acute economic crisis. At the December 1974 session of the NATO Council, held in an atmosphere of disagreement, regret was expressed over Greece's withdrawal from the military organisation of the bloc, and it was also emphasized that "the bases provided by Greece's membership in NATO are of extreme strategic importance and their loss will

seriously affect the position of the bloc in the area". Reserving the possibility of Greece's return, the session participants made a proposal "to consider that membership in the union does not necessarily imply the integration of the armed forces" [28, p. 10-11].

It is noteworthy that supporters of both Atlanticism and Europeanism took a common position on the issue of the US Congress imposing an arms embargo on Turkey. Senator S. Nain (USA) and Lord Howe (Great Britain), as co-chairs of the NATO Military Committee, initiated the creation of a special commission on the southern flank of NATO and, after inspecting the armed forces in this zone, sent letters to the leaders of the bloc and the White House administration, in which they expressed concern about the combat readiness of the Turkish army, which is experiencing a shortage of spare parts due to the embargo, and called for the lifting of the ban.

Fundamental unity was also expressed on the issue of a Cyprus settlement. On both sides of the Atlantic, there was a call to use the NATO mechanism to "normalise the situation on the island, while simultaneously involving the European Economic Community (EEC) in the search for solutions. Thus, simultaneously with the exacerbation of inter-imperialist contradictions that surfaced during the dramatic events in the Eastern Mediterranean, there was also a tendency to use NATO's military-political structures as a mechanism for coordinating the overall strategy of imperialism. In Washington, this gave rise to hopes for a revival of the centripetal process. Arriving in Brussels in May 1975 for a session of the NATO Council, President J. Ford said that this Western alliance should be viewed as "a huge common

enterprise, as a commitment to follow a common policy” [135, 28.V.1975]. At the session of the NATO Council in December 1976, the US Secretary of State emphasized that the “supreme criterion” of the success of any secretary of state should be the answer to the question of how much he contributed to “strengthening the unity, vitality and power of the North Atlantic” [127, 12.XII.1976]. In terms of renewing Atlantic ties, the issue of the consultation mechanism was raised, the points of view on which diverged during the Aegean and Cypriot crises. As the Canadian researcher R. Hill writes, “the NATO consultation system worked perfectly during the crisis in Cyprus, and only thanks to it the final results of the events turned out to be happy for the union. Constant telephone conversations between Washington and Paris, London and Ankara, Brussels and Athens helped to eliminate the Greek-Turkish war” [76, p. 27].

Edward Peck, who in 1970-1975. served as the representative of England in the North Atlantic Assembly, expresses the exact opposite point of view. In his opinion, the Middle East and Cyprus conflicts showed that the NATO consultation system is a collective “agreement to disagree” and that “telephone diplomacy” did little.

But judging not by official statements, but by specific political actions, it would not be an exaggeration to say that it was the attitude towards Greece and Turkey, if not in form, then in essence, that exposed the position of the United States in Western Europe. Revision of Greece’s foreign policy and related measures did not affect the political and economic interests of Western European countries. The decision to withdraw from the NATO military organisation

primarily concerned the United States, the only NATO member state that had bases and other military installations on Greek territory. Therefore, the line of the K. Karamanlis government put on the agenda the issue of the nature and prospects of exclusively Greek-American relations. This uniqueness of the consequences of the tactics of destabilisation is also confirmed by Turkey's decision to close American military facilities, which was also hedged with reservations about its belonging to the Western world. Turkish Prime Minister B. Ecevit, in particular, said: "We will show more and more interest in the integration movement, what is happening in Europe" [121, 3.IV.1975]. In conditions Ankara embargo raised the issue of gradually diversifying the sources of weapons and propose to Western Europe to replace in this sense USA. It would seem that the redistribution of forces in the East. The Mediterranean became an objective reality, but in the capitals of Western Europe took a very ambiguous position.

When analysing the relationship in NATO between the two centres of rivalry, the inconsistency of interests of which was again exposed by the military-political crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean, the lack of initiative in Western Europe in the approach to using the consequences of destabilisation tactics to strengthen its positions in the coastal countries is striking. The documents of the sessions of the NATO Council and the North Atlantic Assemblies explain this in different ways. For example, the Political Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly assessed the Aegean and Cypriot crises as a purely "American affair." He came to the conclusion that "Western Europe, being late in this area twice (the anti-government putsch in Cyprus and

the landing of Turkish troops.—V. Sh.), was completely late” [30, p. 31]. The NATO Military Committee, in a special resolution, stressed that Western Europe should play its role in stabilising the southeastern flank of the bloc, in particular, in conditions when the United States imposed an arms embargo on Turkey, Western European allies should provide assistance to her on a collective or individual basis ... The resolution welcomed Italy’s decision to sell F-104 aircraft to Turkey and Germany’s readiness to supply it with certain types of weapons [28, p. 6]. When the correspondent of the Frankfurter Rundschau newspaper asked Chancellor G. Schmidt if West Germany wanted to take the place of the United States in Turkey, followed by an almost ironic answer: “We cannot play Americans.” [119, 8.VII.1978]. The NATO Military Committee clarified that the countries of Western Europe are unable to provide Turkey with arms supplies, in the same volume and on the same conditions on which the USA did it.

The lack of a single standard for armaments within NATO, the difficulties experienced by Western Europe during the economic crisis, prevented Europeanists from acting actively and taking full advantage of the miscalculations of American diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean. In general, the explanation for passivity should be sought in the fact that although both formally and in fact, Western Europe is making efforts to establish itself as an independent magnitude in the Eastern Mediterranean, while it cannot consider itself here completely independent from the United States in the economic, political and military fields and in the strength of this places great emphasis on cooperation with Washington. The deep crisis of Atlanticism in Greece and Turkey causes her fears for the fate of the

bloc and pushes for a concerted search for a settlement of the Cyprus and Aegean conflicts, to hedge American policy.

There was also a factor that radically influenced the state of American-Western European relations—the growth of left-wing forces. The overthrow of the military dictatorial regime in Greece, the fall of the dictatorship in Portugal, the revitalisation of political life in Spain, the strengthening of the communists in Italy and other social shifts that swept southern Europe seriously frightened the bourgeoisie. In the face of such a shift, the ruling circles of Western Europe began to view the United States as a military-political guarantor of the stability of the bourgeois system. Hence the weakening of European opposition to Atlantic schemes. Thus, the social factor has strengthened the tendency, which, according to V. I. Lenin, makes the “alliance of all imperialists inevitable” [2, p. 332].

In a class-based partnership, efforts were made on both sides of the Atlantic to rebuild NATO's southeastern flank. In practice, this was reflected in the parallel defense agreements of the United States with Greece and Turkey, according to which Washington provided the latter with military aid worth 700 million and 1 billion dollars, respectively, as well as in the lifting of the ban on arms supplies to Turkey from August 2, 1978. These measures, however, did not fully restore the American position. In October 1978, only 4 out of 26 bases closed in 1975 resumed operations in Turkey. In Ankara, they said that these facilities also operate on the basis of a temporary status, which expired on October 9, 1979, and then was extended three times before signing a new agreement on the conditions for the operation of military facilities. In

January 1979, the first round of US-Turkish negotiations began, in which the US demanded that Turkey agree to grant the Pentagon bases “broad autonomy”, and the Turkish government insisted on an agreement on the precise definition of the status of US military installations. Backstage bargaining unfolded, engulfing the military and economic area.

As for Greece, after several rounds of American-Greek negotiations, the parking lot of the US 6th Fleet in Elephesis was eliminated and the air base in Ellinikon was closed. The rest of the facilities were placed under “national Greek control”. By April 15, 1976, Greece and the United States agreed on the principles of a new comprehensive agreement, which should replace numerous (about 40.—V. Sh.) Treaties in the military-political field. The main provisions of the new agreement were recorded in the so-called “Document on the principles of the future American-Greek agreement.” On October 8, 1976, a communiqué was published in Athens on the progress of negotiations on a new agreement on cooperation in the field of defense, and on July 28, 1977, this document was initiated and has been ready for signing ever since.

The Greek side itself was in no hurry to sign the agreement, and this slowness was explained by a number of reasons. First, the Greek government could not fail to take into account the enormous opposition to the treaty within the country: wide public circles demanded the elimination of foreign bases, and not the replacement of some onerous agreements with others. Secondly, the Greek government did not want to lose such a means of pressure on the United States, which was the yet unsigned base agreement. It was said in government circles that the right moment would come

only when: a) the treaty on “special” relations with NATO was completed and b) the corresponding US-Turkish treaty was signed [145, I.XI.1978], practically left the Greek side with the opportunity, if it was not satisfied with this or that provision of the American-Greek treaty, to demand from the United States appropriate changes in the American-Greek agreement.

The revolutionary events in Iran, which ended the pro-Western Shah’s regime, had a great impact on the activation of the Atlantic policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, the CENTO bloc collapsed. Among other measures, the new Iranian government demanded the elimination of American strongholds. The American generals were faced with the urgent redeployment of some of the electronic equipment from Iranian bases to Turkey, Greece and Cyprus. This issue was debated during the January 1979. US Undersecretary of State W. Christopher’s visit to Nicosia, Athens and Ankara. ‘ Where did the American electronic equipment migrate from Iran? According to reports from the Kharavgi newspaper, it was stationed at British bases in Cyprus. The Pentagon’s desire to quickly make up for the loss of Iranian facilities has accelerated the process of “Americanisation” of the Cypriot strongholds, expressed in the constant deployment of military transport aircraft, combat helicopters, airborne troops, as well as U-2 spy aircraft, which are delivered to the base in Akrotiri in cages and assembled on site. American aircraft are collecting intelligence information about the Eastern European socialist states and the Soviet Union, and they are piloted by British pilots to create the appearance of compliance with the Zurich-London agreements [111, 14.IV.1979]. Hinting at the conduct of electronic

intelligence, the official circles of London do not hide the fact that Anglo-American cooperation in the field of aviation intelligence is not limited to the now outdated [115, II.III.1979].

It became known about projects for the construction of new strategic facilities on the island. The Cypriot newspaper "Kharavgi" reported that the Turkish government allegedly promised to provide the United States with the Karpas peninsula for the construction of an American air and naval base on it [110, 1974, No. 35]. This peninsula is 600 sq. km is located in the eastern part of Cyprus and is controlled by Turkish troops.

According to the Cypriot press, in Washington, based on the interests of the basic strategy, they are seriously considering creating a new bloc, which would include Turkey, Greece, Cyprus, as well as Israel and Egypt, tied by separate Camp David agreements.

Despite the unrealistic nature of such a project due to the anti-Iranian position of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, American diplomacy is pursuing a practical line of making up for the missing links of the Egyptian-Israeli axis at the expense of the interests of these countries. According to the Washington Post, the so-called memorandum of guarantees, signed by the US Secretary of State and the Israeli Foreign Minister in parallel with the Egyptian-Israeli "peace" treaty, provides that if Egypt violates the terms of this document, the United States will take such measures to protect Israel's interests. as the use of naval forces and the provision of military supplies in an emergency (like an air bridge, through which the United States supplied Tel Aviv with weapons during the 1973 Middle East war) [135, 28. III.1979]. In other words, the American bases in Greece

and Turkey will serve for the Pentagon to demonstrate its strength, and the bases in Cyprus will form a kind of support on which the US-Israel air bridge will again hang.

Involvement of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus in dangerous militaristic preparations and adventures in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East reflects the aggressiveness of imperialism.

Strategic directive adopted in May 1978. at the session of the NATO Council in Washington, it intends to closely link Greece, Turkey and Cyprus with the aim of pursuing an Atlantic policy not only in the Eastern Mediterranean, but also in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Persian Gulf. On such a functional basis, Washington would also like to overcome the growth of centrifugal tendencies in NATO itself.

The fall of the pro-Western Shah's regime in Iran, the withdrawal of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey from the CENTO bloc, the general strengthening of anti-imperialist sentiments in the countries of the Near and Middle East "mixed the cards" of the Atlantic circles. Calling the outcome of events in Iran "catastrophic" for the United States, the American magazine "Yu. S. News and the World Report" "assumed that in the process of developing a new policy, there will be a shift in favor of the adherents of a tough position, which provides for "getting what you want at any cost" [133, 18.111.1979]. The direction (under the pretext of the "Afghan crisis") of a US naval squadron in the Persian Gulf, the extraordinary intensity of American policy in the Middle East aimed at creating the Tel Aviv-Cairo axis, feverish attempts to restore NATO's southeastern flank, and a plan to create a "rapid deployment" expeditionary force testified to that. that Washington politicians

continued to prioritise the importance of military power “considering it as some kind of absolute guarantor of political advantages and preservation of the existing social status. And this line is continued by Washington, despite the obvious bankruptcy of the concept of “controlled slippage”.

If the failure of the global doctrines of imperialism in the Eastern Mediterranean revealed the crisis of the post-war system of international relations imposed on the peoples of this region, then the inconsistency of the regional concept exposes the helplessness of the imperialist circles to adapt to changing realities, to direct the development of local processes in the direction they need. Although outwardly the concept of “controlled slippage “ appears to be fluid and flexible, its interventionist content is a repetition of the long-obsolete “gunboat diplomacy”. “During Carter’s presidency, “ writes Professor R. Folk, this policy continues in approximately the same directions... Rhetoric ran into strong practical obstacles, and the promised changes in policy were silently rejected” [124, 9.VII.1979] ... Thus, in the Eastern Mediterranean course, Atlanticist strategists remain adherents of the conceptual scheme of “controlled slipping”, which has brought much grief and suffering to the peoples of the coastal countries and continues to threaten the peace and security of the area.

CYPRUS IN NATO'S SIGHTS

Washington's foreign policy towards the Republic of Cyprus, based mainly on the regional concept of "controlled slippage", is subject to significant market fluctuations. It is formed under the influence of two main factors: the strategic position of Cyprus, geographically adjacent to the Arab-Israeli "conflict region," and the island's place in the system of international relations of the states of the Eastern Mediterranean region. On the one hand, Cyprus is seen as a convenient and important foothold for imperialism in the Middle East, on the other, as a kind of a hook on which Greece and Turkey can be kept in NATO orbit and with its help expand the military-strategic positions in the south east flank of the block.

At different stages of the Cyprus crisis, the relationship between these factors changed. Prior to the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the prevailing desire was to prevent upsetting the "equilibrium" in the Eastern Mediterranean. They explained the negative reaction of the US government to the idea of the annexation of Cyprus by Greece. The State Department believed that the implementation of enosis would finally worsen the relations between Greece and Britain and Turkey, with all the ensuing consequences for the North Atlantic bloc. In addition, according to the calculations of the United States, an unconnected Cyprus would free the hands of the diplomats and the military for extensive maneuvering in the very distant future.

However, in the period preceding the Israeli aggression in 1967, imperialism was especially concerned about the turbulent processes in such Arab

countries as Egypt, Syria, and Algeria, which took the path of eliminating the dominance of foreign capital, radical socio-economic transformations, exerting a revolutionary influence on the entire Arab the world, including the Arabian Peninsula, which is considered the citadel of the oil monopolies of the West. The expansion of equal cooperation between the Arab countries and the states of the world socialist system also gave rise to serious concern in the United States.

The growth of the national liberation struggle of the Cypriots and the strengthening of the status of Cyprus as a non-aligned state finally confused the cards of the American strategists.

In this environment, Washington has essentially taken over the police functions in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. His subversive activities were reflected in the incitement of mistrust and suspicion by CIA agents between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. For provocative purposes, large American radio stations were used, which employ about 2 thousand specialists. When in 1963-1964, the hands of extremist circles in Cyprus were inspired by bloody feuds, President Makarios appealed to the Cypriots to end the fratricidal war, surrender their weapons and return to peaceful life. At the same time, the president emphasized that the government promises forgiveness and amnesty to everyone involved in the clashes. Then the American radio stations broadcast: "Do not trust Makarios. All Cypriot Turks will face severe retribution and punishment. " In a 1964 UN Secretary General's report to the Security Council, it was noted that the quality of the transmissions indicated a high technical level of personnel and equipment. The report said: "The actions of the radio stations not only increased the

tension due to the suspicion of their targets, but also created a threat to the safety of flights of aircraft making their regular flights to and from Cyprus” [21, p. 168].

It is noteworthy that so far the State Department has not even formalized the placement of its radio stations on the island even with the appearance of an “agreement.” The exception is the so-called “investment guarantee agreement between the United States and Cyprus, under which American monopolists are carrying out economic expansion. For example, the American Cypress Mines Corporation is the largest foreign company that controls the extraction of copper pyrite in Cyprus.

In essence, the anti-Cypriot activity of the United States was expressed in the advancement and imposition of interventionist plans for solving the problem on the Cypriots. The Balla Plan, Acheson Plan, Rusk Plan, Lemnitzer Plan, named after their authors, prominent American politicians and generals, were aimed at implementing two alternative options for the liquidation of an independent, sovereign and territorially integral Cypriot state—or through the occupation of the island by NATO troops, or as a result of the division of its territory into spheres of influence between NATO member countries. The English historian of Greek origin K. Markides (*The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic*. 1977, p. 127) singles out the Acheson plan among these projects, considering it the most odious.

This stage of American policy can be described as an open attack on the sovereign rights of the Republic of Cyprus. However, faced with a resolute rebuff from the Cypriot people, their government, and all peace-loving

forces, faced with the fact of the Greek-Turkish confrontation over the Cyprus problem, which undermined the foundations of Atlantic solidarity and destroyed the viability of NATO's southeastern flank, the administration of President L. Johnson was forced to make certain adjustments to this course.

Anti-Cypriot activity was only a link in the chain of military-politic measures taken by Washington to strengthen the southeastern flank of NATO, including the one inspired in 1967, secret American services a reactionary coup in Greece. Cyprus was assigned the role of a springboard for imperialist policies. Arab-Israeli wars in 1967 and 1973, finally prompted the United States to reconsider the military-strategic value of the island, whose territory was of exceptional importance. as a transshipment base for providing all-round support to the Israeli aggressors. This also explains: the attempts of American military leaders to squeeze the positions of England, to intensify the process of "Americanisation" of British bases in Cyprus, as well as to expand their presence on the island through the construction of new facilities.

As for Washington's policy directly towards Cyprus, two areas of military-strategic activity created a dichotomy in its official approach to the Cyprus issue. The Atlantic factor, refracted through the prism of the interests of strengthening the southeastern flank of NATO, requires balancing between the nationalist doctrines of Hellenism and Pan-Turkism, and the timely directing of chauvinistic excesses to Cyprus. By guarding its junior conflicting allies, the United States thus gets the opportunity for direct and indirect complicity in interventionist actions against the Cypriot state.

Unlike the Atlantic, the Middle East factor is not

subject to such emotional impact from external forces. In accordance with the doctrine of “selective approach” it implies the consolidation and expansion of the American military presence on the island and, therefore, requires a certain stability in the situation in Cyprus. The Middle East factor puts American politicians in front of the need to actively act through the “back door”—the British military bases.

The Atlantic and Middle East factors were increasingly drawing American imperialism into the Cyprus crisis, giving the latter acute, explosive forms. The object of the intrigues was the policy of non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and personally President Makarios, who rejected the harassment of the imperialist forces.

The organiser of the anti-Cypriot conspiracies was invariably the US CIA. According to the testimony of the American researcher Andrew Tully, during the 1967 Cyprus crisis, the INR (Intelligence and Research Bureau of the State Department) prepared 59 special reports and 17 fundamental analyses on the situation in Cyprus (and this is compared with 5 reports on South Vietnam and 7 on the DRV for the same period, although the United States waged war there) [88, p. 163]. According to the newspaper “Baltimore Sun” dated August 7, 1977, during the years of the independent development of Cyprus, with the direct participation or with the knowledge of the CIA, 19 conspiracies were organized against President Makarios. The US Secret Services acted behind the scenes of the 1974 events, and the regional concept of “controlled slipping” was also developed with their participation.

Judging by the information leaked to the American press, there was no consensus in Washington about how

wide the range of destabilisation should extend to the Eastern Mediterranean region and whether all elements of the concept should be applied.

Thus, some American observers believe that on the eve of the anti-government putsch in Cyprus, disagreements arose between the State Department and the Pentagon. According to them, at first, diplomats prevailed, considering it necessary to support the Athenian junta as a loyal NATO stake. Then the arguments of the military circles took effect, according to which the strategic interests of the bloc and the United States are more consistent with the introduction of Turkish troops into Cyprus.

As the practice of implementing the conceptual scheme of “controlled slipping” has shown, there was also an “intermediate” opinion. The Swiss newspaper *Neue Zürcher-Zeitung* wrote in correspondence from Washington on August 23, 1974 about the “direct accusations” that are being brought forward in Congress circles against American diplomacy, which was preparing to establish official contact with the self-styled Cypriot “President “ Sampson with the aim of giving him the regime of “semblance of legality”. The Political Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly subsequently also rebuked the American diplomacy for its readiness to recognize the rebel government. Immediately after the rebellion, the Foreign Minister in the pseudo-government of Sampson was received by the American ambassador to Cyprus Davis [30, p. 28-29]. The magazine “*Der Spiegel* “ cited an interesting fact in this connection: the journalist Savas Constantnopoulos, known in Nicosia for his contacts with the CIA, organized a meeting as a liaison from Sampson’s side [130, 25.VIII.1974]. K. Markides believes

(“The Rise and Fall of the Republic of Cyprus”, p. 180) that it was in the readiness to “recognize new realities” that the meaning of the “impulse” that the United States sent to Turkey as an incentive for its action in Cyprus was manifested. He writes: “Contrary to the advice to make a statement after the coup in Cyprus with a statement similar to the English one, recognizing Makarios as the only and legitimate head of the Cypriot state, G. Kissinger clearly hesitated and dismissed the remark “Makarios has already become a political corpse.”

Considering the position of the United States on the Cyprus issue, bourgeois researchers simplistically reduce it only to supporting “primitively thinking army colonels” solely for reasons of keeping Greece in the NATO system at any political cost. In reality, the plans of American imperialism. were broader in substance and had a pronounced neo-colonialist orientation.

The proponents of the “controlled slipping” concept assumed that the Greek-Turkish clash in Cyprus would help them reap the benefits while minimizing political costs. And at first, politicians in Washington thought that their goals had been achieved to some extent. It was soon discovered, however, that the anti-government insurgency and the Turkish invasion were a double-edged sword. Greece’s withdrawal from the NATO military organisation and Turkey’s decision to close American bases threatened the entire military-political system of imperialism in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Since 1974 in shaping the American course in the Cyprus issue, the Greek lobby in the US Congress begins to play an active role, which the *Le Monde* newspaper described as “more influential than President Ford

himself” [121, 14.111.1976].

Although the total number of Greek immigrants to the United States is only 435,000, during the Cypriot crisis they managed to secure the support of the Greek Orthodox Church, which extends its influence to almost 2 million believers, as well as traditionally anti-Turkish Armenians and part of the Jewish population [77 , from. 35]. If the cohesion of the Greek community in the United States was greatly weakened due to disagreements over the attitude towards the Athenian junta, then after 1974 it managed to create a “shock” organisation—the American-Greek Institute, which performs lobbying functions. The purpose of this organisation is to “punish” Turkey for military operations in Cyprus and to get concessions from it on the Cyprus issue. The Institute is funded by large commercial, industrial and financial circles, in particular T. Papaz, who controls the entire American-Greek trade, the Athenian ship owner G Livanos, the oil industrialist A. G Jieventis. With significant financial resources, representatives of the institute carry out a petition before the administration or the US Congress, and influence the legislature. It should be noted that “ethnic” lobbying, as a phenomenon of American political life, reflects the interests of big business, whose representatives associate the achievement of foreign policy goals with plans for economic expansion. Papaz, whose nominee Spiro Agnew (Greek by birth), served for some time as vice president of the United States, enjoys a special influence on the sidelines on Capitol Hill. Playing on the difficulties caused by the conflict situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, they entered into lucrative contracts, multiplied profits, subordinated the national economy of the Eastern

Mediterranean countries to their interests. During the Cyprus crisis, Papaz received a \$125 million contract for the construction of a petrochemical complex in Thessaloniki, and Leventis for the supply of fuel to the US 6th fleet. Economic control combined with political intervention, with the support of right-wing conservative forces in Greece and Cyprus.

The millionaires, the Rossides brothers, actively joined the activities of the American Greek Institute, because their property (hotels, mills, land) remained in the Turkish-occupied part of Cyprus for a total amount of about \$ 2 million. In principle, they do not mind the Turkish presence, but demand pay them monetary compensation. According to the testimony of American authors R. Howe and S. Trott, the Rossides felt a sense of personal dislike for President Makarios because he did not allow them to export capital from Cyprus. This also determined their oppositional attitude to the government course of Makarios [77, p. 466].

Analysing the activities of the Greek lobby, one cannot fail to notice its inconsistency with the main direction of American foreign policy. The fact is that lobbyism is a specific form of political influence of monopoly capital on government bodies to achieve their class interests [50, p. 12]. In this sense, it reflects a complex interweaving of contradictory tendencies that leave their imprint on the formation and practical implementation of imperialist policy and give it an opportunistic character and inconsistency.

At the same time, “ethnic” lobbying is one of the convenient tools of US diplomacy, which allows it to maneuver and exert pressure on “intractable” partners. Finally, it provides an opportunity to “play out” rowdy disagreements on tactical issues, presenting

the White House administration in a favorable light.

The Turkish national community in the United States, numbering about 100 thousand people, is also trying to resort to lobbying, using the Federation of American-Turkish Societies for this purpose. In addition, a Turkish-Cypriot lobbying organisation with a capital of \$60,000 is officially registered in the United States [77, p. 458]. According to R. Howe and S. Trott, neither the Turkish community, nor the Turkish Cypriots living in the United States have sufficient political experience and practically cannot be serious rivals of the Greek national group in the struggle for influence on the US legislative branch [77, p. ... 460].

The impact of Greek lobbying led to a seemingly spectacular decision by the US Congress to embargo Turkey's arms supplies. Moreover, the Congress linked the lifting of the embargo to the achievement of progress in the settlement of the Cyprus problem. But the version of Washington's "knightly" action did not last long. This move meant the continuation of American intervention in the conflict situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. Speaking at the XXXIX session of the UN General Assembly, Secretary of State Kissinger said that "the United States is ready to play an even more active role than in the past, in helping the parties find a solution to the age-old problem of Cyprus" [21, p. 32-33]. American diplomacy has subtly maneuvered to convince the world of its sincere interest in reaching a just settlement, although these efforts have yielded no practical results. The project of creating a joint Greek-Turkish consortium for the exploitation of oil fields in the Aegean Sea also proved unsuccessful. Kissinger's "shuttle" diplomacy, rushing between Ankara, Athens and Nicosia, soon revealed its focus (not to ensure the

national interests of the Cypriot people and eliminate the hotbed of tension, but to maintain imperialist positions in the region). Although the procedure for holding informal meetings and consultations, in principle, has its positive aspects, the methods of American diplomacy were used in practice to “resolve” the Cyprus issue within the framework of NATO and bypassing UN resolutions that form the basis of a political settlement. At the same time (with the help of diplomacy) the United States tried to gain a reputation for itself as a “friend” of Cyprus, allegedly understanding its economic difficulties caused by dramatic events. At the XXX session of the UN General Assembly, the American representative of Scali announced the government’s decision to allocate annually, until a settlement is reached, financial assistance to Cyprus in the amount of more than \$ 10 million [21, p. 27].

The only US “initiative” on the Cyprus issue, adopted by Greece and Turkey, was also aimed at restoring the viability of NATO’s southeastern flank. This initiative was put forward in 1975 at the session of the Council of the North Atlantic bloc in Brussels and was expressed in a proposal to the representatives of the Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus to enter into direct negotiations, without preconditions. The lack of constructivism in American politics was explained by the alleged “irreconcilability” of the two ethnic groups. According to Kissinger, “local factors, nationalist goals and international rivalry all together have become an obstacle to the most elementary steps towards solving the problem. On those rare occasions when representatives of two communities sat down at the negotiating table, they engaged in meaningless

procedural disputes” [22, p. 62]. Despite the fuss over the US readiness to stimulate the process of intercommunal negotiations on the basis of the “Brussels formula”, the Ford administration was unable to get out of the vicious circle determined by the imperialist Atlantic attitude of all its practical actions in connection with certain aspects and turns of the Cyprus crisis.

The US government has also been inconsistent in putting pressure on Ankara. According to American politicians, increased pressure could lead to Turkey’s withdrawal from NATO, and this would give rise to a catastrophe on a much broader scale than Greece’s break with the bloc’s military organisation. The Atlantic factor was beginning to outweigh the influence of the Greek lobby, weakened the position of the latter in Congress. For example, when discussing the issue of lifting the embargo in the Senate Commission, the votes were distributed almost equally. “Repair” of NATO’s southeastern flank gradually prevailed over a “just Cyprus settlement”.

March 26, 1976 US President J. Ford sent to Congress a draft American-Turkish agreement on joint defense. In accordance with this agreement, parallel to the four-year base agreement, Turkey was to receive \$1 billion, including \$200 million free of charge. In April 1976 a similar agreement was signed with Greece; it provided for the provision of military aid to Greece in the amount of 700 million dollars for four years [68, p. 155].

These documents were not destined to enter into force: under the influence of the Greek lobby, the American Congress, by a majority vote, secured the preservation of the embargo on the supply of arms to Turkey, despite the demands of the White House.

Summarising this stage of diplomatic activity, the Washington Post made the following judgment: “The immediate cause of the Cyprus crisis was the vicious American policy, and its resolution was hopelessly bogged down in the quagmire of the struggle between the legislative and executive branches. This makes matters even more difficult. Any reasonable policy, in all likelihood, would not only regulate Greek-Turkish relations, but also unravel the tangle of disagreements between the executive and legislative branches” [135, 8.11.1977].

The dramatisation of the consequences of American policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, in addition to propaganda purposes, was caused by obvious doubts about the effectiveness and sufficiency of defense agreements for the continuation and expansion of intervention. In Washington, it was not the correctness of the step itself that was questioned, but its ability to provide diplomacy with a wide range of actions in the future. In this regard, observers drew attention to the warning addressed to the congressmen of the New York Times: “America has undoubtedly become an integral part of what was commonly called the Greco-Turkish issue, which at first was related only to Cyprus and the problems of the Aegean Sea. We are now in the most direct way involved in the matter on which the situation on the southeastern flank of NATO depends” [24, 23.VIII.1977].

The similar agreements with Greece and Turkey in the field of defense have definitively determined the priorities of the US policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. They reflected Washington’s commitment to the principles of Atlanticism, giving the European supporters of this ideology an answer to the question of what the

US line will be in the future. According to the American author L. Stern, although these documents “linked Greece and Turkey strategically for at least 4 years” [85, p. 67], they did not stop the widening divisions between the allies. Describing Kissinger’s diplomacy in the area, Stern named among its mistakes ignoring the complex, international character of the Cyprus problem and underestimating the impact of the concepts of Greek-Turkish capitalism. Bearing in mind the theory of a professor at the University of Wisconsin (Korpata, widespread in the early 70s, according to which the nationalist doctrines of Hellenism and Pan-Turkism have completely exhausted themselves [79, p. 33], he believes that American policy towards Greece and Turkey was based on erroneous perceptions and inaccurate determination of the place of each of these allies in the NATO system. Military agreements with the United States with Greece and Turkey were severely criticized within the walls of the Congress. If the Greek lobby, demanding concessions from Ankara on the Cyprus issue, saw them as an opportunity to restart the supply of military equipment then the congressmen, who were inclined in favor of lifting the embargo, given the great strategic importance of Turkey, considered this “equation “ unfair and demanded that Ankara be preferred. Undoubtedly, the miscalculations of Kissinger’s diplomacy cost President Ford a significant share of the vote in the 1976 elections.

The government of President J. Carter that came to power in the form of the Cyprus problem received a difficult foreign policy legacy in the eastern part of the Mediterranean, which was complicated by the ever greater involvement of the United States in a crisis situation. In the speeches of Washington politicians, in

the reflections of American observers, new notes appeared—the consciousness of the helplessness of Kissinger’s diplomacy in the Cyprus issue. Assessing the prospects for the American course, the Washington Post wrote: “The time has come for calm diplomacy and serious consultations with Congress. Unlike the Arab-Israeli conflict, the dispute over Cyprus, for all its acuteness and complexity, may not be as insoluble as it sometimes seemed” [135, 8.11.1977].

“Quite” US diplomacy began with a statement by J. Carter during his election campaign, in which he reaffirmed the need to first make progress on a Cyprus settlement, and only then tackle the issue of providing arms and aid. Thus, the new administration, in an attempt to gain the confidence of the Greek lobby, linked the explosive Cyprus issue with Turkey’s key role in NATO. Nevertheless, the contours of “moral politics” did not appear clearly even after the appointment of K. Clifford as the special representative of the US President for the Cyprus problem and his trip to Ankara, Nicosia and Athens. Analysing the results of Clifford’s negotiations, some observers noted that “the policy style of the new administration differs from the style of the previous government, it seems decisive, more impartial” [135, 8.11.1977]. According to others, “in showing interest in Cyprus, the United States does not care about justice, but is guided by the old motive — the desire to restore the former warm relations with its important NATO ally, Turkey” [127, 11/29/1977].

The veil of mystery, which deliberately shrouds all the actions of the American leadership related to practical steps in the Cyprus settlement, allowed the Carter administration to hide its point of view on such important issues as the withdrawal of foreign troops,

the constitutional and territorial aspect of the problem. At the same time, the Cypriots were gradually indoctrinated with the idea that “calm” diplomacy meant almost a “reorientation” of the course, an unexpected “understanding” of the fundamental interests of the Cypriot people.

However, the new tactical moves of American policy did not dispel the prejudices of the Cypriots. Answering the question of the Turkish community newspaper “*Halkin Sesi*” about Clifford’s mission, Secretary General of AKEL, E. Papaioannou noted that the party had no illusions about “statements in favor of a radical change in US policy” [140, 24.III.1977]. The leader of the Turkish community, R. Denktash, on April 3, 1977, in an interview with the Austrian newspaper *Noyes Volksblatt*, also said: “The Americans should take the path of neutral and friendly attitude towards Cyprus on the basis of non-interference in its internal affairs. The Americans’ slogan “I know for sure what is good for everyone” is only detrimental to the position of the US around the world. ”

“Quite” diplomacy, without leaving official documents, makes it possible to maintain the appearance of Washington’s diplomatic activity around the Cyprus settlement. Thoughtful omissions, broadcast but unsubstantiated reasoning, heightened attention to details that are really worthless—these are the arsenal of means used by supporters of “calm” diplomacy to divert the attention of the world community from the essence of the matter.

No matter how American diplomacy dressed up in the dress of “impartiality,” the Atlantic factor increasingly influenced the formation of its official course on the Cyprus issue. Soon enough, Ashington

publicly abandoned its previous high-profile declarations. Secretary of State S. Vance, along with Secretary of Defense G. Brown and Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, General L. Johnson, in April 1978 laid out a “new approach” according to which the government of President Carter was going to ask Congress to lift the embargo without waiting for concessions from Turkey in regarding Cyprus. As in the period of the Ford administration, the argument is being made about the threat of an embargo to the Western alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean, because it weakens Turkey. Regarding the speech of officials in the House of Representatives Commission on International Relations, where the issue of resuming military supplies to Turkey was discussed, Congressman R. Lagomarsino said, not without sarcasm: “... if you close your eyes and go back a couple of years, what is said here is very similar to what Kissinger said—only the accent is missing” [127, 8.IV.1978]. After a lengthy and intense debate on July 26, 1978. The Senate expressed support for the administration’s proposal to lift the arms embargo on Turkey (57 votes in favor, 42 against). On August 1, the US House of Representatives approved this proposal by a small majority (208 votes against 205).

The decision to resume military and financial assistance to Turkey was stipulated by the requirement of the conciliation commission of the Congress to the US President to report every two months on the progress achieved in the Cyprus settlement. The American press did not hide the fact that such a compromise amendment was intended to “justify” the senators and congressmen who had previously voted to maintain the embargo, and then abruptly changed their minds.

The lifting of the embargo provoked discontent

among the government circles in Greece and Cyprus. On August 2, US Ambassador to Nicosia G. Stone was summoned to the Foreign Office, where he was conveyed to the deep disappointment of the Cypriot government over the decision of the Congress. Commenting on this conversation, the representative of Cyprus emphasized: "We opposed the lifting of the embargo, because we believed that the reasons for the embargo were not yet removed and the preconditions were not created to justify this step" (15, 15.VIII.1978]. At the same time, the government of Cyprus took into account the statement of President J. Carter that the solution of the Cyprus problem will continue to be the primary goal of American policy, that the United States will contribute to a just and lasting settlement; in particular, the decision of the Congress is associated with the prospect of an early return of refugees to their home countries. at home, with the withdrawal of Turkish troops and the resumption of intercommunal talks, which were part of the US tactical line designed to create an illusory opinion among the world community that only Washington can influence Turkey and act as a "peacemaker."

At the same time, the US diplomatic approach to the ways of a Cyprus settlement was revised. In his speech at the XXXII session of the UN General Assembly, the American representative did not support Resolution No. 32-15 on Cyprus, considering it "non-constructive". He stated that "the threat to international peace posed by an unresolved problem is clearly exaggerated" and pre-empted "not to overestimate the role of the Security Council, "but" to focus on resolving those aspects of the problem that are currently amenable to rapid resolution" [42, p. 34-35]. The statement by the

American delegate gave the impression that there was more behind the calls not to dramatize the situation in Cyprus than an attempt to freeze the consequences of the dramatic events. The statement contained a very transparent allusion to the use of partial measures tactics in resolving the Cyprus issue, in many respects similar to the manoeuvres of US diplomacy around the Middle East settlement. The “new approach” actually condoned NATO’s “fait accompli” policy, blocked constructive initiatives within the framework of well-known UN resolutions. Such diplomacy, pursuing selfish, bloc goals, did not take into account either the structural nature of the Cyprus problem or the realities of the current situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. It was built on deliberately false premises and, as a result, is devoid of any positive prospects.

Subsequent moves by the United States confirmed the fact that the introduction and lifting of the embargo on arms supplies to Turkey, on which hopes for progress in resolving the Cyprus issue were pinned, turned out to be just another neo-colonialist form of American influence on the Eastern Mediterranean states. A wide range of obligations, reflecting the process of further, deeper involvement of the United States in a conflict situation, essentially boiled down to the development of a “peace framework” in Cyprus. The new plan was worked out jointly with England and Canada. Attention is drawn to the caution with which the United States and its allies put forward this “initiative.” The plan (12 points) was published on November 15, 1978 in the Turkish newspaper *Hürriyet*, and representatives of the State Department confirmed the publication was correct. The plan called for, inter alia, the establishment in areas inhabited by Greek Cypriots and

Turkish Cypriots, executive and legislative bodies, which would have “powers” outside the competence of the federal government. “In other words, the American proposal proposes to consolidate the de facto partition of the island under the guise of creating a federal state consisting of two “autonomous regions.” It diligently bypasses such fundamental UN requirements as the early restoration of the sovereignty and independence of Cyprus, an end to outside interference in its affairs, and respect for the policy of non-alignment of the island republic. Other problems, such as the withdrawal of foreign troops, are mentioned in the proposal with vague reservations, allowing them to be interpreted as desired. It is noteworthy that the “framework of peace” was put forward at a time when the UN Security Council adopted a resolution, which for the first time determined a specific deadline for fulfilling the requirements adopted earlier and constituting the basis for a political solution to the Cyprus issue. In an attempt to sabotage the UN resolutions, it is easy to see Washington’s intention to remove the United Nations from the search for a just settlement, to impose on the Cypriots a formula that meets the intentions of NATO’s Atlantic circles.

Analysing the American project, which is a modified version of the old taksim plan, we can conclude that the US ‘peacekeeping efforts’ arsenal has exhausted itself. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that in the long term imperialist diplomacy, playing on the Greek-Turkish contradictions over Cyprus, and also using the increased demand of the world community to replace the bankrupt guarantee system, may lead a line on such a revision of the Zurich-London agreements, which would include the USA guarantors and would give them the

“right” to legally interfere in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cyprus. The visit of Cypriot Foreign Minister Rolandis to Washington in May 1981 and his conversations with Secretary of State A. Haig and Vice President George W. Bush did not clarify American policy. According to State Department spokesman D. Fischer, the policy of the current administration is to support efforts to achieve a just, fair and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem, as well as to support negotiations between the Greek and Turkish communities. Some observers are inclined to regard these general formulations as a sign of an insurmountable impasse, while others as evidence that President Reagan’s entourage has chosen the tactics of belittling the international significance of the Cyprus issue, classifying it as a half-forgotten conflict.

At the same time, an analysis of the American position shows that the US government has ample opportunities to find a way out of the overly prolonged crisis. He has at his disposal quite powerful political, military and economic levers of influence. The elimination of the hotbed of tension in the Eastern Mediterranean could be one of the areas of Soviet-American cooperation, as well as the strengthening of detente and stability throughout the world. As indicated in the joint Soviet-American communique signed on June 18, 1979 during the meeting of Leonid I. Brezhnev with J. Carter in Vienna, the parties recognized the importance of consultations with a view to preventing and eliminating conflicts. If the United States really wanted to contribute to the achievement of progress on the Cyprus issue, it had to move away from the “secret” approach and act within the framework of UN resolutions, closely cooperate with countries that

advocate an early settlement on the basis of these documents. However, pursuing its military-strategic goals in the Eastern Mediterranean region, Washington, apparently, does not think about exerting a really serious impact on the supporters of the “hard” line in NATO, or about a radical change in the approach to the situation in this region as a whole.

The clear and ever-increasing involvement of American imperialism in the Cyprus problem engenders and feeds NATO’s obstructionist course. This is a major obstacle to achieving a just settlement, 153 a source of sustaining tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. All this confirms the deep relevance and scientific validity of the conclusion of the Conference of Communist and Workers’ Parties in Berlin that “the policy of imperialism, neo-colonialism and all forms of oppression and exploitation remain the main threat to peace, independence and equality of peoples” [9, p. 15].

The Carter Doctrine in the Eastern Mediterranean

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a militaristic accent sharply increased in US foreign policy, which in the regional context manifested itself in the most contrasting form in the regions of the Eastern Mediterranean and the entire Near and Middle East. Expansionary aspirations were institutionalized in the form of the “Carter Doctrine”, the goals and objectives of which were formulated by the American President in his message to Congress on January 23, 1980. According to the doctrine, the Persian Gulf region, along with

Western Europe and Japan, is declared a zone of “vital interests” of the United States, which they intend to defend against threats from “outside” by using armed force, including nuclear weapons” [135, 24.1.1980]. In the plans to spread the “protective umbrella “ over the Persian Gulf, the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean are assigned the role of a “rear” bridgehead, since they become peripheral in relation to the epicenter of the doctrine. The military-strategic plans provide for the automatic transformation of Turkey, Greece and Cyprus into naval and air force strongholds to provide logistical support for the long-term military operations that the Pentagon plans in the Persian Gulf. For these purposes, in the regions of the Eastern Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea, not only are significant naval forces concentrated, but large units of ground troops are sent there with attached tanks, anti-tank weapons, the necessary amphibious means, etc. In the higher military spheres The United States and NATO believe that the use of even the most selective strike units can be crowned with success only if the manpower is, firstly, quickly transferred to the theater of operations and, secondly, will have sufficiently heavy weapons without experiencing any difficulties with material and technical support.

The implementation of this plan is practically associated with the implementation of a number of strategic elements of the “Carter Doctrine “, including: in the opinion of American strategists, should lead in the long run to the conclusion of regional military agreements and the creation of flexible forms of military ties; b) with the concept of “division of labour” within the framework of the North Atlantic bloc, which is designed to determine the size of the

contribution of each NATO member country to the implementation of a joint Western strategy in this region.

Before analysing the strategic elements, it is necessary to trace the evolution of US military doctrinal thought over the past decades. As you know, the first American foreign policy doctrine - the Truman Doctrine –was formulated on the basis of a particular situation in Greece, when the rotten anti-democratic regime of this country threatened to collapse as a result of the civil war and in connection with the planned withdrawal of British occupation forces. In these conditions, the US government went to open military intervention in the internal affairs of Greece, providing it, and at the same time Turkey, military and economic assistance totalling \$400 million. As a result, American military advisers established complete dictate and control in the region, turned the countries The Eastern Mediterranean into the objects of its military-political, economic and ideological expansion. Many American researchers do not hide the fact that the “Truman Doctrine” has already taken into account the interests of the oil monopolies, seeking to seize the “black gold” of the Near and Middle East. Such an interesting fact is known. Five days before H. Truman’s presentation of his doctrine to Congress, his assistant C. Clifford proposed to include a special paragraph on this issue in the draft speech. The proposal was rejected by D. Acheson, who considered that a naked argument about supporting American “free enterprise” and its free access to the mineral resources of the Near and Middle East would weaken the US claims as the “defender of freedom” of other countries.

The next American foreign policy doctrine, the

“Eisenhower Doctrine”, embodied on March 9, 1957, in a special resolution of the US Congress, was conceived as a response to Egypt’s independent foreign policy, in particular to its decision to nationalize the Suez Canal. Essentially extending the “Truman Doctrine” to the Middle East zone, the “Eisenhower Doctrine” provided for the provision of military assistance, and, if necessary, the use of military force “against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism” if any state asks for this USA. In practice, the “Eisenhower Doctrine” was applied once (the landing of American marines in Lebanon in 1958), but this was by no means connected with any communist threat, but with an attempt by the United States to change the situation in the region in its favour, as a result of the overthrow of the Nuri Said regime in Iraq by the nationalist military.

The “Nixon doctrine”, adopted in the early 70s and staking on “negotiations “ and “partnership”, was also controversial. With regard to the Eastern Mediterranean, the Near and Middle East, it expressed itself in the course of strengthening as allies of Washington the countries of the Shah’s Iran and Israel, endowed with gendarme functions.

Unlike all previous doctrines, the “Carter Doctrine” was the reaction of American imperialism to the outlined cardinal changes, in particular in the Eastern Mediterranean region. Serious miscalculations and losses of American diplomacy in Turkey, Greece and Cyprus, the growth of anti-American sentiments that led to the de facto collapse of NATO’s southeastern flank, the crisis of regional bloc politics, expressed in the self-dissolution of the CENTO bloc, dealt a serious blow to the military-political positions of the United States.

Therefore, the “Mediterranean part” of the “Carter Doctrine” was made up of the tasks of overcoming processes undesirable to Washington and restoring the undermined positions. The methods of their implementation remained the old— “force methods”, new forms of neo-colonialist politics.

One of these new neo-colonialist forms is the so-called “basis for regional cooperation,” which is, in essence, the next stage of bloc politics. The essence of the “framework for regional cooperation” was originally laid out by former Assistant to the President for National Security, Z. Brzezinski, in his February 28, 1979 political memorandum for President Carter.

The “basis for regional cooperation” is associated with the expectation of a partial solution to the question of replacing CENTO, which faced the American strategists, who played the role of the guardian of the oil riches of the Persian Gulf, the guardian of “stability” and the gendarme for national liberation movements. The search for potential members of the future union was hampered by the crisis of the US bloc policy in the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean. The devaluation of the “values” of the blocs proceeded from the understanding of the danger of following in the wake of Washington’s policy. For example, Turkey refused to place on its territory special military equipment from dismantled American bases in Iran and more than coolly met US projects to form a new military-political grouping in the Middle East, thereby making it clear that it does not intend to take on functions gendarme in this region.

After intensive behind-the-scenes actions of American diplomacy aimed at putting together a bloc with functions similar to CENTO, the abbreviation METO

(Middle East Treaty Organisation) flashed on the pages of the Western press. “Who will join this organisation?”—Asked the question of the chairman of the North American branch of the World Jewish Congress E. Bronfman. And he himself answered: Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, possibly Morocco, Iran and Sudan. “Just think,” he exclaimed, “what prospects are opening up for an organisation that will unite Israelis’ ingenuity, Saudi Arabia’s money, Egypt’s human resources, and the benefits that countries from Iran to Morocco will have in it!” [110, 25.VIII.1978].

However, creating at least a formal basis for this union turned out to be a difficult task. The Afghan revolution thwarted part of the plan, the revolutionary events in Iran destroyed the Shah’s regime obedient to Washington, and the failure of the coup d’état attempts in Aden put an end to the projects to form another wing of this bloc belt—from Egypt and Sudan through two Yemen to Saudi Arabia. Analysing the negative circumstances for Washington, the New York Times wrote: “The fate of the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO.—V. Sh.), Which was created under the government of President Eisenhower and disbanded in 1979, prompted officials to beware of attempts to form an official an alliance of pro-Western countries in the area. Instead, the government embarked on the path of creating a more flexible system of communications to ensure security” [127, 24.1.1980]. Recognising that the United States does not expect a relatively homogeneous (NATO-like) alliance in the Persian Gulf region, Z. Brzezinski stressed: “We must take into account the desire for independence and distinct autonomy of some of the countries concerned, as well as important

ideological differences between them. Nevertheless, recognizing these nuances, we are ready to take various actions to create a system of collective security for the region” [117, 30.1.1980].

In the conditions of a deep crisis of regional bloc policy, the Carter administration, without rejecting its previous content, was forced to include in the tactical line of this policy a new important element, adapting it to a different situation. The Carter Doctrine unambiguously indicated that in the structure of priorities of American “national interests” in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, there is a shift in the center of gravity towards “reliance on regional powers that are powerful enough to support the cause of the West.” At the same time, the approach to the selection of Washington’s main allies is not limited to sub-imperialist “centres of power”, as envisaged by the “Nixon doctrine,” but extends to a wider range of states occupying key positions in local nodes of relations. This feature of the new policy of military alliances of imperialism, which boils down to an overestimation of the importance of individual links in the strategic system, has been embodied in a modernized version of the “basis for regional cooperation.” It clearly set out guidelines for “expanding the American role”, while emphasizing the group of “key” states. In Washington, Turkey, Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan were named among such countries and emphasized the extreme interest in relying on them as their reliable and important allies. According to the Wall Street Journal, the “basis for regional cooperation” envisages in the short term large supplies of weapons and the conclusion of defense commitments, which will lead to more formal regional

treaties [134, 1/18/1980]. That is, another model of the bloc Politics, unlike the first option for creating a regional union, was based on “conceptualisation”, or on the “special”, preferable nature of US bilateral relations with “key” states, which, according to American strategists, creates a “more flexible system of ties to ensure security”. This model is characterized by the absence of the obligatory consolidation of the bonds of cooperation by some kind of collective international legal act. As a result, under the patronage of the United States, fragmented, apparently not necessarily interconnected links are created, although in the policy of intervention, American strategists expect to rely not only on each of their clients in separately but also on their coordinated actions.

It is noteworthy that the selection of the “key” countries was based on a number of criteria and indicators. Among the latter were: a) what kind of American presence countries would agree with; b) what obligations Washington should give them; c) what policy should the United States pursue in order not to take sides in serious regional disputes [127, 24.1.1980]. The fact that these requirements were largely met by countries involved in chronic local conflicts and occupying strategic and economic positions in the Middle East that are important from Washington’s point of view cannot be classified as a coincidence. Establishing priority relations with them gives the United States an opportunity, on the one hand, to intervene more actively and influence events in local knots of contradictions, and, on the other, to tighten its ties with conflicting states to the level of “key” dependence.

However, in the implementation of the Carter

Doctrine, American diplomacy encountered difficulties, which were aggravated by the continuing conflict situations in the Eastern Mediterranean, in particular with the Cyprus crisis and with the complex of Greek-Turkish contradictions. The objective reasons for the emergence and development of centrifugal tendencies in the area of NATO's southeastern flank turned out to be much deeper and more serious than the State Department had assumed. It was not possible to overcome them even with the help of the repeatedly tested thesis about the "threat from the North." In a crisis situation, the two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, remain convinced that the "threat from Moscow" does not outweigh the threats from their old enemies who are closer to them. In this regard, the opinion of the Turkish professor S. Esmer is noteworthy: "More than a danger from the North, Turkey is threatened by a threat from its ally, Greece. Over the past few years, we have repeatedly found ourselves on the verge of war with this neighbor of ours. And Greece is arming itself under the pretext that a war with us may break out ..." [138, 29.VI.1980].

The State Department faced the acute question of how the "Carter Doctrine" would affect American policy in the Greco-Turkish dispute, especially since the future of NATO's southeastern flank and American positions in the Eastern Mediterranean depend on it. A Senate report circulated on March 29, 1980 proposed convening a summit (modeled on Camp David) to help Greece and Turkey resolve their differences and try to re-involve Greece in NATO's military organisation. regarding the search for a solution to the Cyprus problem, including the provision of "extensive economic assistance" to Cyprus.

Congressmen greeted the project of a new Camp David for Greek-Turkish relations rather coolly. In the end, the report's warning that the risk of high-level negotiations "may be too great for the United States: the Cyprus issue remains unresolved, and the United States may not be the desired arbiter to settle the broader dispute, prevailed for a complex of Aegean problems" [135, 23.111.1980]. The fiasco of American attempts to use the Egyptian-Israeli "peace" treaty as a model for finding a solution to the Cyprus problem and the Greek-Turkish contradictions is explained by the opposition to these attempts on the part of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. the government stated that it considers a settlement like Camp David's unacceptable, that the Cyprus issue should remain within the framework of the UN and any initiative should also not go beyond this framework [146, 13.111.1980]. The Turkish government strongly opposes any attempt by the White House to play a mediating role in settling the differences between Turkey and Greece. the leader of the Republican People's Party B. Ecevit, "it has long been known that as soon as third parties intervene in solving the problems separating Greeks and Turks, these problems become more difficult to solve and sometimes it even leads to conflicts" [127, 10.VI. 1979].

In the face of the failure of attempts to resolve the Cypriot and Aegean issues according to American recipes, on the one hand, and the increased strategic position of this region after the revolutionary events in Afghanistan and Iran, on the other, "conceptualising" relations with Turkey became an imperative for American policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. In practice, this meant rejection of the "balanced" approach declared in the past. The tactics of

deliberately disrupting the Greek-Turkish balance of power was thought by the heads of the US State Department as a logical game on rivalry and contradictions between their two junior allies. Turkey's choice as a "key" state in the Eastern Mediterranean meant, in a political sense, the actual recognition of her not only the role of "faithful ally" of the United States, but also its dominant influence in resolving both the Cyprus conflict and the Greek-Turkish contradictions.

An important element in the creation of priority relations with Turkey was the line of Ankara's ruling circles, aimed at using the so-called geopolitical environment to put forward new demands for an increase in military and economic assistance to Turkey from the United States and NATO. A compromise course, pursued by those who came to power at the end of 1979. Government of the Justice Party, provided American diplomacy with the opportunity to act through loans and credits, as well as through promises of military and economic assistance. The leadership of the Justice Party, considering the United States as the main source of foreign aid, made significant and risky concessions for the country's national interests. The "conceptualisation" of US relations with Turkey was expressed in the initiation and signing on March 29, 1980. in Ankara, the US-Turkish agreement on defense and economy, according to which Turkey will be provided with subsidies and loans totalling \$450 million. According to American military experts, this will allow Turkey to produce new weapons and equipment, expand its potential for the production of small arms and ammunition and to increase the capacity required for the repair of tanks and rolling stock. In exchange for its

help, the United States can use Turkish bases to collect intelligence information, as well as for aggressive NATO purposes in the Middle East, in the Persian Gulf zone. Under the American-Turkish agreement, about 26 American facilities and bases located on Turkish territory were granted permanent status. A significant “acquisition” for the Pentagon was the agreement to expand and increase the capacities of the shipyard in Geljuk, in the Izmit Bay, which in the future creates opportunities for construction, repair and maintenance for the 6th US Fleet. Finally, the Turkish government succumbed to Pentagon harassment by allowing U-2 aircraft to patrol Turkish airspace to collect electronic spy information about the Soviet Union. This happened at a time, noted the Turkish newspaper *Cumhuriyet*, when the United States revised some aspects of its course towards Turkey, deciding to make it its main outpost against both the Soviet Union and the progressive states of the Mediterranean, the Middle East. Turkey is, as it were, breaking out of the system of regional relations by the Carter Doctrine by establishing special, more preferable ties with the United States both in the military and in the economic fields [139, 6.IV.1980].

Faced with the fact of “conceptualising” US relations with Turkey, the ruling circles of Greece began to express fears in connection with the buildup of Turkish power, which is leading to a change in the balance of power in the Aegean basin. The next model of bloc politics takes into account the emergence of such sentiments, which, in conditions of rivalry and contradictions, should, according to the calculations of its creators, lead Athens, in the end, to an orientation towards American diplomacy. Thus, the establishment

of preferred US ties with Turkey appears to be a new neo-colonialist form of pressure on Greece, which did not want to reintegrate into the NATO military organisation on the terms dictated by the leaders of this bloc. In response, the Greek government linked the fate of the American military bases in its country with the unresolved problem of restoring Greece's membership in NATO, as well as with the demand to establish equality in the levels of military assistance provided by the US to Greece and Turkey. As the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece K. Mitsotakis said, "it would be unrealistic to expect that American facilities will be preserved if Greece does not enter the NATO military organisation" [145, 27.VII.1978].

State Department officials argued that the presence of American military bases on Turkish territory does not upset the balance of power, but, on the contrary, is intended to establish a balance in the Eastern Mediterranean. Probably realizing the weakness of such an argument, they simultaneously referred to the fact that Greece would receive substantial military assistance as compensation for the US-Turkish deal and that further assistance will be at a level corresponding to the balance of military forces between the countries of this region [133. 4.VII.1980]. Behind such assurances was a tactical maneuver of American diplomacy, aimed at not pushing Greece too far away from itself, but trying to keep it closer to Turkey. "Balance" and connect other countries to their course in the future.

Yielding to intense pressure from imperialist circles, the Greek government announced on October 20, 1980 its return to the military organisation NATO. The basis for the gradual reintegration was the "Rogers Plan", named after the American General, the Supreme

Commander of the Allied Forces of NATO in Europe, who developed it. According to this plan, Turkey removed its objections to the return of Greece to the military organisation NATO and agreed to settle the issue of command and control in the Aegean region in the interests of the North Atlantic bloc, holding direct negotiations after Greece's return. In response to this concession, Greece recognized the need for the entire previous agreement on jurisdiction over NATO defense in the Aegean region to be invalidated and a new agreement be reached with Turkey. [129, 23. Sep. 1980].

The decision of the Greek government was greeted in Cyprus with bitterness and concern. The Cypriot public drew attention to the fact that the reasons that prompted Greece to leave the NATO military organisation have not been eliminated and are still directly related to the fate of Cyprus. In an editorial, the Haravgi newspaper regarded the return of Greece and the restoration of the bloc's southeastern flank to legal capacity as a blow to the just cause of the Cypriots. "I: sleep, " the newspaper wrote, "that this step is not only an internal affair of Greece. It most closely affects the interests of Cyprus and all countries in the region, strengthens the imperialist forces hostile to Greece itself and its neighboring peoples from the Balkans to the Middle East" [146, 21.X.1980].

The tactics of US pressure on Greece were accompanied by practical steps to implement the strategic guidelines of the Carter Doctrine. Citing a report prepared with the assistance of British intelligence services, the Turkish newspaper Hürriyet reported that as early as February 1980, the United States notified Portugal, Spain, Greece and Turkey that

they would have to guarantee a “safe transfer” of American troops to the Middle East. East, in other words, to grant the right to use American military transport aircraft “air corridor” over the territories of these states [142, 17.V.1980]. According to the newspaper, American diplomacy is probing the ground for concluding appropriate agreements, following the pattern of the American-Turkish one, in which “relative loopholes “ allow the Pentagon to conduct operations outside the borders of NATO’s responsibility either with the tacit approval of the country’s military command or with complete ignorance of the US intentions...

At the held in Ankara in June 1980, NATO Council sessions at the level of foreign ministers of the United States have tried to secure official support from their partners regarding the demand for greater authority over the use of American and NATO bases in Western Europe, including Turkey.

The radius of action of the “Carter doctrine” also covers Cyprus, whose military-strategic position is linked to the political situation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. According to the classification adopted in the special American literature, Cyprus belongs to the group of “peripheral” states that can always be connected to the “main” countries that are part of the new model of imperialist bloc policy. Revealing the plans of the United States and NATO in relation to “sovereign” British bases, the Kharavgi newspaper writes: “The West regards British facilities as a lifeline. After the loss of Iran, in connection with the events in Afghanistan, due to the uncertain situation in Turkey and the insurmountable differences between the Arabs and Israel, Cyprus seems to become the base that England intends to use to protect its

interests in the region” [146, 1.VII.1980]. In this regard, the reports in the Western press about NATO’s planned deployment of medium-range missiles at British bases seem quite plausible.

Thus, the “Carter Doctrine”, both in the aspect of bloc policy and in terms of the basic strategy, has in its content a pronounced aggressive orientation, which creates a serious threat to the peace and security of peoples. Relying on the policy “from a position of strength”, it is called upon to return the Pentagon to the Eastern Mediterranean after a long (more than 30-year) period of miscalculations and defeats of American diplomacy. The Carter Doctrine strengthens the military element in US foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Near and Middle East, gives the Mediterranean course a Middle Eastern coloration, and draws Greece, Turkey and Cyprus into dangerous imperialist adventures.

Another strategic aspect of the “Carter Doctrine” is related to inter-imperialist relations in the Eastern Mediterranean, the state of which was described above. If the first post-war US presidents, proclaiming their doctrines, could afford the luxury of acting alone, without looking back at their partners, then in the late 70s-early 80s the situation changed significantly, and now the United States is unlikely to be without material support from its allies will be able to pay the costs of implementing the Carter Doctrine. Therefore, natural bewilderment in the West was caused by the fact that the United States did not consult with its allies, announcing its readiness to use force in the Persian Gulf zone. Subsequently, American diplomacy, of course, woke up: attempts were made to mobilize funds from the Western European NATO member states, to directly

connect them to their adventurous course. However, Washington's measures aimed at "curbing" the leaders of France and the FRG only complicated relations within the Western world. The compromise formula was the concept of "division of labour" within NATO. In general terms, it provides for the following distribution of responsibilities: France should participate in operations on the African continent and in Iraq, while maintaining closer relations with Greece; Germany will provide military and economic assistance to Turkey and Pakistan, as well as carry out political cooperation with the states of the Persian Gulf; England will provide its military bases, including in Cyprus; others provide access routes to the Persian Gulf region (guarding sea routes, overflight permits, etc.). According to the West German newspaper "*Frankfurter Rundschau*", "the main criterion for the contribution of each partner is the ability to achieve maximum success and efficiency in the chosen area of interaction" [119, 26.11.1-980].

The concept of "division of labour" embodied not only the desire of the United States to consolidate the political forces of the West in support of the "Carter doctrine." It also reflected the search for new forms of involvement of the Western allies in Washington's Mediterranean and Middle East courses, and is aimed at finding incentives for the two centres of rivalry to converge. In this context, the Eastern Mediterranean zone is also viewed in a different way, which Western strategists plan to turn into an area of unifying, coordinated policy, and Cyprus—from an "apple of discord" into one of the incentives for "Atlantic rapprochement and unity". Thus, the concept of "division of labour" on a narrow regional scale aims to give the Cypriot policy of the West a "collective"

character, remove the international aspects of the problem, turn it into a purely “family business” of NATO, and “close” the Cyprus issue.

In fact, the Eastern Mediterranean is viewed by American diplomacy as a sphere of concessions to Europeanism. If in the Middle East the United States does not even allow Western Europe to come up with an independent “European initiative”, then in the Eastern Mediterranean they are not just advocating parallelism of actions, but are seeking from allies a “collective” policy, understanding it, however, in a peculiar way. maintaining its dominant, regulatory role. This trend first manifested itself in January 1979 at a meeting of the leaders of the United States, Germany, England and France in Guadeloupe, where it was decided to undertake a “rescue operation” against Turkey, allocating \$1 billion on a multilateral basis. The Guadalupe meeting marked the trend of using with NATO and another mechanism for coordinating imperialism’s strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Inviting Western European allies to take part in “saving” Turkey meant not only the inability of the United States to ignore the growing power of its rivals and their significant influence over coastal countries, but should have encouraged them to cohesion and collective action. Commenting on the results of the meeting, the Daily Telegraph wrote: “It seems that the meeting failed to achieve much in order to unite efforts to solve the complex problems facing the West. The meeting rather demonstrated the inability of the Western powers to control events fraught with catastrophic consequences” [115, 8.1.1979].

The concept of “division of labour” continues and develops the line of enhancing the effectiveness of the

NATO bloc by turning it into an authority capable of regulating both military efforts and a collective foreign policy.

And this time, the US efforts to consolidate the actions of its Western allies met with resistance from the latter. Having received a lot of positive from the policy of detente, they do not want and are not ready to give up all this. hang out. Hence the very restrained support for the Carter Doctrine, which American politicians lament. Britain alone responded to the call and deployed three frigates to the Mediterranean in January 1980, although, according to the Washington Post, “this move demonstrates one potential type of assistance to the United States outside the hotbed of danger in the Persian Gulf.” “If the ships of England, France, Germany and Italy,” the newspaper continues, “expanded their presence in the Mediterranean, the United States would be able to transfer a larger number of ships of its sixth fleet to the Persian Gulf” [135, 13.11.1980]. Washington’s call was not supported in France, and German Defense Minister G. Apel also objected to any expansion of NATO’s geographic zone of intervention, especially in the Persian Gulf.

The lingering inter-imperialist contradictions have a complex impact on the evolution of the foreign policy situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. Objectively obstructing the implementation of a coordinated policy in this area, they also introduce new difficulties and generate sources of potential international tension.

The irreconcilable contradictions in NATO caused by the incompatibility of the Atlantic principles with the national interests of the member countries of the bloc are evidenced by the program of the Greek government, formed as a result of the victory on October 18, 1981 in

the parliamentary elections of the Pan-Greek Socialist Movement Party. The new prime minister announced, in particular, the suspension of a number of provisions of the agreement on the return of Greece to the military organisation of NATO. According to A. Papandreou, the terms of the agreement contradict national interests. For the first time in the history of NATO, the final communiqué was not published at the December (1981) meeting of the bloc's military planning committee, since Greece refused to sign it, since it did not include a security guarantee clause. The new government believes that the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the island should serve as a prerequisite for solving the Cyprus problem.

Objectives of the Cyprus Politics of England

England occupies a special place in the Cypriot policy of Atlanticism. This is due both to her 82-year colonial rule on the island and to her remaining strong political, military and economic positions. It is this circumstance that gives grounds to consider London's Cyprus policy on purpose, and not in the context of the position of the Common Market.

The former metropolis is pursuing a course in the Cyprus issue that is one of the components of British policy "east of Suez." In the late 60s, as a result of the national liberation struggle of the peoples of the countries of the Near and Middle East, British colonialism was forced to retreat from the doctrine of "military presence", to move the center of its activity

to Western Europe, although its overseas interests remain significant [46, p. 32]. Unlike other zones, from which the ruling circles of Great Britain retreated hastily, the defeat of colonialism in Cyprus took place as an organized retreat to previously prepared positions. According to the Zurich-London agreements, as mentioned above, large areas in the Episkopi, Akrotiri and Dhekelia regions (99 sq. Miles), where the British military bases are located, with the territorial waters adjacent to these objects, were declared “sovereign “ territories of Great Britain. The continued military presence is imperative in British politics in any settlement of the Cyprus problem. Such a tough line is determined by the strategic role of Cyprus, in particular its proximity to the Arab East.

Although the Labour governments of G. Wilson and J. Callaghan stuck to Israel somewhat moderate approach, the role of Cypriot bases as watchdog and strongholds of imperialism in the Middle East has not diminished. Among other things, these objects were entrusted with the task of protecting the great economic interests of the British monopolies. It is well known that the UK satisfied up to the 80s through oil supplies from the Middle East up to 60% of all its needs for this raw material [46, p. 33]. In the Persian Gulf region, its capital investment exceeded 1 billion pounds. [Art.](#)—a third of all investments in the oil business [109, 1978, No. 3, p. 53]. Despite the prospect of oil production in the North Sea, British business circles continued to focus their policy on the “oil pantries” of the Middle East, where the British oil company operates as part of the Seven Sisters cartel, company “British Petroleum” and the Anglo-Dutch Royal Dutch Shell.

In addition, imperialism associates its geopolitical aspirations with the military presence in Cyprus. 170 Given the rise in anti-NATO sentiment in Turkey, on the Cypriot base? In fact, the role of England as a link between the North Atlantic bloc and strongholds in the Persian Gulf and in the Indian Ocean is being closed. Using these facilities, Atlantic strategists are able to expand the radius of interventionist actions, extending them to more distant areas.

In this regard, the opinion about the Cypriot bases of the English newspaper "*Daily Telegraph*" [8.X.1974] is quite indicative: "All planes traveling from England to Oman or the Far East can make a stop in Cyprus. If these bases are closed, there will remain an alternative route to the Far East via America, but it would be very difficult to serve the Omani military in Dhofar, which is provided with most of the air force officers and provided logistical support. The newspaper saw another strategic reason for the continued British presence in Cyprus. "In Akrotiri," wrote the Daily Telegraph, "Vulcan bombers are deployed, whose task is to deliver nuclear bombs, following at a minimum height, below the action of enemy radars. The bombers placed at the disposal of CENTO represent the "teeth" of this organisation."

British colonial rule left a deep mark on the character and structure of the Cypriot economy. After the proclamation of Cyprus as a republic, Great Britain continues to occupy a dominant position there, controlling the main industries - agriculture and mining. Such British monopolies as Cypress Sulfur and Copper Company LTD, Cypress Chrom Company LTD, Jeepsem and Plasterboard Company LTD and others, captured rich deposits of copper, iron, zinc and manganese ores,

asbestos, chromium, gypsum [52 , from. 64-66).

Although after the final accession to the Common Market (1975) England had to give up the previous imperial preferences, it remained the leading trading partner of Cyprus. The volume of its trade turnover in the war remained at the same level: the share of England in the export of Cyprus in 1977. is about 30, and in imports-20%.

The economic dependence on foreign capital, aggravated by internal political crises, confronts the young state with the need to rely on outside assistance in financing development plans.

The influx of aid in the form of loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund and the European Economic Community, as well as subsidies from England, the USA, and the Federal Republic of Germany is quite tangible for Cyprus. On the one hand, this orientation serves as a breeding ground for strengthening the comprador bourgeoisie, adhering to a compromise line with imperialism on the Cyprus issue, on the other hand, it allows it to influence the economic situation of Cyprus, to preserve it as an appendage of the former metropolis.

Another source of foreign exchange earnings was to be British financial aid, allocated to Cyprus every five years in order to “compensate” for the use of bases, road network, ports and communication systems of the island. According to the Zurich-London agreements, Great Britain must provide assistance to Cyprus in the amount of £ 12 million. (at the current rate of 34.3 million dollars) within five years, and in the future its size will be revised after consultations with the Cypriot government. However, with the emergence of a crisis

situation on the island of London, “forgot” about this arrangement, and its arrears for three five-year periods since the last payment in 1964, amounted to, according to estimates “*Financial Times*”, 250 million pounds. (715 million dollars) [117, 25.VII.1979]

Taking advantage of the crisis situation, as well as acting in accordance with the doctrine of “interdependence” and proceeding from the “special relationship”, the British ruling circles agreed to a partial US military presence in the Cypriot bases. In subsequent years, the process of “Americanisation” intensified. This step was formally motivated by budgetary difficulties, which, they say, are forcing Britain to go even to the reduction of armed forces in the Mediterranean region. In fact, British imperialism secretly passed the “baton” to the American one, although the British authorities hypocritically promised that the bases on the island would never be given over to third hands. As a result of a behind-the-scenes bargaining, the British government “agreed” to continue its military presence in Cyprus, provided that its expenses on NATO obligations remain the same.

A characteristic detail: even when forced to reduce the armed forces, London retains at the bases such a level of servicemen (1,000), which is necessary to maintain all the equipment deployed there in full operational readiness, to receive aircraft and call in of the Navy ships. to England, make “shuttle flights” to Cypriot bases (flight time 1-1.5 hours), and British warships can systematically participate in Mediterranean exercises and manoeuvres together with NATO allies. This circumstance also testifies to London’s violation of previous assurances about the fact that the troops stationed on the island and equipment at the

sites will never be integrated into the military organisation of NATO. Of course, the British ruling circles are no longer able to count on leadership in the Eastern Mediterranean. The position of a world power, which England occupied here in the first post-war decade turned out to be undermined, and the first The United States, which is the main driving force in the implementation of imperialist plans, undividedly belongs to this zone.

And yet, although England is following in the wake of US foreign policy, it cannot be argued that her position on the Cyprus issue has lost its national color and completely duplicates the American one. The commonality of goals does not mean the identity of priorities. Unlike the United States, which has large military-strategic interests in Greece and Turkey and is concerned about their preservation, and therefore approaches Cyprus from the standpoint of “globalism,” British imperialism has focused its attention on the internal aspects of the Cyprus problem. Possessing political and economic levers, relying on the ramified local agents, England is actively influencing the internal political processes in the country. In some cases, she resorts to sophisticated insidious methods of influence. Describing the role of Great Britain in the history of Cyprus, the Patrice newspaper wrote on September 15, 1968: “As our state developed, the British did not stop their behind-the-scenes activities. Expelled from the island, England continued to rule over it through its intelligence service. Our land will never forget the disasters that were the result of the activities of British diplomacy.” It should be noted that this nationalist newspaper, which at one time served as the mouthpiece of the Greek General Grivas, and is now an organ of the

right-wing forces, does not accuse England because it hinders the independent development of Cyprus. Patrice criticizes Great Britain for putting in a lot of effort to thwart Enosis by supporting the “Turkish factor” on the island.

Criticism is also heard among the Turkish community. In an interview with the Daily Express on October 24, 1976, R. Denktash expressed dissatisfaction with the British position on the Cyprus issue, which, in his words, “was not able to protect what England has undertaken to protect as one of the guarantor countries.” The reason for these critical sentiments lies in the reluctance of the British government to openly support the Turkish federal state of Cyprus.

It is symptomatic that London’s negative attitude towards the introduction of a separatist state formation in the northern regions of the island does not fit in any way with its traditional course towards partition, which was considered the “optimal” option for solving the Cyprus problem and fully met imperial interests. The inconsistency stems from the tactical line dictated by the interests of Atlantic “solidarity”, as well as by the capabilities of England, which in recent years is moving from first to middle places in the table of ranks of Western Europe. Turkish researcher Omer Kyurkchuoglu sees indecision and inactivity in this tactic, caused by the fact that England is “stuck” in the bloody events in Northern Ireland and is experiencing serious economic difficulties [81, p. 23]. The events of 1974 were a practical test of the tactics of the British ruling circles, a test of the “flexibility” of their diplomacy.

Let us return to the critical days of 1974. On the second day after the putsch (July 17), Turkish Prime Minister B. Ecevit arrived in London to enlist Britain’s

support for the implementation of a joint Anglo-Greek-Turkish or Anglo-Turkish intervention on the basis of the Zurich-London agreements. Leaving the British capital on July 19, the head of the Turkish government said that “he is still striving to find a peaceful solution to the issue.” As it turned out later from informed sources, England refused to take part in the collective action, stating that the only lasting and just solution to the crisis could be only political, not military. This statement made the impression of a bomb exploded on NATO circles—England, the leading guarantor country, refuses its “right “ to military intervention! What was behind this unexpected departure from the traditional style of British politics? It turned out that the tactic of self-elimination was nothing more than a position of conniving at the escalation of aggressive actions. The Greek historian Nikos Kakaunakis in his book “2650 days of intrigues” cites in this connection the facts of the direct participation of British troops in the Cypriot events. In particular, he testifies that the command at the “sovereign “ bases, timely warned of the Turkish intervention, sent a military transport ship “Hermes” to the waters of the port of Kyrenia (the landing site of Turkish troops—V. Sh.) To provide support to the landing units [103, p. 83].

In Western historiography, another interpretation of the British position is given. For example, L. Stern explains London’s refusal to interfere with the following reasons: unwillingness to lose its reputation as an “honest broker” in the Cyprus settlement, ensuring the safety of 30 thousand British citizens who were on a tourist trip to Greece during this period, and the lack of mobile intervention forces (2 / of the 9-thousandth garrison in Cyprus they are busy guarding “sovereign”

objects], uncertainty that after the invasion the bases will remain [85, p. 117].

British aid did not go unnoticed in Turkey. But no sooner had applause erupted in the Turkish capital than England, adhering to the American balancing tactics, condemned Ankara's actions. She initiated the convening in Geneva of a conference of the foreign ministers of the three guarantor countries—England, Greece and Turkey, during which Foreign Minister J. Callaghan unambiguously stated that he viewed the landing of Turkish troops as an action going beyond the framework of the Treaty on guarantees. After the collapse of the conference, the British position was reduced mainly to the resumption of trilateral negotiations.

Similarly, British imperialism “balanced” in Cyprus. Playing along with the Greek community, the military command at the Cypriot bases forcibly held back about 1,000 Turkish Cypriots who left their homes during the reign of the dictator Sam Peon and temporarily took refuge in British facilities. In London, it was believed that their fate would be determined within the framework of the general decision of the refugees. However, a few months later, despite the demarches of the Greek side, England made a curtsey towards Ankara. Turkish Cypriots were evacuated to Istanbul, from where they returned to the northern regions of the island. This step actually contributed to the growth of separatist sentiments, the introduction of the concept of “two zones” in Cyprus. The British scientists P. Kellern and C. Hitchens believe that by agreeing to the evacuation of the Turkish Cypriots, the government took responsibility for the ethnic division that followed. These authors see the reason for the centrism policy

pursued by the Labourites in full understanding with the United States. Turkish author Mehmet Birand deciphers the concept of “centrism” as the process of England’s transition to the ranks of the second-rate countries of Western Europe, which leaves an imprint on its Cypriot policy, gives it external colorlessness [95, p. 283).

Uncertain, wait-and-see tactics were also demonstrated in the issue of the Cyprus settlement. It was presented at the XXIX session of the UN General Assembly by Foreign Minister Callaghan: “The solution of such an aspect of the problem as the borders of regions depends on the main question - should there be a system of federal government in Cyprus. England is ready to provide assistance at a later stage” [23, p. 90]. This statement was seen in Western diplomatic circles as another sign of a tactic of self-withdrawal from the search for a settlement.

Analysing the British position, many Western researchers are inclined to believe that England has finally completed its role this time: the last anachronism in the eastern Mediterranean is disappearing. Of course, against the background of heightened US diplomatic activity in this region, British policy seems especially ambiguous and indecisive. But, apparently, one should not rush to final conclusions. Firstly, the withdrawal of England will not be allowed by the Atlantic circles, for whom this would mean the denunciation of the Zürich-London agreements and the actual loss of strongholds. Secondly, British imperialism, despite the weakening of its former positions, still has a fairly strong influence and will not want to cheaply yield it in the NATO backroom deal on the Cypriot issue.

Britain’s ruling circles are not only benefiting at the expense of the bases from the underpayment of the

ever-increasing military spending in NATO. Cyprus is intended to become a “bargaining chip” in re-evaluating the preference for Atlanticism over Europeanism. In this combination, the Cyprus problem is intended to raise London’s weight in the Common Market. As you know, in addition to economic disagreements between England and some EEC countries, there are serious contradictions on the further political evolution of the community. For example, Germany and Italy are in favor of intensifying integration processes in the political field (the Colombo-Genscher plan). A concession to this demand is London’s agreement to involve the Common Market in the search for ways of a Cyprus settlement and to come up with a joint initiative. For the first time, the content of this “mission” was revealed in the speech of a British representative during the XXX session of the UN General Assembly: “Together with all partners in the EEC, the British government has begun to actively work towards the resumption of intercommunal negotiations.” At the XXXI session of the UN General Assembly, the delegate of Great Britain fully subscribed to the position of the “nine” (as presented by the representative of the Netherlands), although he somewhat concretised his idea of a possible compromise on the Cyprus problem. He stated: “The Turkish Cypriots should be willing to accept rectification, which would ensure a fairer division of territory between the two communities; Greek Cypriots must show their readiness to agree to revise the constitution to ensure equal constitutional rights for both communities” [24, p. 19-20]. This point of view has not undergone any changes during the XXXII session of the UN General Assembly.

The Conservative government, which came to power

in May 1979, headed by M. Thatcher, did not make significant adjustments to the Cypriot policy. According to the Daily Telegraph newspaper, “the conservatives are trying to oppose the role of the United States in the world with a united Europe,” therefore the strengthening of Anglo-French-West German relations may give an impetus to the emergence of their ties in terms of solving the Cyprus problem [115, 7.V.1979]. The visit of the British Defense Minister F. Pym to Washington in July 1979, during which the issues of Greek-Turkish relations and the problem of protecting the sea routes for tankers from the Persian Gulf to Western Europe were discussed, initiated the preparation of new plans to expand the Anglo-American military cooperation, including the use of Cypriot bases. Thus, there is a tactic of maneuvering between the EEC and the United States, reflecting the deep contradictions that are associated with overseas and European interests of London in the field of politics, economics, and the military sphere. [115, I.VII.1979].

The Carter Doctrine has strengthened the pro-American orientation expressed in London’s gestures in support of American action in the Persian Gulf and Eastern Mediterranean. Conservatives expect, following in the wake of the United States, to restore their own “positions of strength” in these regions. When Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington in early January 1980. went on a “research” trip to Turkey, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and India, he was concerned not only about supporting American actions. Already in Turkey, he expressed his readiness to consider the issue of “the English naval presence in the area” [129, 9.1.1980]. Within the framework of the concept of “division of labour”, the Thatcher government increased its military

presence in the Mediterranean by sending three combat frigates to the Cypriot shores.

In February 1980, under the sign of pressure on the Cypriot government to take “collective “ NATO actions and use “sovereign” bases for this. visit to London of the President of the Republic of Cyprus S. Kyprianou. Summarizing the results of the negotiations, the Daily Telegraph stated that “since the events in Afghanistan and Iran, as well as the collapse of CENTO, the Cypriot policy has been built on the basis of an understanding of the sharply increased strategic importance of” sovereign “bases” [115, 26.II.1980]. Raising in this regard the issue of Britain’s debt for the use of “sovereign” bases, the newspaper believes that “the Conservative government will be willing to pay it in order to maintain an impressive military presence in Cyprus, in view of the fact that Britain and the United States began to pay more attention to the security of the Middle East.” [115, 3.111.1980].

In the coming years, the manoeuvres of British diplomacy are unlikely to go beyond this course. However, on the whole, the policy of England, characterized by attempts to exploit its levers of influence to gain benefits in NATO and the EEC, may be fraught with the most unexpected and fatal consequences for the Republic of Cyprus. As stated in the final Document of the 1969 International Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties, “despite the weakening of British imperialism, Britain remains among the main imperialist powers and seeks to maintain its positions in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and the Middle East using the methods of neo-colonialism, and sometimes through direct military intervention” [12, p. 295]. An analysis of the policy of the British ruling

circles in the Cyprus question confirms the relevance of this conclusion.

EEC Position On The Cyprus Issue

The position of the Common Market on the Cyprus issue constitutes one of the elements of the Community's strategic policy towards the Mediterranean. Back in 1972, after the signing of the Association Agreement between Cyprus and the EEC, such a strategy was formulated in general terms as "global" and "comprehensive". "The community is concerned about the progress of political, economic and social development in this area. The goal of the global Mediterranean policy is to preserve or restore political stability"—noted the West German magazine "*Ausenpolitik*" [109, IV.1978].

But before considering the policy of the "nine" in the Cyprus issue, it is advisable to dwell on the economic component of the relationship between Cyprus and the EEC.

In March 1971, negotiations began to establish association relations with the European Economic Community, and almost two years later, in December 1972, in accordance with Art. 238 of the Treaty of Rome, an agreement was concluded for the permanent association of Cyprus with 180 EEC (it entered into force on June 1, 1973). The agreement provided in the long term (after the first decade) the conclusion of a customs union. This act provoked heated discussions among public and political figures of the country, who identified three possible options for the nature and

form of future ties with the EEC: full membership, association, trade agreement. The government justified the choice in favor of association with the prospect of establishing a customs union with a number of considerations: first, the benefits that, in its opinion, could bring the creation and strengthening of a stable basis for relations between Cyprus as a European state and Western Europe; secondly, the desire to overcome the adverse consequences for the economy of the island and its exports, the loss of British preferential customs tariffs—as a result of the forthcoming entry into the “Common Market” of Great Britain; thirdly, the threat of competition from other Mediterranean states that have already provided special privileges for their exports to the EEC countries; fourthly, the need to take measures to maintain and increase the export of Cypriot agricultural and industrial products [112, 180, No. 11].

In a nutshell, the terms on which the 1972 agreement was concluded are as follows:

- preservation until June 30, 1977, that is, for the first phase of the association, a preferential customs regime for Cypriot exports to the UK;

- establishing a quota for the export of potatoes; protection tariffs on wines exported from Cyprus for a period not exceeding two years (and the wine exports covered by them are not should have exceeded 200,000 hectolitres);

- 40 percent reduction in import duties EEC on citrus fruits and abolition of duties on carob;

- a 70% reduction in the EEC duties on products of the Cypriot industry.

In turn, the Cypriot government pledged to time of completion of the first stage of the association agreement, gradually reduce by 35% its fees for import

of products from the Common Market countries. On the second phase of the agreement (1977-1982) Cyprus and the EEC should have completely abolished customs duties and implement a customs union. In agreement from 1972, there is also a commitment not to set new quantitative and other restrictions on import of these goods, to facilitate their access to the Cypriot market.

The conditions of the association created illusory hopes that the named benefits and preferences would favor the growth of Cypriot exports. Of course, it cannot be denied that the maintenance of preferential treatment in the English market, albeit for a limited period, was of no small importance to Cyprus. Indeed, as a result of long-term British colonial rule, the island's economy is unilaterally oriented towards Great Britain, which remains the main market for Cypriot products, primarily agricultural products (citrus fruits, potatoes, wines, grapes, vegetables, juices, carrots).

However, on this positive point, all the arguments and the arguments in favor of the association of Cyprus with the EEC are exhausted. The reality turned out to be much more severe than the supporters of joining to the Common Market. June 30, 1977 the first stage of the Association of the Republic of Cyprus with the "Common Market".

In this regard, negotiations were held in Brussels between the Cypriot representatives and the EEC and a additional protocol for the extension of the first stage association for two and a half years and the establishment economic cooperation between Cyprus and the community. During the discussion of these documents in the Cypriot parliament, MPs from the AKEL and EDEK parties pointed to the negative economic aspects of the association. Imports from the

EEC countries increased from year to year and at the same time, Cyprus exports to member countries of this group. If in 1972 exports to the Common Market countries amounted to 12 million.

Cyprus pound, then in 1974, it fell to 7 million and remained on the same level until 1976. Imports from EEC countries increased 67 million. In 1972, up to 85 million pounds in 1976 G. [146, 27.VII.1977]. Some increase in subsequent years turnover did not change the nature of trade relations. According to statistics, for the period since 1972, when the association agreement was signed, 1978 total trade deficit of Cyprus with countries community exceeded \$800 million, the inequality of economic relations between Cyprus and the "Common Market " manifested itself in 1978. Its purchases in the EEC countries reached the amount of \$ 300 million, and exports to community countries amounted to only \$ 75 million, happened due to severe restrictions imposed by the EEC for agricultural products amounting to about 90% of Cypriot exports [111, 7.1.1979]. The imbalanced nature of trade and the increased penetration of foreign capital are negatively affecting on the country's economy.

The inequality of economic relations between the EEC and Cyprus is also manifested in the desire of investors from Western European countries to invest their capital in those sectors of the Cypriot economy that provide the greatest profit, while a number of sectors important for the country's development are experiencing an acute shortage of capital investments.

In his speech in parliament, the secretary of AKEL D. Constantinou emphasised that life itself showed the correctness of AKEL, which came out in 1972, against the accession of Cyprus to the EEC. Even then, the party

saw where the country was being led and what consequences this would have on its economy. The Cypriot public sharply criticizes the article of the Association Agreement with the Common Market, which provides for a 15 percent reduction in duties on imported products of the countries of this group, indicates that this measure should lead to a reduction in government revenues from import operations, and will adversely affect the Cypriot industry.

In the most difficult years for the country (1975-1976), the EEC member states, having reduced the export of products from the island, put forward humiliating conditions for the transition to the second stage of the association, and the government circles agreed to them.

The Fileleftheros newspaper wrote: "We demand food signing an agreement with the Common Market to continue live the course for the recovery of our economy and further development of relations with the EEC. If not ignoring the general principles of grouping, then its interest in Cyprus could have positive results. We hope that our Common Market allies will not will disappoint us" [149, 3.11.1977].

In Nicosia, the opinion was established that difficulties in relations with the EEC are generated by temporary, stage reasons and therefore are easily removable. Ignoring the imperialist nature of the activities of Western monopolies, they believe that contacts with the Common Market are beneficial in the economic and political sense. Cypriot government ministers regularly commit they travel to Western European capitals in order to convince EEC member states to reconsider their approach to tariffs for Cypriot agricultural products. It is believed that Italy is the

main obstacle to obtaining the desired prices for the agricultural products exported to the Common Market countries.

Unsurprisingly, the Cypriots are constantly disappointed by the monopolists. The negotiations held in 1979 by representatives of the community showed that, firstly, the conditions of the beginning of the second stage of the association worsened markedly, secondly, Cyprus will not have the concessions provided for in the EEC Mediterranean policy. thirdly, its trade with other states is hindered. The Community also cancelled its commitment in 1972 to provide economic and technical assistance to Cyprus [112, 1979, No. 9, p. 44]. There is no progress in relations with the community and in the political aspect. Moreover, in recent years, the tactics of economic blackmail and pressure used by the EEC in the hope of persuading the country to accept Western options for resolving the Cyprus problem has been more and more clearly visible. The negotiations on a new phase of the association were held in the same tone, which took place in late October-early November 1979 in Luxembourg. EEC representatives in the negotiations proposed to extend the association agreement for another three years on the same terms. The Cypriot delegation headed by Foreign Minister N. Rolandis did not agree with this proposal. As a result, the negotiators decided to extend the agreement on the first phase of the association of Cyprus with the EEC for one year (until December 31, 1980).

Why did the transition to the second stage of the association never take place? The main reason is political. The point is not only that the monopolists of the Common Market do not like the orientation of the

Republic of Cyprus, following a course of non-alignment, but above all that the EEC does not want to displease Turkey with the establishment of closer ties with Cyprus. Nevertheless, the Cypriot government continues to push for the next stage, the customs union.

The position of the EEC on the Cyprus issue is based on the common Mediterranean policy and is determined by economic and political considerations. The economic confrontation between the various monopolies of Western European countries is intertwined with "Atlantic solidarity". The political aspect is that out of ten members of the Community, eight are members of the North Atlantic bloc (including France, which is not a member of the NATO military organisation).

During each discussion in parliament of the state of relations with the EEC, the deputies point out that the Common Market is a conduit for NATO policy and the development of relations with it is contrary to the course of non-alignment of the Cypriot state [146, 27.VII.1977]. While the Cypriots emphasise the urgent need for the EEC to move to concrete political initiatives to put pressure on Turkey, Western monopolists limit themselves to general assurances and declarations. In the face of obvious pressure and diplomatic manoeuvres by the monopoly capital of the West, the country's democratic forces are demanding that trade policy be brought in line with the course of non-alignment pursued by the Republic of Cyprus. They stand for the development of trade relations with all states of the world and for such a form of relations with the EEC that would not interfere with the implementation of the country's foreign policy line. Based on these considerations, AKEL proposes to terminate the association agreement and start

negotiations on concluding a trade agreement with the Common Market. The party emphasizes that in its foreign trade policy, Cyprus should focus on countries that, being profitable trading partners, at the same time actively support the just cause of the Cypriots [112, 1979, No. 9, p. 45].

The official position of the government of Cyprus regarding the EEC boils down to the fact that the association of Cyprus with the 'Common Market' does not contradict the policy of non-alignment. At the same time, the government strongly opposes the provision of assistance by the Common Market to the Turkish community, believing that this would mean the recognition of two separate states in Cyprus.

In turn, the leadership of the Turkish community believes that following this course, the Greek Cypriot administration continues the economic blockade, which puts the population of the northern part of the island in the face of serious difficulties and creates a chasm between the communities. According to the Turkish press, after the 1974 Cypriot operation, the Greek community received aid from other countries in the amount of \$ 350 million, while the Turkish community-Tolyko \$10 million [140, 20.11.1978]. "If the economic abyss and the trade embargo continue," said one of the leaders of the Cypriot Turks, Orek, "then we will have to look for another way out of this situation." The business circles of northern Cyprus see an alternative way in establishing "special" relations with the EEC countries, which are the main buyers of their export agricultural products. Since 1977, representatives of the Turkish community have been trying to negotiate directly with the leaders of the Common Market to establish such relations and receive financial assistance.

The last round of negotiations, held in Brussels in February 1980, also did not bring concrete results, in connection with which the delegation of the Turkish federal state of Cyprus threatened to reconsider its trade relations with the EEC.

Although the expansion of the Common Market due to the entry of England into it increased the possibilities of influencing the Cyprus problem, this circumstance simultaneously increased the contradictions within the Community. For example, a more independent course from NATO, pursued by France, meets opposition from other leading members of the group. The approach to the problems of the Eastern Mediterranean fully revealed a characteristic feature of the Gaullist form of Europeanism—an open challenge to US hegemony and pressure. France firmly refused to participate in 1964 in the NATO collective aggression against Cyprus and in the subsequent subversive combinations of the Atlanticists. At the same time, she declared her support for the nationalist slogan of enosis, in which she saw the usual method for militant Europeans appeal to the sense of self-awareness, self-respect and dignity of the nation.

1974 events put Atlantic circles before the need to maneuver between Greece and Turkey, to achieve their goals in Cyprus by diplomatic means. At this stage, Western diplomacy seized the neo-colonialist mechanism—Zurich-London agreements. July 25, 1974 in Geneva—opened a conference of foreign ministers three countries of the guarantors of the independence of Cyprus—Greece, Turkey and England. The conference lasted until July 30 and ended with the signing of a joint declaration calling for the preservation of independence, the territorial integrity and security of

the Republic of Cyprus and the restoration of the constitutional Cypriot government. The declaration called not to expand zones controlled by Turkish and Greek sides. As of 22:00 Geneva time on 29 July 1974. [80, from p. 34]. Agreement was also reached about a ceasefire. Ministers agreed again Meet in 10 days for the second round negotiations. However, the second meeting began with fierce accusations by Greece against Turkey that it violates the agreements reached, expanding the area of occupation in Cyprus. Turkey replied that this action was a forced measure, moreover, provoked by the Greek side. Moreover, Turkey went to Geneva to present an ultimatum to Greece, demanding consent to the federal structure of the Cypriot state, as well as establishing its control over 34% of the island's area. Although there was no unity among the EEC countries in assessing the Cyprus events of 1974, the Nine, influenced by France, condemned the anti-government rebellion and the Turkish invasion. On behalf of the group, the Turkish representative in Paris was handed a note demanding the suspension of hostilities on the island [95, p. 157].

It should be noted that the state of France's relations with Turkey and Greece serves as a barometer in prioritising France's Cyprus policy. If during the reign of the Athenian junta, Franco-Greek relations were strained, then after the fall of the regime of "black colonels" they revived, positions on many issues became closer. The French side attached particular importance to the process of the change of power in Greece, as evidenced, in particular, by the gesture of the president of the republic, who provided K. Karamanlis with his plane, on which the opposition leader arrived from Paris to Athens to head the civil government. Paris was

impressed that Greece followed his example, leaving the military organisation NATO: the break with Atlanticism was associated with the inclusion of Greece in the European movement. Subsequently, France acted as an initiator in the admission of Greece to the Common Market (of which it became a full member in 1981. This action was also seen in Paris as strengthening the basis of Europeanism—as an alternative to obediently following the US channel. The intensification of Franco-Greek ties in the political, military and economic fields is especially noticeable against the background of a certain restraint in relations between France and Turkey due to Ankara's approach to solving the Cyprus and Aegean problems. The official visit of Turkish Foreign Minister I. Caglayangil to Paris in November 1976 did not lead to a convergence of views on these critical issues. According to *Le Monde Diplomat*, the parties remained in their positions: Turkey believes that repeated violations since 1963, the constitutions justify the preservation of its military presence in Cyprus and that in the Aegean Sea the Paris and Lausanne treaties providing for the demilitarisation of the Greek islands are not being respected. France, for its part, emphasizes that it is the Turks in a strong position that should make concessions [122. XI.1976, p. 9]. France consistently pursues and defends this principled line.

France's Cyprus policy has received a fairly complete account in a number of statements and official documents. In particular, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs de Guirengo, in an interview with the correspondent of the newspaper "*Monde*", said that, "as a Mediterranean power", a member of the EEC and the Atlantic Union, France cannot remain indifferent to

the disagreements and the risk of conflict that undermine security in the East Mediterranean “and that she” stands for negotiations, provided that they respect the legal norms and justice, the legitimate interests and aspirations of everyone” [121, 5.XI.1976]. The French position was also set forth in the joint Soviet-French Declaration, signed in June 1977, during a visit to Paris of the General Secretary of the UK CPSU, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Leonid Brezhnev. The parties noted the coincidence of views on the settlement of the Cyprus problem on the basis of full respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. “Such a just and lasting settlement must be found through negotiations” [p. 108].

A realistic approach to ways of eliminating the hotbed of tension raises the prestige of France in the eyes of the Cypriots. The leadership of the Republic of Cyprus proposes that the French representative head a committee in a narrow composition with the participation of the members of the Security Council, which would undertake a mediation mission in the practical implementation of UN resolutions, and assist the UN Secretary General.

The monopolists of the Common Market are trying to take advantage of this circumstance to promote their “initiatives” in the Cyprus issue. At the headquarters of the EEC, they made it a rule to instruct the French ambassador in Nicosia to submit for discussion by the government of Cyprus all kinds of proposals of the group, which often duplicate the Atlantic plans. Debunking the parallelism of NATO and EEC actions, AKEL Secretary General E. Papaioannou stresses that EEC “initiatives” are fraught with the danger of further

complicating the Cyprus issue, since they are not within the framework of the UN and are not based on its decisions on Cyprus, but pursue the interests NATO bloc. These same “initiatives” are aimed at removing the Cyprus issue from the UN framework and isolating us from sincere friends in the form of socialist and non-aligned countries. If the “mediators” really want to play a positive role, then let them agree to the convening of an international conference on Cyprus, which will discuss the issue openly, and not in the dark curtains of NATO [146, 3.VII.1977].

Despite the realistic and positive trends, France’s Mediterranean course is not free from a certain “Atlantic attitude” dictated by the class nature of politics. The Military Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly, when discussing the Cyprus crisis in September 1975, noted with satisfaction that France had decided to strengthen its Mediterranean fleet, with which the fleets of other NATO countries had outlined the coordination of joint activities. The French leadership, represented by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, General Guy Meri, indicated that in the event of a conflict in Europe, France would immediately join military operations conducted by the North Atlantic bloc [29, p. 13, 16]. Such a course is fraught with any surprises in the approach to the Cyprus problem.

The Socialist government that came to power in 1981, headed by F. Mitterrand, emphasized that the Cyprus issue is a constant source of concern for France. “France,” the president said, “which did not approve of violent methods and a fait accompli, believes that a just and permanent settlement of the Cyprus problem can only be achieved through negotiations between the parties concerned. Despite the fact that the

negotiations are not easy, they have been resumed and are being conducted under the auspices of the Secretary General of the United Nations.”

The policy of another leading member of the EEC-FRG differs in many respects from the position of France. Its attitude to the Cyprus problem is characterized by a clearly delineated pro-NATO direction focused on supporting Turkey and the Turkish community. The content of this line is caused, in addition to strategic considerations and a sense of “traditionalism” towards Ankara, which in the past played an important role in the penetration of German imperialism into the countries of the Near and Middle East.

... In support of a common NATO course aimed at undermining an independent, sovereign and territorially integral Cyprus, the FRG government first came out openly during the period of inter-communal clashes in 1963-1964. The West German press does not hide the fact of the involvement of special intelligence services in inciting intercommunal enmity, as well as in supplying extremists with weapons, ammunition, and explosives. According to the magazine “*Der Spiegel*”, only in January 1964, “Gehlen’s service” secretly transported 23 tons of explosives to the island [130, IV.1965].

In Bonn, although with reservations, they generally approve of the idea of the occupation of Cyprus by the troops of NATO member states under the pretext of “appeasement” and supported the ultimatum demand to agree with such a “plan” put forward in February 1964 by the United States and Britain. Moreover, NATO’s governing spheres seriously envisaged the participation of the West German Bundeswehr in the

NATO “peace brigade”, which was preparing to be transferred to the island. As emphasized in the diplomatic circles of Bonn, the United States and Britain viewed the planned action as a “joint task of the West” and believed that the FRG was their “equal partner” in this matter. The question of the participation of the Bundeswehr contingents in the occupation of Cyprus was repeatedly discussed at the meetings of the Cabinet of Ministers, at which it was decided to send 1,000 West German soldiers and officers to the island.

The failure of NATO calculations did not embarrass the Rhine politicians. They actively supported the “Acheson plan” and increased the supply of weapons to NATO partners “interested” in Cyprus.

The course, openly hostile to independent Cyprus, practically did not transform after coming to power in 1966. The “grand coalition” of the CDU/SPD, although the statements of the FRG officials on the Cyprus issue have become somewhat more cautious and streamlined. In January 1968, West Germany supported the separatist aspirations of the leadership of the Turkish community, aimed at creating a “temporary Turkish administration”. In early October 1968, German Chancellor K. Kiesinger paid an official visit to Turkey. According to the British historian R. Stephens, in conversations with Turkish leaders, he emphasized “a great interest in Cyprus for moving to the Arab East”, touched upon issues of military construction on the island through NATO channels. During the Turkish-West German negotiations, the Cyprus problem was also discussed, in particular measures to provide economic assistance to the Turkish community [86, p. 218].

At the same time, the pro-Turkish orientation on the Cyprus issue was not as open as it was under the

Adenauer-Erhard government. The “Grand Coalition” could not fail to realise that in the European situation a turn towards detente is taking shape, that new positive tendencies are inexorably making their way.

An integral element of this evolution was a partial revision of the previous course in the Cyprus issue. West Germany, while supporting the demands of the Turkish Cypriots in intercommunal negotiations, at the same time tried to maintain good relations with the Greek population of the island, which was expressed mainly in the expansion of economic and cultural ties with Cyprus.

Using the entry of England into the Common Market, the West German monopolists rushed to the Cypriot market and firmly occupied the second place in the foreign trade of Cyprus. Germany exports from the island copper ore, cement, asbestos, citrus fruits, wine, and imports trucks and cars, products of the machine-tool, printing, chemical and electrical industries. Such large concerns as Mercedes, Volkswagen, Telefunken have firmly established themselves in the Cypriot economy. Equipment and machinery are supplied against the loans provided; West German specialists supervised the construction of a cement plant near the city of Limassol. With the help of the Federal Republic of Germany, mineral exploration is being conducted.

Expectations to put the key sectors of the Cypriot economy under their control in the long term and to use the island as a springboard in the Middle East are complemented by intensive ideological expansion. The propaganda penetration of the FRG into Cyprus, carried out by the branch of the Munich Goethe Institute operating in Nicosia, is aimed at distorting the peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist

countries, hindering the development of relations between the Republic of Cyprus and the German Democratic Republic. Distributing printed publications, giving lectures and presentations, West German propagandists pose as representatives of the entire German people.

Acting on the principle “let them not love us, but love our money,” the FRG statesmen, when signing some agreements with Cyprus, repeatedly tried to put forward political demands. By offering lucrative contracts, they made them conditional on the termination of relations between Cyprus and the GDR. This was the case, in particular, with the agreement on air traffic between Cyprus and the Federal Republic of Germany. Its conclusion was accompanied by the issuance of an ultimatum demand to stop flights to Cyprus of the aircraft of the Interflug airline belonging to the GDR.

NATO’s course of blackmail and diktat on the Cyprus issue did not bring the expected dividends. The Cold War fettered the political initiative, created a kind of stereotype of thinking among Bonn politicians that did not go beyond the limits of “Atlantic solidarity”. The apparent loss was not limited to Cyprus. In the context of the developing process of detente of international tension, the desire to correct the discrepancy between the economic power of the FRG and its weakness in the political arena prevailed. Basically, these factors prompted the West German ruling circles to make some changes in their Mediterranean policy, including towards the Republic of Cyprus. Not wishing to abandon the program of foreign policy expansion and without affecting the essence of the previous course in the Cyprus issue, they tried to find a new, good-looking

form for them. Given the economic leverage, the choice fell on the Common Market. If after the 1973 Middle East war, the Nine countries made a number of statements contributing to the search for ways to resolve the conflict, then the Cyprus events of 1974. they responded with a promising but vague proposal to come up with a joint “peace initiative.” For two years, the content of the “initiative” remained a mystery. As stated at the press conference, August 5, 1976, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus I. Christofides, “the government has not yet been offered any concrete plans” [146, 5.VIII.1976]. And only in the speeches of the delegates of NATO member states at the XXXI session of the UN General Assembly were the main contours of the “mediation mission” of the EEC which were limited to the resumption of intercommunal negotiations, and its implementation was stipulated by two conditions: a) the Common Market initiative would be parallel to the US mediation efforts; b) it should not go beyond the five principles set forth at the session by US Secretary of State Kissinger.

These principles, in particular, provide:

- the settlement should preserve the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus;
- the current dividing lines will be corrected so as to reduce the area controlled by the Turkish side;
- territorial measures should take into account the economic needs and humanitarian problems of the two communities, including the plight of refugees;
- the agreement on the constitutional aspect should create conditions according to which the two communities can live in an atmosphere of freedom and enjoy the right of the majority in deciding their affairs;

– You should also agree on security measures that will allow the withdrawal of foreign troops, with the exception of those that are in Cyprus in accordance with international agreement [21, p. 62-63].

The principles accepted by the leadership of the EEC as the basis for collective action in the Cyprus issue seem outwardly streamlined, although they do not differ much from the long-known NATO concepts, which envisage “closing” the problem at the expense of the interests of the Cypriot state. Specifying in speeches at the XXXII session of the UN General Assembly the position of the FRG, Minister of Foreign Affairs G.-D. Genscher spoke in favor of “turning the Republic of Cyprus into a two-communal federal state”.

At the same time, West Germany shared the opinion of the Turkish side, which accused Makarios of blocking a negotiated settlement [129, VIII.1977]. On March 1, 1977, Schmidt asked him to resign as president of the republic and devote himself exclusively to church affairs. The West German press against the personality of Makarios was accompanied by broad support for the candidacy of Clerides for the presidency of the country [146, I. II.1977].

To persuade the government of Cyprus to accept a settlement plan pleasing to NATO, Bonn is also resorting to economic measures of influence. In particular, they are trying to use the status of Cyprus as a member associated with the EEC and to play on the difficulties experienced by the country after the events of 1974.

Similar levers of pressure are applied to Greece, the goals here are somewhat different. Bonn promised assistance in resolving the Greek-Turkish conflicts, including the Cyprus issue, as well as its support for the full accession of Greece to the EEC.

Western European monopolists, accepting Greece into their grouping, naturally, first of all hoped to expand the base of confrontation with overseas competitors, but at the same time, Greece's entry into the EEC was supposed to make it more reliable: a partner in terms of NATO commitment, to provide additional leverage both on its foreign and domestic policies.

As for Turkish-West German relations, during the 1974 events, they were sharply criticized by Ankara, which believes that the FRG is pursuing a "hard line" through the EEC, that the Common Market is thoughtlessly wasting its benefits in the Mediterranean region, instead of in order to focus on the countries that can lay claim to them in the first place [117, 8.XII.1976]. The refusal of the FRG to accept new parties of Turkish immigrant workers due to the economic recession also cast a shadow on relations.

Ankara's claims are based on the fact that Turkey has long been an associate member of the community and that an agreement was signed in 1970 allowing it to become a full member by 1995. The agreement provides, among other things, free circulation of Turkish workers and the provision of significant preferences to Turkish agricultural exports. As the results of the official visit to Germany of the Prime Minister of Turkey B. Ecevit in May 1978 showed, despite the frozen relations between the EEC and Turkey, the policy of "traditionalism" is gaining the upper hand. The parties came to an agreement on financing the supply of military equipment and improving the situation of Turkish workers in West Germany.

The increased military-strategic importance of the Eastern Mediterranean in the plans of imperialism in the

late 70s and early 80s, as well as internal instability in Turkey, which threatened with serious social consequences, prompted the leading circles of the FRG to take on the role of the “guardian” of the southeastern flank of [the NA THAT](#). At the summit held in Guadeloupe, which was already mentioned above, the West German side was identified as the coordinating country for providing Turkey with collective economic assistance. In April 1980 the FRG organized the second action of providing assistance to Turkey in order to improve its economy in the amount of 1.16 billion marks. In addition to financial aid, West Germany provides Turkey with generous military aid through special bilateral agreements concluded in 1975 and 1979. In particular, Turkey received various types of weapons in the amount of 560 million marks (119, 14.IX.1980]. Therefore, to say that the FRG government willingly responded to the US call to support the “Carter Doctrine” and increase assistance to Turkey and Pakistan is too little to say. It underscores in every way its “exemplary” efforts to strengthen NATO’s southeastern flank.

“One of our most important contributions to ensuring joint security,” said German Chancellor G Schmidt in New York, “is the military and economic assistance that we provided to Turkey even at a time when one of our great allies (USA. Sh.) Suspended military assistance”, he continued, “is not only the key to the security of NATO’s southern flank, but together with Pakistan, is the cornerstone of strengthening the West’s positions in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. In any case, we hope so” [113, 14, 1980]. Bonn continues to “score points”, acting very prudently:

while arming Turkey, it is planting weapons in neighboring Greece so as not to aggravate its irritation.

Now there are no signs that the development of Turkish-West German relations will go beyond the framework of “traditionalism”, including in the approach to the Cyprus problem. The political and economic weight of Germany in NATO and the Common Market will undoubtedly increase its role in the future in the events in Cyprus and around it. Therefore, it would be an oversimplification to regard West Germany’s position on the Cyprus issue as secondary and shady. Relying on the preservation of the “allied framework” by the governments of Greece and Turkey, it has a pronounced Atlantic character and is fully consistent with NATO’s plans to involve Cyprus in the sphere of imperialist control over the regions of the Eastern Mediterranean.

Considering Greece’s entry into the Common Market and its influence on the Greek community of Cyprus, it can be concluded that the EEC, embodying the “Europe of Monopolies”, is at this stage for Cypriots one of the main and most dangerous weapons of political and economic penetration of imperialism.

CONSISTENT, PRINCIPAL POLICY

The Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community are using imperialist tactics of pressure and blackmail and are actively pursuing a policy of improving the world situation, strengthening international security, and protecting the sovereign rights of peoples. Support for countries and peoples that have become victims of the aggressive actions of imperialism is an invariable principle of the USSR's approach to international conflicts.

The Peace Program put forward by the XXIV and developed by the XXV and XXVI Congresses of the CPSU covers all the main tasks of eliminating the threat of war, preserving peace, deepening and developing the process of detente. Its implementation objectively limits the parameters of the policy of the imperialist forces and creates real conditions in which the tactics of inflating hotbeds of tension is significantly hampered. At the same time, one must reckon with the fact that the forces of aggression and war continue to act in the direction of aggravating the international situation, using for this purpose both the remaining conflict situations (the Middle East, Cypriot, Lebanese) and new (Iranian, Iraqi).

It is no coincidence that the materials of the 26th Congress of the CPSU give priority to the problem of preventing international conflicts. As emphasized in the Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the XXVI Party Congress, "in recent years, in one or another area of the world, hotbeds of military conflicts have arisen, often threatening to escalate into a big fire. To extinguish them, as experience has shown, is not an

easy task. It would be much easier to carry out prophylaxis, to prevent the appearance of such foci". Improving the effectiveness of preventive measures is one of the urgent tasks of modern international relations. The Peace Program for the 80s, developed by the XXVI Congress of the CPSU, is aimed at solving it.

This chapter examines various aspects of the struggle around achieving a just settlement of the Cyprus problem, analyses all kinds of "plans" and "initiatives" of Western countries, outlines the principled and consistent policy of the USSR in the Cyprus issue, and also highlights the state of Soviet-Cypriot relations.

Fighting For A Fair Settlement

The general European conference on security and cooperation in Helsinki and the agreements reached there affected both the political climate and the style of action of Western diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean. At almost every session after the meeting of the NATO Council, "progress on the path of détente" was noted, and "efforts towards a Cyprus settlement" were outlined. But at the same time, Atlantic strategists continued to actively build up weapons in this zone, torpedoed positive proposals aimed at achieving a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem. This indicated that the NATO course in the Eastern Mediterranean developed under the influence of two contradictory trends. Detente objectively narrowed the possibilities of the Atlantic policy, and led it to a certain restraint in its approach

to the Cyprus problem. Without the Helsinki accords, the political map of the Eastern Mediterranean would be redrawn depending on the strength of the parties claiming to acquire new spheres of influence or any other privileges. Of course, after the meeting in Helsinki, the organisation of international relations in the Eastern Mediterranean has not changed. A big and stubborn struggle still lies ahead for this. But detente reminded everyone that democratic principles are beginning to play a significant role in international life. This tendency has a material basis. As Leonid Brezhnev emphasized, “the relaxation of international tension has become possible because a new balance of forces has been established in the world arena. Now, the leaders of the bourgeois world cannot seriously expect to resolve the historical dispute between capitalism and socialism by force of arms. The senselessness and extreme danger of further heating up the atmosphere are becoming more and more obvious...” [8, p. 317].

The stamp of contradictions also lies in the search for ways of a Cyprus settlement, which the NATO countries embarked on after the events of 1974, but which in their goals are diplomatic intrigues. Before considering the manoeuvres of the higher Atlantic spheres, it is necessary to dwell on the essence of the so-called “traditional “ settlement options.

The main content of the struggle for the solution of the Cyprus issue, liquidation of the dangerous hotbed of tension in the Eastern Mediterranean region is determined by the nature of the crisis, that is, the confrontation of national patriotic forces with the international reaction, which is the aggressive NATO bloc. At different stages of the crisis, the struggle for a just settlement has always assumed a class, political

character, despite the attempts of imperialist circles to direct it into the channel of nationalist friction, to reduce it to the level of one of the Greek-Turkish differences.

The essence of the struggle of the national-patriotic forces of the Cypriot people was reduced to the elimination of the remnants of colonialism. The solution to the problem implied the acquisition of complete independence and the demilitarisation of the island, the approval of a constitutional structure that would close to imperialism any opportunity to interfere in internal affairs.

The bourgeois nationalists took advantage of the Cypriot discontent with the remnants of the colonial past in the country, who, in the conditions of the prevailing Greek population on the island, came out for enosis. The annexation of Cyprus by Greece was put forward by them as a maximalist program of action and imposed as an imperative to resolve the national question. The extreme extremism of the doctrinaires of Hellenism was expressed in the dilemma “either Cyprus as a whole will unite with Greece, or a catastrophe will come” [23, p. 137]. Many statesmen who joined in the actual promotion of the hidden enosis allowed themselves to be carried away by this slogan. As the representative of Cyprus to the UN, Rossides, later admitted, “the hopes of unification with Greece could not be suddenly forgotten; it was impossible to say: “Forget about prayers, about everything that you had before, because now you are separated from the rest of the Greek nation both in terms of national feelings and in all other respects” [23, p. 162]. Analysis of internal and external factors opposing the implementation of this plan shows that the advocacy of enosis and actions

towards its implementation pursued provocative, anti-Cypriot goals. Enosis was actually put forward by Greek nationalists as a counterbalance to the goals of the national liberation struggle and such a solution to the problem that liberated would a country from the colonial heritage.

Turkish nationalists came up with an antithesis—the slogan of *taksim*. They sought to disunite the Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus on national and territorial grounds or the federal structure of the country. In the conditions of Cypriot reality, when Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were widely and randomly scattered across the island, this project was purely hypothetical. Lord Radcliffe, the English public lawyer who originated the idea of the division, wrote: “There is no clear territorial demarcation between the two communities, and the only way to create such a demarcation is through the forced displacement of the population.”

Despite its unrealism, the idea of *Taksim* was taken up by the NATO spheres and turned into a subject of behind-the-scenes discussions. On January 15, 1965, the English newspaper *The Sunday Times* published a map of Cyprus, which specified the boundaries of the geographic demarcation of communities. The dividing line stretched from the northern coast west of Kyrenia, passed through the Turkish sector in Nicosia and further down to the Turkish sector in Famagusta [97, p. 7].

Like *enosis*, *taksim* does not take into account the national interests of the Cypriot people, a single state, as well as political realities.

In the conditions of the bankruptcy of *enosis*, a compromise behind-the-scenes deal appeared in the depths of NATO, which received the scientific name—

double enosis. According to this model, Cyprus is divided into parts, which are annexed by Greece and Turkey. For all its political cynicism, the plan of double enosis turned out to be long-term. This is explained, firstly, by the fact that it accumulates the strategic goal of imperialism to liquidate the Cypriot state, and secondly, by the ability to some extent to play along with the nationalist ambitions of certain circles in Greece and Turkey. At this stage of the development of the Cyprus problem, the double enosis, although it remains in the arsenal of Western diplomacy, is used as a deterrent. For example, it is put forward in opposition to the intention of the leadership of the Turkish community to proclaim a separate state.

Analysing the enosis and double enosis, which laid the foundation for many American and NATO plans to resolve the Cyprus problem, one cannot but draw attention to the erroneousness of their identification prevailing in the political schools of the West. For many years, enosis and double enosis, as two options for the Atlanticisation of Cyprus, were considered in Western diplomatic circles as equal alternatives with a single end result—to liquidate the independent Cypriot state. Meanwhile, a retrospective consideration makes it possible to more accurately assess the comparative significance of the two types of Atlanticisation, namely, the second path is by no means equal to the first. It, as a forced option, arose out of the bankruptcy of Enosis and contains elements new for Atlantic politics, in particular, an additional border of the Greek-Turkish confrontation in Cyprus. An important discrepancy between the two methods of Atlanticisation emerged when it became clear that, despite the external attractiveness, not every path of the Republic of

Cyprus's liquidation would ultimately lead to the strengthening of the southeastern flank of NATO.

The reassessment of the ratio of the Atlanticisation options for Cyprus was expressed in the 1978. "The framework of the world", about which the plan, sponsored by the United States, Britain and Canada, reveals a fundamentally new moment in the approach of Atlantic circles to the Cyprus settlement. According to the West German historians N. Kadritsky and W. Wagner, it reflects the need for a "banana republic", easily controlled politically, on whose territory there are two tiny and barely viable states. Such a prospect for NATO is preferable to the option according to which Cyprus, divided between Greece and Turkey, would lead to the creation of a new Greek-Turkish border and thereby increase the potential for war between it" [78, p. 119-120].

In a word, any political combination built on such a shaky ground as enosis or double enosis sooner or later reveals its precariousness, causes the temptation to revise it, and, consequently, creates unforeseen consequences for the Atlanticists.

1974 events put Atlantic circles before the need to maneuver between Greece and Turkey, to achieve their goals in Cyprus by diplomatic means. At this stage, Western diplomacy seized the neo-colonialist mechanism—Zurich-London agreements. July 25, 1974 in Geneva—opened a conference of foreign ministers three countries of the guarantors of the independence of Cyprus—Greece, Turkey and England. The conference lasted until July 30 and ended with the signing of a joint declaration calling for the preservation of independence, the territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus and the restoration of the

constitutional Cypriot government. The declaration called not to expand zones controlled by Turkish and Greek sides. As of 22:00 Geneva time on 29 July 1974. [80. from. 34]. Agreement was also reached, about a ceasefire. Ministers agreed again to meet in 10 days for the second round negotiations. However, the second meeting began with fierce accusations by Greece against Turkey that it violates the agreements reached, expanding the area of occupation in Cyprus. Turkey replied that this action was a forced measure, moreover, provoked by the Greek side. Moreover, Turkey went to Geneva to present an ultimatum to Greece, demanding consent to the federal structure of the Cypriot state, as well as establishing its control over 34% of the island's area.

The Turkish proposal was called the "Gunesh Plan" (after the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Turan Gunesh) and provided for the creation on the island of 6 new enclaves for Turkish Cypriots, most of which were supposed to be located in the northern zone. The general leadership of the bi-communal Republic of Cyprus was to be carried out by two independent administrations. The Turkish side disavowed this plan, but it entered Western historiography under the name "Gunesh-Kissinger plan." According to Western authors, the "Gunesh plan" was developed at the request of G. Kissinger, who considered it "a specific means for reaching a compromise" and more "moderate" compared to the one put forward at the same talks in Geneva and immediately rejected by the Greek and Greek Cypriot sides. R. Denktash's demand to revise the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, to create a federal state in which the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots would live geographically separately. On August

13 in Geneva, a representative of the State Department clarified the US attitude to the Turkish proposal as follows: “We recognize that the position of the Turkish community in Cyprus requires serious improvement and protection, and therefore we support its demands for autonomy in many respects” [85, p. 132].

The content of the Gunesh-Kissinger plan and the US position caused a storm of indignation in Greece and Cyprus. Athens rejected the ultimatum; in response, Turkey removed its representative from Geneva. On August 22, the Soviet government in its statement condemned the practice of trilateral negotiations of the former “guarantors” of the status of Cyprus, which proved fruitless. The statement noted that the “guarantees” taken by Greece, Turkey and Great Britain under the Zurich-London agreements of 1960 turned out to be completely untenable, attempts to resolve the Cyprus crisis in a narrow circle of NATO ended in failure [111, 23.VI 11.1974].

The mechanism of the Zurich-London agreements did not work. Attempts to determine the fate of Cyprus behind the backs of its people and to impose a decision alien to them on the Cypriots have proved unsuccessful. But they alerted the world community, which rightly saw in the intensification of Western diplomacy a threat to the independence and sovereignty of the second territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.

The decisive, sharply negative position taken by the Cypriot government with respect to the “peacekeeping efforts” of the West prompted imperialist diplomacy to resort to more sophisticated and disguised manoeuvres in the future. Keeping the goals of their behind-the-scenes activities the same, the US and NATO tried to present themselves in the role of impartial “mediators”

who supposedly believe that the Cypriots themselves must resolve controversial issues and therefore do not put forward any projects. This position was intended to hide old diplomatic miscalculations, to sow illusions among the Cypriots about the good intentions of the West.

Indicative in this respect was the “Brussels formula” for the settlement of the Cyprus problem, developed at the meeting of the foreign ministers of Greece and Turkey in Brussels in December 1975 with the active participation of the US State Department. It concerned a purely procedural issue and boiled down to an agreement that the parties would enter into direct contact without preconditions, submit proposals in writing for the next stage of intercommunal negotiations [129, 15.IV.1976]. In the editorial “New impasse in Cyprus,” the London Times, April 15, 1976, wrote: “Even this very limited agreement turned out to be not quite what it appeared to be: it was injected.” This procedure did not stand up to the first practical test. While the official communiqué stated that the parties would “exchange proposals at the same time,” the head of the Greek community delegation, Clerides, agreed that his proposals should be transmitted first and that the Turkish community had ten days to formulate a response. As a result of the Brussels formula, which was nothing more than one of the means of diplomatic intervention, intercommunal negotiations came to a standstill. The United Nations has become the real arena of the struggle for a just settlement of the Cyprus problem. In the midst of the politico-military crisis, the Security Council adopted Resolution No. 353, which operatively called on all States to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of

Cyprus, as well as cease fire and exercise maximum restraint. The resolution demanded an immediate end to foreign intervention and proposed the immediate withdrawal of foreign military personnel from the Republic of Cyprus. This document called on all countries to fully cooperate with the UN international peacekeeping force in Cyprus. Resolution No. 353 decided to keep Cyprus under constant surveillance and requested the Secretary General to submit reports as necessary with a view to taking further measures to ensure that peace conditions are restored as soon as possible [111, 20.VII.1974].

In late October-early November 1974, the discussion of the Cyprus issue took place at the XXIX session of the UN General Assembly. The head of the Cypriot delegation, S. Kyprianou, in his speech condemned the behind-the-scenes manoeuvres undertaken by some NATO member states to impose on Cyprus a solution that does not meet their interests. He pointed to the senselessness of resuming trilateral negotiations on Cyprus, which ended in Geneva without results. After discussion of the Cyprus question, Resolution No. 3212 of November 1, 1974 was adopted [see 19), which in its operative part called on all states to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and policy of non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus, to refrain from any acts or intervention directed against it, as well as to the prompt withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and foreign military presence in the Republic of Cyprus. ... Considering that the constitutional system of Cyprus is a matter of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, the resolution expressed satisfaction with the contacts and negotiations being conducted on an equal basis with the good offices of the UN Secretary General

between the representatives of the two communities and welcomed them to continue with the aim of free achieving a mutually acceptable political settlement based on their fundamental and legal rights. The fifth paragraph of the resolution dealt with the problem of refugees, who, as noted, “must return to their homes in safety”. The sixth paragraph expressed the hope that, if necessary, within the UN framework, appropriate efforts, including negotiations, can be made to implement the provisions of the resolution, thereby ensuring the Republic of Cyprus its fundamental right to independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. December 13, 1974 The Security Council unanimously approved Resolution No. 3212 as an effective basis for solving the Cyprus problem.

... In subsequent years, the UN General Assembly, after discussing the situation in Cyprus, adopted the following documents: Resolution No. 3395 of November 20, 1975 Resolution No. 31/12 of November 12, 1976. and Resolution No. 32/15 of 10 November 1977. Despite some differences in individual paragraphs, in general, these documents contain all the main elements of Resolution No. 3212. They constitute a solid international legal basis for achieving a just political settlement, clearly outlining the framework of possible initiative steps and mediation missions. In the absence of a single generally acceptable method of settling interstate. disputes and conflict situations, these documents are designed to provide practical assistance in finding a solution to the problem to all interested states through the use of the negotiation procedure. mediation, arbitration and other peaceful means. The resolutions, developed taking into account the structural nature of the problem, cover all aspects of

the Cyprus issue and meet the legitimate rights and interests of all parties involved in the conflict. They contain both principles and methodology for reaching a settlement.

The methodological approach is based, firstly, on respect for such basic elements as the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, secondly, on the demand for the withdrawal of all foreign troops, an end to interference in the internal affairs of the Cypriot state, and thirdly, on resolving the issue of refugees, which cannot be a subject any bargaining, fourthly, on the adoption of the procedure of intercommunal negotiations as the only means for resolving the internal aspects of the problem as a whole. As for the international aspects, they can be discussed within the UN.

XXXIII session of the UN General Assembly (1978) demanded the immediate withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and military personnel from the territory of the Republic of Cyprus. The resolution, voted for by the majority of UN member states, expresses "full support for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and policy of non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus" and calls for an end to any outside interference in its internal affairs.

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The Security Council resolution also noted the need to restore the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus. The Security Council not only called for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the island and for respect for the policy of non-alignment pursued by Cyprus, but also for the first time set a specific deadline for fulfilling the requirements of previously adopted resolutions on the Cyprus issue [111, 14.XII.1978].

XXXIV session of the General Assembly by an overwhelming majority of votes adopted on November 20, 1979 a resolution on the Cyprus question, which not only repeats previous decisions, but contains new positive elements. In particular, it provides for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on Cyprus in March 1980 if progress has not been made by then. The resolution makes a special reference to the need to hold an international conference and take practical measures to implement UN resolutions. For the first time, the General Assembly reaffirmed the right of the Republic of Cyprus and its people to full and effective sovereignty and control over the entire territory of Cyprus, its natural and other wealth, and called on all states to support the Government of Cyprus and help it to exercise these rights. At the same time, she welcomed the proposal to demilitarize the island.

However, all the provisions of these documents remain unfulfilled yet. And the reason for this lies not in the absence of the due constructiveness of the adopted resolutions, but in the obstructionist policy of the imperialist powers of NATO. One cannot but agree with the opinion of experts in international law, who argue that the Cyprus problem at this stage is a problem of the full, urgent and effective implementation of UN documents.

The course of the debates in the UN has convincingly shown the deep fundamental difference in the positions in the approach to the solution of the Cyprus issue of the Western states, on the one hand, and the socialist and non-aligned countries, on the other. Polar approaches are one of the manifestations of differences in the class content of the policies of the two camps. The Soviet Union and other socialist states opposed the manoeuvres to draw the discussion of the issue into the framework of NATO with the principled lack of searching for ways to settle and achieve a mutually acceptable formula based on unconditional respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, and its policy of non-alignment. At the same time, the requirement to urgently implement in full the relevant UN resolutions is combined with a willingness to cooperate with other states in the interests of achieving a just solution to the Cyprus crisis.

A practical confirmation of this readiness was the proposal put forward on August 22, 1974 by the Soviet government to convene, within the framework of the UN, a pre-final international conference to address the Cyprus problem.

The imperialist circles could not prepare a decent alternative project, which would be dictated by a sincere desire to achieve a just and lasting settlement in accordance with the well-known UN resolutions. The *Nouvel Atlantique* magazine of August 26, 1974, in an editorial, gave the following definition of Western policy on the Cyprus issue: "NATO would ultimately be sufficiently satisfied with a decision leading to the partition of Cyprus under the guise of a federal state. But today this solution is not reliable." The magazine

calls for the act of introducing a “private” solution that would not discredit either the Alliance or the United States.

The negative position of the Western countries in the UN continues to be based on selfish, bloc goals, having received concrete expression in a number of “plans,” “initiatives,” and mediation missions. In the interests of restoring NATO’s southeastern flank, the so-called batch method was put forward. Artificially linking the Cyprus issue with the problem of the Aegean Sea, its authors (a group of US congressmen) propose to consider them in the form of a “package”, when a compromise is reached by gaining advantages by the parties in one issue and concessions in another. Part of this “package” was the recommendation of US Secretary of State Kissinger to create a mixed Greek-Turkish consortium to exploit the oil resources of the Aegean Basin. However, this project was rejected by Greece, which views the Cypriot and Aegean issues as two unrelated issues [139, 19.1.1975]. The position of the Turkish government was stated at the XXX session of the General Assembly by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Chaglayangil [21, p. 17]. She proceeded from the fact that any decision should be based on four principles, one of which is the requirement to create a bi-zonal federation. The government of B. Ecevit, which came to power in January 1978, announced a “new course” in the Cyprus issue, but also insisted on this demand (139, 8.1.1978). A similar position on the Cyprus issue was taken by the next Turkish government—S. Demirel. The National Security Council (SNB) of Gurtiy also announced its adherence to the requirement of “dualism”, which temporarily assumed (after the military coup on September 12, 1980) the functions of the country’s

supreme legislative body. The government program approved by him emphasizes that Turkey wants to resolve the intercommunal differences in Cyprus through negotiations within the framework of the agreements already reached, the creation of a bizonal, bi-communal federal state.

Based on the thesis “the key to the settlement is in Ankara”, Western diplomacy partially took into account this element of Turkish policy in its other “plan”, which provided for the creation of three loosely connected zones in Cyprus: two under the administration of the Greek and Turkish communities, respectively, and the third, mixed, under the control of the central government. In exchange, the Western “mediators” pledged to settle the complex internal problems of Cyprus, and at the same time the Greek-Turkish contradictions in general (73, p. 73).

English newspaper “*Sunday Times*” January 22, 1978, outlined the general contours of the “peace initiative” Turkey, with which B. Ecevit’s government came out in opposition to the “three-zone plan”. According to the newspaper, the Turkish concessions amount to the return of 4-6% of the Cypriot territory. In Greece, this plan was regarded as Ankara’s policy to create the appearance of progress in the Cyprus problem and to convince the United States to lift the embargo on the supply of military equipment to it. Rejecting the Turkish plan. Athens, however, expressed its readiness to accept other steps from the West. The contradictory position of Greece in the approach to the solution of the Cyprus issue bears the imprint of bourgeois nationalism and class compromise with imperialism [150, 1974, No. 11, p. 2].

Among the Western “initiatives” should be noted the “intermediary mission” of Clifford, US President Carter’s special envoy for the Cyprus issue. Ironically, the name of this Washington official is associated with the beginning of the entry of the post-war world into the period of the Cold War. Clifford wrote and edited H. Truman’s infamous speech, which he delivered on March 12, 1947 in the US Congress and in which he outlined the basic principles of the program of “assistance” to Greece and Turkey and, referring to the “need to ensure the country’s security”, openly proclaimed the main task of American foreign policy to “contain” communism. As the New York Times wrote sarcastically, mindful of this, as a result of the mission, the new administration received an objective report from a confidant who was not constrained by loyalty to the past political course. Although during the March 1977 talks in Ankara, Nicosia and Athens, Clifford did not reveal the content of the American plan, known as the “Carter formula”, he probed the ground for promoting an agreed and NATO-friendly solution [127, 4.III. 1977]. In this case, the intervention consisted in substituting the role of the United Nations in the settlement of the Cyprus problem through the so-called mediation. The initiators of this mission obviously hoped, playing on the unsettledness of the problem, to persuade the Cypriot government to take a compromise course with NATO.

In parallel with this mission, the European Economic Community offered its mediation services. The monopolists, using the status of Cyprus as a member associated with the “Common Market” and its great economic dependence on trade with the West, resorted to pressure tactics in order to induce the Cypriot government to make concessions to NATO. The EEC

“initiative”, which was kept secret for a long time, ultimately boiled down to a proposal to resume the intercommunal dialogue, but not on the basis of UN resolutions, but on the basis of the so-called “Brussels formula” [110, 1975, No. 48].

Recently, the intensification of Atlantic policy in the Eastern Mediterranean region has been associated with the shuttle diplomacy of US Deputy Secretary of State W. Christopher. Although the Cyprus problem looked obscured by maneuvers aimed at settling the Greek-Turkish conflicts and restoring the viability of NATO’s southeastern flank, it remains a constant subject of behind-the-scenes negotiations.

Regarding the place of Cyprus in this combination, the Washington Post admitted: “It would be senseless and even harmful to openly demand Ankara to soften the Cypriot policy as a condition of receiving financial assistance from Western countries. However, there is a definite connection here, and it cannot be otherwise “[135, 14.1.1979]. The chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee of the Turkish Parliament, Z. Mulayim, analysing the motives of the American “generosity” in the provision of military and financial assistance to Ankara, suggests that Washington will try to impose the “Camp David procedure” to resolve the Greek-Turkish conflicts [139, 8.IV.1979]. Such a policy preserves the undemocratic system of international relations in the Eastern Mediterranean, for the sake of a bloc strategy threatens the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus.

With all the apparent diversity and diversity of Western “plans”, “initiatives” and “missions”, each of them has a common tendency and they all share common goals: presence; acting in circumvention of UN

resolutions, to replace the real basis of a political settlement; lead the discussion of the CPR issue into the bowels of the North Atlantic bloc, where, with the help of a behind-the-scenes deal on Cyprus, “close the gap” in the southeastern flank. The intensification of imperialist diplomacy in the search for a settlement is fraught with the danger of further complicating the Cyprus issue, since it ignores the well-known UN documents on Cyprus and is outside the strictly outlined framework.

It is noteworthy that the Atlantic circles are trying to promote their “initiatives”, relying on reactionary and compromising elements in Cyprus. These pro-imperialist forces, mistakenly believing that their hour has struck and that it is they who have to bring the Cyprus crisis out of the impasse in the near future, are striving to move to the forefront of political life. Taking advantage of the difficulties generated by the unsettledness of the problem, they willingly pick up and spread the version of Atlantic politicians that the key to a solution is allegedly in the West and that the country’s foreign policy should be reoriented. At the same time, these circles propagandize the thesis of “equidistance from the socialist countries and imperialist powers and thus seek to emasculate the anti-imperialist content of the principles of the policy of non-alignment pursued by the Republic of Cyprus. Maintaining an “equal distance” is the way to distance Cyprus from the socialist states, which are taking initiative constructive proposals on the Cyprus issue, the way of gradual blocking with Atlanticism.

The manoeuvres of the Compromisers and their “arguments” in favor of the political reorientation of the Republic of Cyprus were debunked by President

Makarinos in his speech at the all-European meeting in Helsinki: that the allies would give us if we belonged to any bloc. The non-aligned world serves a great service to the cause of world peace, and I do not think that we would have to change the policy to ensure protection.”

The provocative nature of the “equidistance” thesis is especially visible against the background of the growing role of the non-aligned movement in the Cyprus settlement. Perceiving the events of 1974 as a test for their principles, a group of non-aligned countries established at the XXIX session of the UN General Assembly a committee consisting of five countries—Algeria, Guyana, India, Mali and Yugoslavia—to monitor the development of the Cyprus crisis, to keep in touch with interested parties, and also to assist in the development of resolutions. The Committee was the collective sponsor of all 19 resolutions, which were adopted as a basis by the participants in the sessions. As the representative of Algeria stated at the XXIX session of the UN General Assembly, “the position of the group of non-aligned states is fully based on the conviction that explains the special interest of our countries, always shown to this problem, and their efforts in a crisis situation are aimed at achieving a solution that would ensure the character of Cyprus non-aligned country” [23, p. 47].

Discussions on the Cyprus issue invariably result in the defeat of imperialist diplomacy, and the decisive role in it is played by the changed balance of power in the UN. The solidarity of the states of Asia and Africa and their support for the interests of Cyprus were manifested in the work of the Belgrade (1978) conference of foreign ministers of the non-aligned countries. The conference participants adopted a

resolution on Cyprus, which is considered the most positive document ever endorsed by the non-aligned movement. For the first time, it makes a special reference to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which provides for sanctions against the aggressor in case he does not comply with the resolution of the United Nations [15, p. 7]. Participants of the VI Conference of Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in September 1979 in Havana, also spoke out in support of the just cause of the Cypriots. The meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned Countries, held in Delhi in February 1981, also reaffirmed its support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. The meeting reaffirmed their solidarity with her government and people and welcomed the resumption of intercommunal talks under the auspices of the UN Secretary General.

The Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not refuse to support from individual states and groups of countries that could make a constructive contribution to solving the problem. However, it believes that an indispensable condition for any initiative missions should be taking into account the well-known UN resolutions. They are in favor of solving the Cyprus problem within the framework of the UN. Referring to the sixth paragraph of Resolution No. 3212 of November 1, 1974, S. Kyprianou emphasised: "From today on, the Cypriot people believe that the General Assembly is directly involved in the development of events in Cyprus. Our determination lies in the fact that any steps and negotiations should be carried out within the framework of the UN" [15, p. 19].

Advocating for the internationalization of efforts to achieve a just settlement, the government continues to support the Soviet Union's initiative to convene an international conference under the auspices of the United Nations to address the international aspects of the Cyprus problem. Confirming the continuity of Makarios' foreign policy, the new President of the Republic of Cyprus S. Kyprianou said: "Despite the difficulties, we continue to support this proposal. We are also developing close economic, commercial and cultural relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries" [111, 2.11.1978].

Great hopes for finding a mutually acceptable agreement on the Cyprus issue were associated with the beneficial influence of the detente process that developed in Europe after the Conference on Security and Cooperation. The principles contained in the Final Act of the meeting, as well as the section "Questions Relating to Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean" create good preconditions for resolving contentious issues. The universal international legal content of such principles as the inviolability of borders, the peaceful settlement of disputes, the territorial integrity of states, non-interference in internal affairs, the non-use of force or the threat of force, etc. is already directly related to the Republic of Cyprus. Strict, unswerving observance of these principles by all countries, as well as the implementation of measures of military detente in the Mediterranean, would undoubtedly contribute to the elimination of a dangerous hotbed of tension.

The normalisation of the situation in this zone was facilitated by and the implementation of such collective initiatives of the socialist states as proposals to limit the

scope of military exercises and to extend confidence-building measures to the Mediterranean region. This proposal was put forward in November 1978 by the participants of the Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member states (13, p. 18).

The development of events in and around Cyprus testifies to the fact that for the imperialist circles the intentions proclaimed at the all-European conference are one thing, but real politics is something completely different. Not observing any of the principles adopted in Helsinki with respect to the Cypriot state, they are clearly using the continuing tension to undermine positive trends in Europe, to whip up a military psychosis in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

Only such a solution to the Cyprus problem will be effective, which will put an end to the military-political structure of the Zurich-London agreements imposed from the outside and become an anachronism and fully reflect the changed balance of forces in the world arena, as well as the requirements of the process of defusing international tension.

The interests of improving the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean and around the world require the elimination of dangerous phenomena, such as hotbeds of tension. Speaking at the XVIII Congress of the Komsomol (1978], General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR L. I. Brezhnev said: "Peace, non-interference in internal affairs, respect for independence and territorial integrity, equality, mutually beneficial cooperation - all this and there are the necessary and most important elements of detente and lasting peace. This is our policy in Europe, and it is

the same in Africa, Asia, Latin America, in all parts of the world” [111, 28.V.1978]

USSR Policy On the Cyprus Issue

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries oppose imperialist interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cyprus with a policy of peace and friendship between peoples, a policy of protecting sovereign rights from external encroachments. The situation in Cyprus, located near the southern borders of the USSR, has always attracted the attention of the Soviet government. The Soviet Union treats with great sympathy the struggle of the Cypriots for independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, for the elimination of NATO military bases on the island.

The USSR’s position on the Cyprus issue is based on Lenin’s foreign policy aimed at providing all-round support to the peoples defending their freedom and national independence. This position is consistent and principled and is not subject to any tactical or opportunistic changes. Concerning the program of the Soviet delegation at the Genoa conference, V. I. Lenin highlighted the following provisions: “The novelty of our international scheme should be that Negroes, like other colonial peoples, participate on an equal footing with European peoples in conferences and commissions, have the right not to allow interference in their inner life”, as well as “voluntary cooperation and assistance to the weak on the part of the strong should be applied without subordinating the former to the will of the latter” [4, p. 36-37]. In his report on the work of the

All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars at the first session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the VII convocation on February 2, 1920, V. I. Lenin, carefully take into account national characteristics [3, p. 98].

It is these Leninist instructions that form the basis of the Soviet position on the Cyprus question. The peaceful foreign policy of the USSR is aimed at condemning and curbing the imperialist aggressors who are encroaching on the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, to provide active support to the Cypriot people who have become their victims, and to oppose a system of reliable international guarantees on the path of imperialist intrigues.

When in December 1963, as a result of NATO's intervention in Cyprus, clouds thickened, the Soviet Union resolutely advocated a peaceful, without any outside interference, settlement of the differences that had arisen between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. The USSR has firmly declared its solidarity with the people of Cyprus. In the TASS Statement of January 30, 1964, it was emphasised that the threat of NATO aggression hanging over the young sovereign state affects the interests of all peace-loving peoples. In the message of the Soviet government on the Cyprus question of February 7, 1964, the heads of state of the United States, Great Britain, France, Greece and Turkey called for restraint, respect for the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Cyprus. In connection with the request of the government of Cyprus for help to protect the sovereignty of the country, the Soviet government announced on August 15, 1964, his readiness to render it to Cyprus and stressed the need to find ways of a peaceful settlement of the problem.

This position of the USSR strengthens the base of the struggle of the Cypriot people and helps to expand its international support.

Taking into account the opinion and wishes of the directly interested parties, and above all the government of Cyprus, the Soviet Union does not object to the presence of the UN armed forces on the island, although from the very beginning it considered their presence unjustified and a prolonged stay abnormal. In approaching this issue, he always proceeded from the fact that a real solution to the problem must be sought through the withdrawal of foreign troops from Cyprus, the demilitarisation of the island, and the cessation of any outside interference in the internal affairs of the country. The restoration of peace and tranquility is also guaranteed by the elimination of foreign military bases, the deployment of which is contrary to the sovereignty of Cyprus and the interests of international security.

During the November 1967 events, the Soviet government issued a Statement in which it condemned the machinations in Cyprus of the reactionary militarist circles of Greece. Supporting the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and guided by the interests of preserving and consolidating peace in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Soviet government called on the parties to exercise restraint and prudence, to abandon attempts to resolve the problems arising between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots by force. "A solution to the issue of eliminating tension in Cyprus," the Statement emphasized, "should be sought on the basis of a peaceful settlement, respect for the sovereign rights of the entire Cypriot people, and strict observance of Security Council resolutions on Cyprus." As can be seen

from this document, an organic element of the Soviet position on the Cyprus issue is the search for a peaceful solution to the Cyprus issue, taking into account the interests of the Cypriots of both Greek and Turkish origin.

At the beginning of 1970, the imperialist circles of NATO, with the help of internal reaction, again tried to aggravate the situation in Cyprus. They launched the propaganda of enosis, under the guise of which they hoped to create favorable opportunities for turning Cyprus into their military base, for eliminating the independence of the republic, and reprisals against the democratic and patriotic forces of the country.

However, this time too, the intrigues of imperialism encountered a growing resistance from the people and government of the Republic of Cyprus, which relied on the support of the Soviet Union and other peace-loving forces. As indicated in the TASS Statement of February 18, 1970. regarding these intrigues, "the Soviet Union resolutely supports the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, for the elimination of foreign military bases in Cyprus, for a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus question without any foreign interference in any form." The statement ended with a warning that the Soviet Union was closely following the development of events in Cyprus and around Cyprus. At the same time, the urgent need was emphasized "to put an end to subversive activities against the Cyprus state, to show restraint and prudence, to respect the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Cyprus."

The Soviet position on the Cyprus issue, set forth in the repeated Statements of the USSR government, largely helped to defend the country from the threat of

losing its independence. It has become an important factor in protecting the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. It is quite natural that the foreign policy of the USSR evokes deep gratitude from the people and government of Cyprus. Highly appreciating the Soviet position, President of the Republic of Cyprus Makarios said: "We consider the solidarity of the Soviet leadership and the Soviet people with our struggle about the GIV of those who hatch plans against the territorial integrity of our island, or are planning to impose on us decisions that run counter to the will our people and with internationally recognized democratic principles" [106, 3.VI.1970]

Recent years have especially clearly shown the combination in Soviet foreign policy of genuine peacefulness and constructivism with decisive opposition to the aggressive actions of imperialism, which continues to encroach on the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. The July-August 1974 events put the republic on the brink of a national catastrophe. At that critical time for the fate of the country, the Cypriot people again met with the firm and resolute support of the Soviet Union. True to its line of defending peace, repelling aggressors, protecting the legitimate rights of all peoples, large and small, the USSR made a number of decisive statements. The Soviet Government's Statement of July 16 assessed the criminal nature of the anti-government rebellion organized by the Greek military against the legitimate government of the Republic of Cyprus, headed by President Makarios. The Soviet government expressed in it for the immediate adoption of measures to end the intervention of Greece in the affairs of Cyprus [45, p. 120]. However, as the situation in Cyprus became more

and more tense, in the Statement of July 21, the Soviet government again drew the attention of the world community to what was happening on the island. On July 20, Turkey landed its troops in Cyprus. The Statement of the Soviet Government noted: “The duty of every state and government to which peace and independence is dear is to raise its voice against the crimes committed by the Greek military before the eyes of the whole world, to provide firm support to the Cypriot people and their legitimate government in the struggle for the independence and sovereignty of the republic and ensure the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the Republic of Cyprus” [45, p. 122].

The continued gross interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cyprus prompted the Soviet Government to issue yet another Statement on July 29. This document set forth fundamental considerations on the elimination of a dangerous hotbed of tension and ways of solving the Cyprus problem. It emphasized: “There must be, and as soon as possible, an end to attempts on the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus ... All states that not in words but in deeds stand for the preservation of Cyprus as an independent state must take necessary steps in this direction. The first priority is the full and immediate implementation of the Security Council resolution on Cyprus of July 20 of this year. The Cypriot people—both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots—must be guaranteed the inalienable right to solve their problems themselves, the fate of their common homeland—the sovereign Republic of Cyprus—in peace and tranquility” [45, p. 127-129].

The logical consequence of the consistent, principled position of the USSR on the Cyprus issue was

the Statement of the Soviet Government of August 22, which outlines the need to take effective measures to protect the Republic of Cyprus from outside interference, ensure the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territory of Cyprus, and give the Cypriots the opportunity to decide for themselves. their problems. The Soviet government believes that “the time has come for a representative forum of states, reflecting the political face of the modern world, to take up the consideration of the Cyprus problem. The issue of convening for these purposes within the framework of the UN an international conference with the participation of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and all the member states of the Security Council is ripe. It is possible, of course, to attract other states to participate in the conference, in particular, from among the non-aligned” [45, p. 134].

The conference would create a real organisational basis for solving the Cyprus problem. The permanent members of the Security Council, which are especially responsible for maintaining international peace and security, could jointly or in parallel provide appropriate effective guarantees of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, guarantees of the implementation of the decisions of the international conference. This issue is of fundamental importance. The future of the Republic of Cyprus is connected with it, the interests of the independent development of which cannot allow a security system to be imposed on it again, which not only would not provide it with peace and tranquility, but could be used in interests alien to it.

The initiative proposal reflected the political realities in and around Cyprus. The constructive nature

of the initiative is determined by two axiomatic provisions. First, the proposal proceeds from the premise that the UN is not just a number of international bodies for coordinating the efforts of states aimed at resolving certain international issues, but also an extensive system of international cooperation. By its structure, the Cyprus problem is one of those problems of world politics that cannot be resolved on a unilateral, bilateral or even regional basis, without appropriate coordinating centres on a global scale. This implies the objective need to internationalise efforts in search of a mutually acceptable solution. Secondly, the Soviet initiative envisages putting an end to the obsolete military-political structure of the Zurich-London agreements and creating a new, effective international system of guarantees. The urgent need for such a measure is caused by the bankruptcy of the trilateral guarantee system imposed on Cyprus by England, Turkey and Greece. The practice of international life shows that bloc mechanisms are losing their effectiveness as levers for resolving controversial problems and cannot ensure the achievement of a just settlement.

The holding of a representative international conference on Cyprus within the UN could be a concrete form of implementation of paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 221 32-12 (XXIX), which provides: "If necessary, appropriate measures can be taken within the United Nations, including negotiations, with the purpose of implementing the provisions of this resolution, thereby ensuring the Republic of Cyprus its fundamental right to independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity" [19]

Support for the just cause of the Cypriots is combined in the Soviet position with the desire to develop and deepen discharge process. Intensive contacts and meetings at the highest level with the leadership of the capitalist countries of the West are used by the Soviet Union to establish cooperation in resolving problems important for all mankind, including the problem of Cyprus. For example, November 23-24, 1974, in the Vladivostok region, a working meeting between the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid I. Brezhnev and the US President J. Ford took place. In a joint Soviet-American statement, the parties expressed support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus. They stated that a fair solution to the Cyprus question should be based on strict implementation of the decisions of the Security Council and the UN General Assembly regarding Cyprus [108, 1975, No. 12].

At the same time, the USSR proposed to send a Security Council mission to Cyprus to familiarize themselves on the spot with the implementation of the decisions. Such a practice, which was repeatedly applied in the past and fully justified itself, would undoubtedly play an important positive role. However, opponents of this proposal prevented the adoption of the necessary decision and had a negative impact on the position of some other members of the Security Council. Although time has been lost, the relevance of the Soviet proposal remains.

Pointing to the obstructionist position of Western diplomacy in relation to these proposals, the Soviet diplomat and scientist V. L. Israelyan noted that "from the high rostrum of the UN, there are often voices of those who like to criticize the UN Charter, to speculate

about the need to increase the effectiveness of the UN and strengthen its role in international life, but when specific proposals are made to send a special mission of the Security Council to Cyprus, to hold an international conference on Cyprus within the UN, that is, proposals that have as their goal a real and concrete, and not in words a manifestation of the effective role of the UN in modern world politics, then there are opponents of these proposals, including those who like to talk, to philosophize about the need to increase the authority of the UN" [23, p. 44-46].

The USSR's initiative on the Cyprus issue received the approval and support of the governments of Greece and Cyprus. President Makarios in an interview with the *Katimerini* newspaper said that he fully supports the proposal of the Soviet government to convene an international conference within the UN, which should work out concrete measures to resolve the Cyprus issue [145, 6.XI.1974].

The principled and firm position of the USSR, set forth in the Statements of the Soviet Government of 18, 21, 29 July and 22 August 1974, contributed to the localization and politicisation of the conflict. The military-political crisis was transferred from the sphere of armed confrontation to the sphere of diplomacy. These documents also contributed to the discussion in a constructive spirit of the Cyprus problem in the UN Security Council. During the discussion, the Soviet delegation made a number of specific proposals providing for urgent measures to protect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. In particular, as a result of the consistent and persistent efforts of the Soviet Union and other peace-loving states, the Security Council

succeeded in adopting a number of important resolutions paving the way for a political settlement of the situation on the island, and above all Resolution No. 353 of July 20, 1974.

In the struggle for a just and lasting settlement, special attention has always been paid to the country's territorial integrity. That is why the unilateral decision on the establishment of the Turkish Federative State of the Republic of Cyprus was described in the TASS statement of February 17, 1975 as "a new attempt by certain NATO circles to disrupt the settlement process and carry out the partition of the island against the interests of the Cypriot people."

The USSR supported in the Security Council Resolution No. 367 of March 12, 1975, in which the Council expressed regret over the unilateral decision that proclaimed part of the Republic of Cyprus a "federal Turkish state".

The intensification of attempts aimed at the partition of Cyprus and the elimination of the unified Cypriot state prompted the Soviet government to issue a statement on June 22, 1976, in which it expressed "serious concern about the unjustified delay in the Cyprus settlement and attempts to use the difficult situation in which the Republic of Cyprus found itself to impose her decisions that are alien to the interests of the Cypriot people." "The Soviet Union," the statement said, "is against attempts to seek ways to a Cyprus settlement behind the backs of the Cypriot people in the narrow interests of certain countries or military blocs. The Soviet Union still believes that the best opportunity for a settlement of the Cyprus problem would be the convening of a representative

international conference on Cyprus within the framework of the UN" [111, 22.VI.1976].

Concrete diplomatic actions confirm the Soviet country's constant readiness for sincere, constructive and honest cooperation with all states in the name of achieving lasting peace in the Eastern Mediterranean region. The principled and consistent position of the USSR on the Cyprus issue was clearly defined in the materials of the 25th Congress of the CPSU, in particular in the Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The third paragraph of the program adopted by the congress for the further struggle for peace and international cooperation, for the freedom and independence of peoples says: "To concentrate the efforts of peace-loving states on the elimination of the remaining hotbeds of war" [9, p. 26]. The responsible, proactive mission of the USSR in Cypriot affairs, characterized by the desire to end the hotbed of tension in the Eastern Mediterranean and to this end to mobilize the efforts of all interested parties, found its vivid expression in the Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the XXV Congress, which was made by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Leonid Brezhnev: "We are convinced that reasonable accounting interests and rights of both communities in Cyprus, with unconditional respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and without attempts to impose solutions alien to them from the outside, will allow resolving this acute problem for the benefit of peace, security and tranquility in Europe" [9, p. 19].

Support for the just cause of the Cypriots is combined in the Soviet position with the desire to develop and deepen the process of detente. Intensive

contacts and summit meetings with the leaderships of the capitalist countries. The West is being used by the Soviet Union to establish cooperation in resolving problems important for all mankind, including the problem of Cyprus. For example, November 23-24, 1974. in the Vladivostok region, a working meeting between the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid I. Brezhnev and US President George Ford took place. In a joint Soviet-American statement, the parties expressed support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus. They stated that a just solution to the Cyprus question must be based on strict compliance with the decisions of the Security Council and the General Secretary.

The situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, in particular the problem of Cyprus, was raised in 1978. at the Vienna meeting of Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, with US President J. Carter, at which the principled and consistent position of the USSR was confirmed. In his speech at a press conference in Moscow on June 25, 1979. Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko, referring to the intercommunal negotiations, expressed the hope that their final result would be acceptable to both communities and that Cyprus would exist as a single independent, sovereign, non-aligned state.

The Soviet-Turkish communiqué on the results of negotiations between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A. N. Kosygin and the leaders of the Republic of Turkey, which took place in Ankara at the end of December 1975, testifies to the close attention of the USSR to the Cyprus problem. [51, p.

550], as well as a visit in June 1978, to Moscow, Prime Minister of Turkey B. Ecevit.

The firm, peaceful policy of the Soviet Union had a great influence on the positions of the Greek and Turkish sides, in the Cyprus question. The position of Turkey, which was fixed in 1977, is indicative in this respect. in the joint Soviet-Turkish communique adopted at the end of the official visit. in, the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey I. S. Caglayangil. The communiqué said: “The parties believe that the Cyprus question must be resolved peacefully; through positive and constructive negotiations between both Cypriot communities on the basis of respect for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity of Cyprus and its policy of non-alignment, while respecting the legitimate rights and interests of the Turkish and Greek communities of Cyprus and ensuring their peaceful life in an atmosphere of complete security” [106, 19.III.1977]

Special attention was paid to the situation in Cyprus during the official visit to the USSR in September 1978 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece G. Rallis. As noted in the joint Soviet-Greek communiqué, “the USSR and Greece emphasised the urgent need for a speedy solution of the Cyprus issue on the basis of the principles of independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, respect for its policy of non-alignment and implementation of the relevant decisions of the General Assembly and the UN Security Council on Cyprus” [111, September 12, 1978].

Adherence to these principles was reaffirmed by the parties during the October 1979 visit to the Soviet Union by the Prime Minister of Greece, Karamanlis. In a joint Soviet-Greek communique, the parties declared the

urgent need for an early settlement of the Cyprus issue [111, 5. X.1979].

The principled and consistent policy of the USSR in the Cyprus question is set out both at the state and party levels. Speaking at the 14th AKEL Congress, the head of the CPSU delegation said: “Our party firmly and consistently strives for a peaceful and just settlement of the Cyprus problem, taking into account the interests of the entire Cypriot people, with reasonable consideration of the interests and rights of both communities, advocates independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of the Republic of Cyprus. The continuing intrigues of the imperialists around Cyprus raise the question of the need to take practical measures to implement the UN resolutions on Cyprus, including the convening of a representative international conference within the United Nations.

Peacefully, without threats of the use of force, other disputable issues between the states located in the Mediterranean region should also be resolved” [111, 28.V.1976].

Contrary to the true state of affairs, Western propaganda has repeatedly tried to distort the Soviet position on the Cyprus issue, to ascribe to the Soviet Union “selfish, expansionist goals”. The purpose of such hostile campaigns is to divert the attention of the Cypriots from the real perpetrators of the Cyprus tragedy—the aggressive NATO circles. Those who, willingly or unwillingly, act as spokesmen for NATO are doing a disservice to the Cypriot people.

The consistent, principled position of the USSR on the Cyprus issue has become a solid foundation for the all-round development of Soviet-Cypriot relations, which meet the interests of strengthening the foreign

policy positions of the Republic of Cyprus in conditions of incessant encroachments from outside.

The Soviet position contributes to the preservation by the Republic of Cyprus of the basic foreign policy principle of the policy of non-alignment and the development of relations with all states. This orientation on the world stage allows a small country to enjoy well-deserved respect and authority. The policy of non-alignment (since 1961 Cyprus has been participating in the work of all conferences of non-aligned states) makes it possible to make a constructive contribution to the cause of international cooperation and friendship of peoples, to the strengthening of the process of detente. The Republic of Cyprus was among the first states to sign the Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Testing in Three Areas (1963). She put her signature to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1970). President Makarios attended the historic 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and is signed by the Final Act. The Government declares its desire to help defuse international tension and strengthen global peace. It sees its task in intensifying efforts aimed at ending the arms race, both nuclear and conventional, at disarmament up to general and complete. At the special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament (May 1978), the Cypriot head of state proposed to carry out a complete demilitarisation of the island. The implementation of this project would undoubtedly contribute to the interests of military detente not only regionally, but also on a wider scale.

Cyprus is a constant participant in the meetings of representatives of the states that signed the Final Act of the Pan-European Conference in Helsinki. At the Madrid

meeting (1981), he, together with a group of non-aligned countries, co-authored a draft final document that contributed to the search for mutually acceptable agreements.

The peaceful proposals put forward by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR L. I. Brezhnev in his report at the XXVI Congress of the CPSU were greeted with deep satisfaction by the public and government circles of Cyprus. Accepting the message of Leonid Brezhnev, which explains the Soviet initiatives, the President of the Republic of Cyprus said that these proposals are very constructive and are a significant contribution to the cause of detente and peace throughout the world [15, 23.11.1981]

Nicosia emphasizes that the process of detente cannot develop without solving the most pressing international problems, including eliminating the explosive situation in the Middle East. The Government of Cyprus declares its support for efforts aimed at the earliest possible implementation of the well-known UN Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967 on the Middle East problem. It considers the seizure of foreign territories inadmissible and advocates the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab lands. However, the conciliatory reactionary circles do not want to properly assess the constructivism of such a line in the Middle East settlement and even go for a direct violation of the sovereign rights of the Cypriot state. This is evidenced, in particular, by the events at Larnaca airport in February 1978, when there was an armed clash between a detachment of Egyptian commandos and units of the Cypriot National Guard. As

a result, diplomatic relations between Cairo and Nicosia were interrupted.

The government of Cyprus demands to eradicate the remnants of the colonial system. It speaks for the active and consistent support of all UN members for the just struggle of peoples against racism and all forms of colonialism and neo-colonialism.

An analysis of the foreign policy positions of Cyprus shows that since the island became an independent and non-aligned state, it has occupied a place in the world much more important than its size or power. The events of 1974 and their grave consequences did not question the status of the country, largely thanks to the support of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community. The Soviet position helps to mobilize world public opinion in support of the just cause of the Cypriots, a just settlement of the problem on the basis of UN resolutions and within the framework of this organisation.

The International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow (1969) and the Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties of Europe in Berlin (1976) condemned the imperialist intrigues of NATO against the independent Republic of Cyprus and proposed a constructive program of action aimed at eliminating the dangerous hotbed of tension. The Declaration of the States Parties to the Warsaw Pact emphasizes: "The participants in the meeting of the Political Advisory Committee believe that it is necessary to intensify efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem on the basis of ensuring the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. All foreign troops must be withdrawn from the territory of Cyprus, and internal problems must be resolved by the

Cypriots themselves, with due regard to the interests of both the Greek and Turkish communities. If we proceed from the spirit and letter of the Final Act of the All-European Conference, all states of Europe, and not only Europe, should be interested in the fastest settlement of the Cyprus problem on this basis” [106, 27. XI.1976]

However, Western countries, considering the Cyprus crisis a "family affair" of NATO, left these proposals unanswered. Their policies have only become more sophisticated. As indicated in this regard in the Declaration of the Warsaw Pact member states, adopted at a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in Moscow on November 23, 1978, "influential circles of the imperialist powers, international monopolies, as experience shows, did not abandon their "classical" ways of keeping entire countries and peoples are subordinated to military interventions, gross interference in the internal affairs of independent states, encroachments on their sovereign rights" [13, p. twenty]. To this policy the Soviet Union and all the countries of the socialist community oppose their solidarity with the struggle of the Cypriots against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, against all forms of domination and oppression. They provide and will continue to support the forces fighting for national liberation, defending their independence and freedom, including their right to ensure territorial integrity. independence and sovereignty. The documents of the XXVI Congress of the CPSU are a new confirmation of the invariability of the principled and consistent position of the USSR on the Cyprus issue. The Reporting Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU emphasizes: "... The CPSU will continue to consistently pursue a course towards the development of

cooperation between the USSR and the liberated countries, towards strengthening the alliance of world socialism and the national liberation movement” [11, p. 15].

Soviet-Cypriot Relations

The Soviet Union builds its relations with all states, including small ones, on the basis of the Leninist principles of peace and friendship between peoples, all-round support of states that have thrown off the colonial yoke and are defending their independence and sovereignty. The USSR has consistently and firmly adhered to this line from the first days of the victory of the October Socialist Revolution of 1917, which opened a new era, the era of the revolutionary transformation of the world, the transition from capitalism to socialism. She showed the peoples, including the Cypriots who were languishing under colonial yoke, the way to fight for freedom and independence. Despite the fact that the young Soviet Republic was going through a difficult period associated with the struggle against internal and external enemies, hunger and devastation, it, faithful to its international duty, from the first years of its existence began to provide all-round support and assistance to the peoples who had risen to the national liberation struggle.

The October Socialist Revolution had a great influence on the rise of the national liberation movement in Cyprus. After 1917, the anti-colonial actions of the Cypriots took on an increasingly decisive character, they were characterised by such qualitatively new features as mass character and anti-imperialist

orientation. Under the influence of the ideas of October, the first Marxist cells were organized in 1922, which later became the nucleus of the Communist Party of Cyprus.

Soviet people followed the development of the national liberation movement in Cyprus with great sympathy. The Soviet Union showed solidarity with the struggle of the Cypriot people, demanding the elimination of all forms of colonial oppression in international forums. Since 1954, when the Cyprus problem was first included in the agenda of the IX session of the UN General Assembly under the title “Application to the population of the island of Cyprus, under the general leadership of the UN, the principle of equality of peoples and their right to self-determination”, the Soviet Union has consistently supported the UN right Cyprus for self-determination. At subsequent sessions of the UN General Assembly (XI and XII), the USSR delegation actively supported the proposal to grant the population of Cyprus the right to self-determination, exposed colonial robbery, as well as plans to use the island as a base for aggression against the national liberation movement in the Middle East. The Soviet delegation emphasised that a correct solution to the Cyprus question should provide for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the island and the elimination of foreign military bases. When Cyprus gained independence, our country was one of the first to establish diplomatic relations with the new republic, the first to advocate the admission of the young state to the United Nations.

On the occasion of the proclamation of the Cypriot state, Leonid I. Brezhnev, on behalf of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, sent a welcome telegram to

President Makarios expressing friendly congratulations and sincere wishes for the well-being and prosperity of the people of Cyprus. The telegram spoke of the readiness of the Soviet Union to establish diplomatic relations with the young state and exchange diplomatic representatives. On August 18, 1960 diplomatic relations between the USSR and Cyprus were established.

Soviet-Cypriot relations, which are traditionally friendly in nature, are invariably built on the principles of complete equality, respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs, have rightfully become an important factor in strengthening the independent Cypriot state.

The political orientation of Soviet-Cypriot relations was embodied in the firm and consistent position of the USSR on the Cyprus issue, which acquired particular importance during and after the tragic events on the island in July-August 1974. From the first day of the Cyprus crisis, the Soviet Union came out resolutely in defense of the Cyprus Republic and its people. Thanks to the efforts of the USSR, other countries of the socialist community, all the peace-loving forces of the planet, the well-known Security Council resolution of July 20, 1974 was adopted, calling for a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus problem on the basis of respect by all states of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, and an immediate end to foreign interference, the withdrawal of all foreign troops and the restoration of constitutional order.

The Soviet public strongly supports the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and its policy of non-alignment.

For many years a campaign of solidarity with the people of Cyprus has been waged in the Soviet Union. In various cities of the USSR—Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, Alma-Ata and many others—rallies of solidarity with the struggle of the Cypriots are being held. Activists of the Soviet Peace Committee meet with workers, students, schoolchildren, tell them about the events taking place on the island, and explain the situation in the country. At rallies and meetings held at enterprises, institutions, educational institutions, collective and state farms, Soviet people unanimously speak out for the fastest and just settlement of the Cyprus problem on the basis of UN decisions.

The principled and consistent policy of the USSR on the Cyprus question has created, in turn, a solid foundation for the all-round development of Soviet-Cypriot relations in the direction of developing friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance. As an example of the implementation of the policy of peaceful coexistence in practice, they became an example of equal relations between a small non-aligned country: a country with a powerful socialist state.

The establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the Republic of Cyprus marked the beginning of a broad exchange in the political, economic and cultural fields. After the first mutual visits of public figures, cultural and art workers in 1961, followed by an official visit to Moscow of the Cyprus parliamentary delegation. Subsequently, deception by delegations at various levels became permanent.

An important event in the development of Soviet-Cypriot relations was the official visit to the USSR in June 1971. President of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios. The joint communique noted that the USSR stands for

the integrity, sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Cyprus, against intervention and interference in its internal affairs. During the talks held with the Soviet leaders discussed a wide range of issues, including the Cyprus problem, determined directions and ways of further expanding and strengthening Soviet-Cypriot relations. And in subsequent years, personal contacts at various levels served the purpose of enriching friendly relations.

... In May 1977, for the first time in the history of the two countries, a delegation of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR paid an official visit to Cyprus (106, May 17, 1977). The delegation was received by President Makarios, who praised the principled and consistent policy of the Soviet Union in the Cyprus issue. The Soviet parliamentary delegation to Cyprus testifies to the support of the USSR for a just and democratic solution of the Cyprus problem. The Soviet proposals on the Cyprus issue are based on generally recognised international principles and are not opportunistic in nature, the president emphasised. In his opinion, the support provided by the Soviet Union to Cyprus strengthens the struggle of the Cypriot people and gives it new strength.

In 1978, the Minister of Education of Cyprus H. Sofianos, Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs G. Palagias, and other statesmen and public figures visited the Soviet Union.

From 3 to 10 November 1980, at the invitation of the Central Committee of the Progressive Party of the Working People of Cyprus (AKEL), a delegation of the CPSU headed by the candidate for membership in the CPSU Central Committee, Minister of Justice of the USSR V. I. Terebilov, was in the Republic of Cyprus. The

delegation had meetings with the General Secretary of AKEL E. Papaioannou and members of the Central Secretariat of AKEL, visited the district party organisations. In a joint communiqué, representatives of the CPSU and AKEL noted that all meetings in Cyprus were held in the traditional spirit of mutual friendship, comradeship and fraternal relations that are characteristic of both parties.

The 15th AKEL Congress was attended by a delegation of the CPSU headed by a member of the CPSU Central Committee, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldova S. K. Grossu. In his welcoming message to the Congress of the CPSU Central Committee, he noted the significant contribution of the Cypriot communists to the struggle of the country's people for peace and detente, for thwarting imperialist plans to turn Cyprus into a NATO military base, for a just solution of the problem by the Cypriots themselves on the basis of UN resolutions.

In addition to fruitful political cooperation, Soviet-Cypriot ties are successfully developing in the trade, economic, scientific, cultural and sports fields.

For 20 years now, trade and economic relations between the two countries have been successfully carried out, based on the principles of equality and mutual benefit. The signing of a trade and payments agreement between the USSR and the Republic of Cyprus on December 22, 1961 laid the legal framework for bilateral trade, which was based on the principle of the most favored nation with a clearing form of settlements. An important stage in trade relations was the signing in Nicosia in February 1965 of an agreement on the mutual supply of goods for 1965-1967, which became the first long-term trade agreement concluded

by Cyprus after the declaration of independence. This document laid the foundation for the practice of concluding bilateral long-term agreements between the USSR and Cyprus.

Successful experience of cooperation allowed the parties to conclude in March 1968 new long-term agreements on mutual supplies of goods in 1968-1972, and then in November 1972—an agreement on mutual supplies of goods in 1973-1977.

In November 1976, in Nicosia, a new long-term trade agreement was signed between the USSR and the Republic of Cyprus for 1977-1981. It replaced the 1961 Trade and Payments Agreement and the 1973-1977 Reciprocal Supply Agreement. This document reflects the desire of the parties to promote the expansion of Soviet-Cypriot economic ties based on the principle of equality and mutual benefit. The Cypriot public regarded it as a great achievement, ensuring the successful development of the national economy, serving to overcome the economic consequences of the events of 1974. Both parties agreed to take all necessary measures for the bilateral harmonious implementation of the trade nomenclature between the two countries both through traditional and new types of goods ... The agreement contains a provision that the parties will continue to apply the most-favored-nation treatment, and the governments of both countries will encourage and facilitate the conclusion of contracts between Soviet and Cypriot foreign trade organisations, including long-term ones. The agreement providing for the transition from the clearing form of settlements to payments in freely convertible currency will be automatically renewed—annually, if neither party notifies the other about its desire to terminate it.

In December 1981, the long-term trade agreement was extended for a five-year period—from 1982 to 1986. Speaking at the signing ceremony, Cyprus Minister of Trade and Industry K. Kittis stressed that the extension of the agreement reflects a mutual desire to further expand trade ties. On October 1, 1975, the first agreement in the history of Soviet-Cypriot relations was signed in Moscow on economic and technical cooperation between the two countries. This was a period when the Cypriot economy was particularly affected by the consequences of dramatic events. Highly appreciating the significance of this document, the newspaper "Kharavgi" wrote: "The agreement strengthens the economic front of our struggle and strengthens the international authority of our state at a time when the worst enemies of Cyprus are systematically undermining its existence, having failed to liquidate the Cypriot state through a fascist coup and foreign invasion." [110, 1975, No. 42].

In May 1978, a cooperation agreement was signed in Moscow between the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Cypriot Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The agreement notes that, taking into account the aspirations of the business circles of the Soviet Union and the Republic of Cyprus, "the parties, within the framework of the legislation in force in their countries, and strictly guided by the documents signed between government organisations, will use all opportunities within their competence to help strengthen and expand trade, economic, scientific, technical and other business ties and contacts between foreign trade organisations of the USSR and organisations and firms of the Republic of Cyprus." B. Borisov, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR

Chamber of Commerce and Industry, in his speech on the occasion of the signing of the agreement, stated that trade relations between the USSR and Cyprus are stable. These ties are growing, getting stronger and developing. The agreement will facilitate the conclusion of new contracts, as well as the development of new forms of cooperation in accordance with the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Vice-President of the Cypriot Chamber of Commerce and Industry H. Mavrodīs stressed the importance of the signed document, which will “contribute to the further expansion of mutually beneficial trade relations between the USSR and the Republic of Cyprus.”

The parties agreed to exchange information on economic issues, foreign trade, protection of industrial property and examination of goods, changes in laws, rules and customs in the field of foreign trade. They agreed to provide mutual assistance in organizing symposia, reports and lectures of various specialists, as well as in organizing and holding trade exhibitions of one side on the territory of the other.

The agreement stipulates that the chambers of commerce and industry of both countries will facilitate, within their competence, the exchange of business delegations, as well as delegations of technical specialists.

Soviet-Cypriot trade is characterised by dynamic growth. It grew in value terms from 1 million rubles in 1960 to 9.3 million rubles. in: 1970 In 1974 it amounted to 19.8 million rubles, in 1977—26.8 million rubles, and in 1980 it almost doubled, amounting to 42.6 million rubles. The Soviet Union supplies Cyprus with machinery, equipment, metal-cutting machines, automobiles, petroleum products, rolled ferrous metals,

sheet glass, cotton fabrics, condensed milk, tea, cameras, televisions and other goods. In turn, Soviet foreign trade organisations buy copper concentrate, raw hides, cognac alcohol, vintage wines, fruit juices, industrial goods, including leather shoes, and much more in Cyprus.

The supply of Soviet machinery and equipment contributes to the restoration and development of the Cypriot economy. Thus, the equipment for the production of cement, supplied by the Soviet foreign trade association "Techmashexport" to the firm "Vasiliko Cement", is being used productively. The same Soviet organisation and Hellenic Mining K O signed a long-term contract for the supply of equipment for a sulfuric acid plant. The Soviet Union is the main supplier to Cyprus of fuel oil used for power generation. There are favorable prospects for the further development of Soviet-Cypriot cooperation in the implementation of irrigation work in Cyprus.

On the whole, constructive cooperation, mutual understanding and mutual interest are inherent in Soviet-Cypriot ties. Their successful development on a mutually beneficial and equal basis contributes to the strengthening of the republic's authority in the international arena, the restoration of its economic potential, and provides employment for the country's population.

In addition to trade and economic relations, Soviet-Cypriot relations are also developing successfully in other areas. In February 1978, a delegation from the Ministry of Civil Aviation GCCP and the Ministry of Communications and...—the signing of an agreement on air traffic between the USSR and the Republic of Cyprus. At a press conference held at the Soviet

Cultural Center in Nicosia in connection with this date, it was noted that cooperation between the two countries in the field of air transportation is developing successfully. This, in particular, is evidenced by the fact that in recent years air traffic between the USSR and Cyprus has increased approximately 4-5 times compared to the level of 1973 [15.IV.1979].

With the opening of an international airport in Larnaca, Aeroflot became the first foreign airline to start flights to Cyprus after the 1974 events.

A serious step towards strengthening friendly ties between the two countries was the signing in Nicosia in 1972 of an agreement on cooperation in the fields of science, education and culture, which served as a legal basis for further intensifying cultural exchange between the Soviet Union and Cyprus. The agreement indicated that the contracting parties will periodically develop an exchange program, which should reflect specific cooperation activities, the conditions for their implementation and financial provisions.

The first such program for a period of two years was signed in Moscow in March 1974. It provided for exchange events in the fields of science, education, culture and art, television and radio, sports and tourism. The implementation of this program, however, was interrupted by the July 1974 events. A new revival in cultural contacts began only by the beginning of 1975 with the holding of a festival of Soviet films.

In August 1978, the third two-year program of cultural and scientific cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Republic of Cyprus was signed in Moscow. The program provides for the further development of cultural and scientific ties between the two countries. It

is based on the principles of the All-European Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The program provides for the organisation of scientific exchanges between a number of institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences and relevant scientific institutions of Cyprus, educational activities, in particular the study of the Russian language in Cyprus and Greek in the USSR, expansion of contacts in the field of culture, art, cinema, television, sports, tourism.

During the signing of the program, the parties expressed satisfaction with the existing cultural and scientific cooperation between the USSR and Cyprus, which contributes to the growth of mutual understanding between peoples. After the signing of the document, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, N. P. Firyubin stated that the implementation of the planned measures will certainly serve to strengthen friendship and cooperation between peoples, will contribute to strengthening peace throughout the world.

In turn, the Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus G Palagias, who signed the program from the Cypriot side, noted that the Cypriot people appreciate the help and support that the Soviet Union has been providing for a long time to a small country fighting against internal and external reaction. Palagias stressed that the exchange of scientific and cultural values, of course, will not only enrich the peoples, "E: O will also be an excellent basis for the further development of friendly ties between the USSR and Cyprus in all areas.

In recent years, cultural exchange between the two countries has significantly intensified. In Cyprus, exhibitions of Soviet books, painting, applied art,

stamps, gramophone records were held. Exhibited in Nicosia, Limassol and Larnaca, they attracted the attention of the widest sections of the population, became notable events in the cultural life of the island. Film festivals are systematically held, introducing Cypriots to the novelties of the Soviet screen, meetings of Cypriot spectators with Soviet art workers. Frequent guests in Cyprus were Soviet scientists, public figures, journalists who delivered lectures on various aspects of the life of the Soviet people. Ensembles and ballet companies from the USSR come to Cyprus; amateur art groups. In turn, the Soviet people applauded the art of the artists of Cyprus more than once.

Literary and art magazines of the republics of the USSR regularly publish translations of Cypriot poetry and prose, essays and stories by Soviet journalists, on ... The television and radio of the USSR includes in its programs documentaries and special programs about the ancient history, literature and art of Cyprus, about its present day, the problems facing the country, concerts of national music are broadcast. In 1979, a program about the original folk art of Cypriots was shown with great success on Soviet television in the international program "Rainbow".

Public, trade union, women's, youth, sports and tourism organisations make a significant contribution to the development of relations between the two countries. The intergovernmental agreement between the USSR and Cyprus on cooperation in the field of tourism, signed in Moscow in June 1976, served to further strengthen and develop Soviet-Cypriot ties.

In June 1977, a delegation of the heads of the sports organisations of Cyprus was in Moscow. During the visit, an agreement on sports cooperation was signed,

according to which the exchange of sports delegations, coaches, judges, scientists and specialists in the field of sports is provided. In 1980, Cypriot athletes took part in the Summer Games of the Moscow Olympics.

The activities of friendship societies make a great contribution to the development of friendly ties. Both societies celebrate anniversaries and memorable dates in the life of the two countries, organize exhibitions, demonstrations of feature and documentary films, evenings dedicated to the literature and art of friendly peoples. The societies exchange delegations, organize mutual trips of scientists and cultural workers. In recent years, with the assistance of the USSR-Cyprus Society, Soviet publishing houses have published a number of books by prominent Soviet specialists on the history, economics, culture and art of Cyprus.

At the regular meeting of the Board of the "USSR-Cyprus" society held in February 1979, where the results of the work of 1978 were summed up and a plan of cooperation for 1979-1980 was discussed, the president of the society, full member of the Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR, the famous Soviet paediatrician M. Studenikin, in particular, noted: "We are pleased with the relationship that we have developed with the Cypriot-Soviet friendship society. Every year the forms of our cooperation are becoming more interesting and diverse. Last year, prominent Cypriot statesmen and public figures visited us; we accepted 10 young Cypriot scholarship holders to study in the Soviet Union. Evenings dedicated to one or another significant date in the life of Cyprus, cultural events on the island have become traditional."

In 1978, a new Soviet cultural center was inaugurated in Nicosia, which made it possible for all

Cypriots interested in the Soviet country to be constantly aware of the events taking place in the USSR, its latest achievements in all areas.

One of the striking examples of Soviet-Cypriot cooperation, the concrete assistance and support that the Soviet Union provides to Cyprus is the training of highly qualified specialists to work in various sectors of the republic's economy. Cypriots study at the Patrice Lumumba University, a unique educational institution of its kind, where students from many developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, as well as in other higher and secondary specialized educational institutions of the Soviet Union, study.

A high level has been achieved in relations between the USSR and Cyprus. They have something valuable that can characterise true friendship: sincerity, mutual understanding, trust and readiness for genuine cooperation in the interests of peace and international security in accordance with the principles developed at the All-European Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Firmly and consistently guided by the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence, the Soviet Union will continue to support the just cause of the Cypriots, expand and strengthen economic, scientific, technical and cultural ties with the Republic of Cyprus on a long-term, sustainable and mutually beneficial basis.

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Vladimir Alexandrovich Shmarov

CYPRUS IN NATO's MEDITERRANEAN POLICY

Approved for publication by the Institute of Oriental Studies of
the USSR Academy of Sciences

Editor T. K. Garushyants. Junior Editor N. N. Komarova.
Artist N. P. Larsky, Artistic Editor E. L. Erman. Technical Editor H.
S. Teplyakova. Proofreader L. M. Kaltsina

IB No. 14441

The print is high. Circulation 2000 copies. set 19.03.82. Signed
for printing 10.09.82. A-10868. Typographic number 2. Format 84X
1081 Literary typeface. l. 13.02. CONV. cr.-Ott. 13.12. Uch.-nzd.
l. 13.6. Ed. No. 5088. Order. No. 193. Price 2 rubles.

The main editorial office of oriental literature of the Nauka
Publishing House

Moscow K-45, Zhdanova st., 12/1
3rd Printing House of the Nauka Publishing House. Moscow B-
143, Open highway, 28